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Rollovers are among the most serious crashes of cargo tank motor vehicles carrying hazardous 
materials.  They are more likely to be fatal to the driver of the vehicle than other crashes, and 
they can cause spills and necessitate highway closures.  The Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) has identified the need to study cargo tanks, from design through 
operation, to improve their roll stability. 
 
The objective of this program was to evaluate four complementary approaches to reducing the 
incidence of cargo tank truck rollovers:  improving the training of drivers, deploying electronic 
stability aids, implementing new vehicle designs, and learning lessons from highway designs.  
The benefits, in terms of reduced numbers of rollover crashes, that could accrue from each 
approach, have been estimated, along with the costs of achieving those benefits.  All four 
approaches are expected to be cost beneficial.   
 
Ultimate responsibility for the safety of the vehicle rests with the driver.  The driver must be 
aware of the situations that can lead to rollover and have the skills and vigilance to prevent those 
situations from developing.  Drowsiness and inattention together contribute to 1 in 5 cargo tank 
rollovers, so adherence to viable and legal schedules of work and rest is essential.  Modern, 
motion-base simulators can help new drivers acquire skills more quickly and without consuming 
fuel, so simulators can pay for themselves through reduced training costs alone, for those carriers 
large enough to afford them.  Electronic stability aids automatically slow a vehicle when it starts 
to round a corner too fast.  Excessive cornering speed accounts for about 1 in 5 cargo tank 
rollovers, and these devices can be quite effective in what they do while adding only marginally 
to the cost of a tractor or trailer.  Vehicles with more stable designs are available on the market 
today.  Lowering the trailer’s center of gravity by only three inches can reduce rollover incidence 
by more than 10 percent.  However, these trailers have been slow to gain market share because 
they have a cost premium and their benefit is not widely appreciated.  Improvements in highway 




Statisticians examined four crash databases to identify the conditions and circumstances that are 
present when cargo tank motor vehicles roll over.  The databases were  
 
• Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS),  
• Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS),  
• Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA), and  
• General Estimates System (GES).   
 
The data from MCMIS was a subset of hazardous materials that was enhanced with additional 
information during a previous study for the FMCSA.  The final LTCCS data set was not 
available at the time of this task, so a draft data set was used.  TIFA, of course, is limited to fatal 
accidents, and rollovers were well represented in the data.  GES was the only one of the four 
databases not specifically limited to large trucks.  Agreement between the databases was quite 
good for the most part.  Exact agreement between the databases was not expected because they 
are distinct databases with their own reporting procedures. 
 
The focus of the search was crashes of a cargo tank truck transporting a hazardous material 
where there was a rollover.  In some cases, rollover crashes were analyzed alongside all crashes 
so that the characteristics of the two could be compared.  Both single-unit trucks and 
combination-unit trucks were studied in the statistical analysis, though the remainder of the 
project focused on trailers or combination vehicles.  The study included crashes where an 
untripped rollover was the primary event as well as crashes where a rollover was a secondary 
event following another event.  The queries of TIFA and LTCCS sorted the cargo tank body 
type, but they were not limited to hazardous materials. 
 
Table ES-1 indicates the configurations of cargo tank vehicles in rollover crashes in the three 
large databases.  Approximately 60 percent of the rollovers were tractor-semitrailer 
combinations.  Combinations were a slightly higher fraction of the fatal crashes (i.e. in the TIFA 
database).  Table ES-1 is a combination of Tables 2-12, 2-13, and 2-14 of the main text. 
 
Table ES - 1 Most of the Cargo Tank Vehicles that Roll Over are Tractor-semitrailer Combinations 
Vehicle Configuration 






















Straight Truck,  
One Trailer 
15 5.2% 0.2%
Other or Unknown 5 1.7% 0.7% 0 0%
Total 291 100.0% 100.0% 482 100%
(The MCMIS and GES numbers are for one-year periods.  The TIFA totals are for six years.) 
 
The data confirmed many expectations, but a few of the factors were not as strong as might  
have been expected.  The portion of rollovers that occur on freeways (approximately 15 to  
20 percent), though substantial, is not the largest share.  Only about 7 percent of cargo tank 
rollovers occur on entrance or exit ramps.  A driver error of one kind or another (e.g., decision or 
performance error) figures in about 3/4 of cargo tank rollovers.  Inattention and distraction 
account for about 15 percent.  Evasive maneuvers were a factor in 5 to 10 percent of rollovers.  
Pavement is dry in 85 to 90 percent of rollovers.   
 
Tables ES-2 and ES-3 summarize the most important information about where rollovers occur 
and the circumstances surrounding them.  Table ES-1 indicates the locations of cargo tank 
rollovers.  The numbers come from the MCMIS database, summarizing the data in Tables 2-38 
and A-34. 
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Table ES - 2 Most Rollovers Occur on Undivided Highways 
Location of Accident 
Total 
Rollovers 
Percent of All 
Rollovers 
Close to Interchange 11 4.6% 
Not at Interchange 45 19.0% 
On or Off Ramp 17 7.2% 
Total Divided Highway 74 31.2% 
Close to Intersection 82 34.6% 
Not at Intersection 81 34.2% 
Not on Roadway 0 0% 
Railroad Grade Crossing 0 0% 
Total Undivided Highway 163 68.8% 
 Total 237 100.0% 
 
Table ES-3 is a summary of Table 2-8 in the main text.  It is taken from GES.  Roadway 
departures accompany more than half of all cargo tank rollovers.  Separate studies on roadway 
departures have implicated drowsiness, inattention, and speed as causes for roadway departures 
of heavy vehicles. 
 
The annual number of cargo tank rollovers nationwide, averaged from the GES data over the 
years studied, is 1,265. The report itself and the appendixes contain complete tables and more 
fully nuanced interpretation.   
 
Table ES - 3  Rollovers Occur on their Own or Along  
with Another Kind of Crash 





Untripped rollover 65 5.1% 
SVRD  
  with untripped rollover 
113 8.9% 
SVRD  
  with tripped rollover 
599 47.4% 
Lane Change Merge 5 0.4% 
Rear End 12 0.9% 
Other 471 37.2% 
Total 1265 100% 
SVRD means “Single Vehicle Roadway Departure.” 
This kind of crash is also called “run off road.” 
An “untripped” rollover results from rounding a corner too fast. 
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Driver Training 
 
Modern motion-base simulators can deliver better training for some tasks than actual driving 
because of their ability to simulate dangerous situations without actually posing a danger.  The 
disadvantage of simulators is that they are quite expensive, and there is no demonstrated business 
model for incorporating them in training for drivers of smaller carriers.   
 
The tasks required to safely operate a tanker are essentially the same as those to operate another 
heavy vehicle, but they must be mastered to a greater proficiency.  Several medium and large 
carriers, who are early adopters, are currently using fixed-base and motion-base simulators to 
train new drivers the skills, including rollover prevention skills, for driving tractors hauling dry 
freight.  Their experience has been that training that includes simulator time is both faster and 
more thorough than conventional training.  An initial step to improving the training for cargo 
tank drivers would be to provide simulator training for tank drivers.  Existing simulators can vary 
the properties of the trailer, so the next step would be to tailor the dynamics of the simulators to 
model various cargo tanks.  This should include at least the center of gravity height and roll 
inertia of tanks, but input from experienced tank trainers would be needed to ensure that enough 
effects were captured to produce proper fidelity. 
 
Because the crash statistics disproved some common assumptions about the causes of rollovers, 
it is important to tell drivers what the true causes are.  Certainly drivers of top-heavy cargo tank 
vehicles need to appreciate the consequences of taking a freeway ramp too fast, but they need to 
realize that running off the road due to inattention is a leading cause of serious crashes as well.  
Dispatchers and drivers alike need to understand the benefits of good communication, proper 
route selection, and practical scheduling.   
 
Electronic Stability Aids 
 
Technologies to help the driver maintain stable control of the vehicle have been on the North 
American market for about five years.  They have gained such wide acceptance that they are now 
standard on some models.  Conceptually, these technologies slow the vehicle when the vehicle is 
in danger of rolling over due to excess speed.  Roll stability aids are incorporated into the 
existing braking equipment on heavy vehicles, so their costs are low.  They add several hundred 
to a thousand dollars to the price of a tractor or trailer and require only minimal additional 
training of drivers or mechanics.   
 
These systems can be quite effective, but marketing literature is correct when it points out that 
the devices cannot prevent all rollovers.  Both computer simulations and test track maneuvers 
have shown that some situations develop so suddenly that even the automatic braking cannot 
prevent a rollover.  More importantly, crash statistics are clear that excessive speed is a factor in 
only about half of all rollovers.  When a rollover results from a vehicle drifting off the road, 
these aids are not useful.  Electronic stability aids are certainly an important part of an overall 
rollover prevention program, but they are only a part. 
 
Stability aids can track the time and location of events when they are activated.  This information 
can be useful for the continuing education of drivers, alerting them to instances where they 
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approached a rollover condition but did not roll over.  Some carriers are already incorporating 
the information in a formal feedback program. 
 
Roll stability aids that are mounted on tractors can be combined with additional features that 
provide yaw (steering) stability as well.  The most important benefit of these fuller stability 
systems is that they can prevent a tractor from oversteering, which is a jackknife.  The yaw 
stability aids can be effective in any conditions, but their greatest benefit is when the road 
surface is slippery, due to water or snow.  On the other hand, the kinds of rollover where the 
electronic stability aids are effective, i.e., driving too fast in a curve, are most likely to occur 
when pavement is dry and friction is good.  Because the topic of this study was rollovers, it 
concentrated on the function and benefits of only the roll stability aids and not the yaw stability 
function. 
 
Cargo Tank Design 
 
The three other approaches evaluated in this program can be quite effective in eliminating 
rollovers in a variety of situations, but the only way to address rollovers from all scenarios is 
through improvements in the stability of the vehicle itself.  Some cargo tank trailer 
manufacturers already offer products with a slightly lowered center of gravity for a small 
premium in cost.  The economic analysis in this study has shown that such improvements are 
cost beneficial.   
 
Substantial reductions in the height of a tank have been studied by some manufacturers.  One 
carrier of cryogenic liquids has decided to adopt a new trailer design that is more stable than its 
previous trailers.  In another case, a manufacturer began a project to substantially lower the tanks 
in its DOT 406 trailers.  Not only was the height of existing load racks an impediment to the 
lowered fittings, but the amount that drivers would have to bend over to make the connections 
was another practical obstacle that would not be easily overcome.  This example illustrates 
perhaps the largest reason that improved vehicle designs have not to date appeared to improve 
roll stability:  the tremendous segmentation of the cargo tank vehicle market.  DOT 406 trailers 
represent a large, somewhat uniform market, but the diversity of other cargoes and the requisite 
vehicle configurations means that each vehicle model is its own design problem with an 
associated capital cost.   
 
The legal restriction posing the greatest impediment to improved vehicle stability is the 
requirement that trailers be at most 96 inches wide off arterials.  New van trailers are almost 
exclusively 102 inches wide, and some cargo tank trailers are wider as well.  To be sure, carriers 
who deliver to service stations in tight urban areas cannot use wider trailers, but many can, and 
permitting others to do so would increase vehicle stability at very little cost in capital expense or 
weight.   
 
Table ES-4 summarizes the analysis of the proposed improvements to cargo tank vehicle design.  
It lists a “nominal” case, which is a typical modern DOT 406 trailer.  Three proposed 
improvements, a modest and an aggressive lowering of the center of gravity and a widening of 
the axles, are listed below the nominal case.  The first two columns list the features that identify 
the design modifications.  The next column is the expected reduction in the number of rollovers, 
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which was estimated through computer simulation and comparison to historical crash statistics as 
outlined in Section 5.4 of the main text.  The final column is the estimated cost premium for each 
improvement, which was provided by manufacturers. 
 
Table ES - 4  Characteristics of the Nominal and Three Improved Semitrailer Designs 
Height of the Loaded 












Nominal 78.9 96 -- -- 
Lower CG 75.9 (nominal - 3) 96 12% $1500 to $4000 
78.9 102  (nominal + 6) 17% $150 to $800 Wider Track 
Aggressive 




The analysis of rollover improvements through infrastructure was limited to a few locations 
where a relatively high incidence of rollover was observed and geometric information could be 
obtained.  A high incidence of rollovers in Wyoming was observed at locations that are subject 
to high winds or where mountainous terrain made steep grades and sharp curves unavoidable.  
The Wyoming Department of Transportation is addressing the rollovers by providing 
information to truckers through various means, including new Intelligent Transportation System 
(ITS) technologies.  The treatments are expected to be cost beneficial.  The benefit-cost analysis 
cannot be compared to the others from this project because the mitigation efforts are specific to 




The benefit-cost analysis was performed from the societal viewpoint.  Separate analyses were 
conducted for potential reductions in cargo tank rollovers arising from improved driver training, 
electronic stability aids, and vehicle design.  Highway design, with each location being a 
separate situation, was not analyzed.  The analyses were conducted in a parallel fashion and, to 
the extent possible, under a common set of assumptions.  Net discounted costs and benefits were 
computed over a 20-year time frame.  Under the assumptions in the analysis, all of the proposed 
approaches to reducing rollovers, except one, were cost beneficial.  The substantial reduction in 
the height of a semitrailer, though expected to prevent a number of rollovers, fell short of being 
economical, due to its high cost.  The modest reduction in the height of semitrailers was 
economical. 
 
Table ES-5 lists the estimated net benefits and the benefit-cost ratio for the electronic stability 
aids and the three improvements in vehicle design.  The net benefits are the total estimated costs 
over the 20-year time frame, minus the total estimated costs.  Even though widening the track 
has a higher benefit-cost ratio than the electronic stability aids, it has lower net benefits.  This is 
because the analysis applied electronic stability aids to all cargo tank semitrailers carrying a 
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hazardous material but the vehicle design improvements were applied only to some DOT 406 
semitrailers.  An advantage of the electronic stability aids is that they can be applied with only 
modest engineering effort to any vehicle, whereas the vehicle design improvements require a 
separate engineering analysis for every different trailer.  Driver training and highway design are 
not listed in this table because they were treated differently.  Table ES-5 is a summary of  
Table 7-21 of the main text. 
 






Ratio  Approach 
Electronic Stability Aids Cargo tank HM $51 2.2 
Tanker Design    
Lower CG DOT 406 $21 1.7 
Wider Track DOT 406 $35 18.9 




The prime contractor for this work was Battelle.  Subcontractors were The University of 
Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMTRI) and General Dynamics Information 
Technology.   
 
Battelle had primary responsibility for the project, including integrating the work of the 
subcontractors.  Battelle was responsible for the benefit-cost analysis, the assessment of 
electronic stability aids, and the majority of the work on crash statistics.  Battelle contributed to 
the driver safety work and the benefits assessment of the vehicle designs.  UMTRI had primary 
responsibility for the vehicle design and highway design portions of the project, and made 
substantial contributions to the crash statistics work.  General Dynamics Information Technology 
had primary responsibility for the driver training review. 
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In investigating ways to improve the rollover stability of cargo tanks, the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA) identified the need to study cargo tanks from their design 
through their operation. 
 
Rollovers occur in more than two-thirds of the serious single-vehicle crashes of cargo tank motor 
vehicles.  Cargo tank trucks account for only 15 percent of all fatal crashes involving heavy 
trucks, yet cargo tank rollovers account for 31 percent of the heavy vehicle rollover fatal crashes.  
Improving the rollover performance of cargo tank motor vehicles offers significant benefits to 
society in terms of lives saved, environmental damage avoided, and improved traffic flow. 
 
The purpose of this research was to identify and evaluate four broad approaches to decreasing 
the number of cargo tank rollovers.  They are 
 
• Driver training.  Some carriers have experienced significant improvement in the safety of 
new drivers through improved training, including simulators.  The potential benefits in 
rollover prevention are discussed. 
• Electronic stability aids.  Devices that automatically apply the truck’s brakes when a 
rollover is imminent can prevent rollovers that occur due to certain kinds of driver errors. 
• Improvements in design of the vehicle itself.  By improving the basic stability of the 
vehicle, rollovers arising from potentially any cause can be avoided. 
• Improvements in highway design.  The experience of a state department of transportation 
in handling locations known to have high rollover incidence is discussed. 
 
This report presents the results of a research program that has identified specific improvements 
to be made within each of the four broad areas and evaluated their potential economic benefits to 
society.  The four approaches are discussed separately, and their economic benefits are evaluated 
side by side. 
 
FMCSA anticipates that solutions may come from regulations, outreach, operational changes, 
and deployment of technology.  The study has identified some of the obstacles to implementing 
solutions, but actually developing plans or business cases is beyond the scope of this project. 
 
To the extent possible, the scope for the discussion in this report was cargo tank motor vehicles 
carrying a hazardous material.  In the cases of driver training and electronic stability aids, the 
economic benefits calculation included only cargo tank combination vehicles carrying a 
hazardous material, to be parallel with the other analyses, but this was done with the realization 
that the principles apply to other trucks as well.  The vehicle design discussion generally applies 
to all cargo tanks, but the economic analysis concentrated on petroleum semitrailers (DOT 406), 
which is the largest uniform segment of the market.  Any improvements to the infrastructure 
benefit all vehicles.  Table 1-1 summarizes the scope for each analysis.
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Table 1 - 1  The Discussion in this Report Focused on Cargo Tank Vehicles Carrying a Hazardous Material.  
This Table Shows the Scope of the Quantitative Analysis. 
Section Vehicles Included in the Analysis 
2  Crash Statistics Primarily cargo tanks.  See Table 2-1. 
Cargo tank semitrailers carrying a hazardous material (specifically, the 
excess of crashes experienced by drivers under age 35) 3  Driver Training 
Cargo tank semitrailers carrying a hazardous material (further limited to 
rollovers due to cornering at an excessive speed) 4  Electronic Stability Aids 
5  Vehicle Design DOT 406 semitrailers 
6  Highway Design All heavy vehicles 
 
A heavy truck rolls over when the sideways forces are too great.  The vertical forces on the  
tires tend to resist the rolling over.  The lateral (sideways) force on the center can come from a 
high-speed curve or from gravity if one side of the truck has dropped off the pavement.  The 
lateral forces on the tires can come from cornering at to high a speed.  If a truck rolls over for 
this reason, the crash is called an “untripped” rollover.  Or, the lateral forces on the tire can come 
from striking a curb or another fixed object.  Rollovers that result from striking a fixed object or 
uneven ground are said to be “tripped.”  The arrows in Figure 1-1 illustrate the force pulling on 
the center of gravity and the tire forces.  The propensity of a vehicle to roll over depends on the 
height of its center of gravity, its track width (the left-to-right distance between the tires), and  
the lateral force on the tractor, which ordinarily comes from cornering.  In its simplest form, the 
rollover threshold is the ratio of the half track width to the height of the center of gravity.   
The actual threshold is lower than this theoretical maximum because of a number of other 
factors, many of which are related to the suspension.  Notably, when the trailer begins to lean, 
the tires on the lower side compress, allowing the trailer to lean even more.  This process is 
revisited in Section 5.1 of this report.  The roll stability of heavy vehicles is discussed quite 
thoroughly in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of Winkler et al. [2000]. 
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Figure 1 - 1 Roll Plane Forces Acting on a Tank Trailer 
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2.0 Crash Statistics 
2.1 Introduction 
By identifying the conditions and circumstances most commonly present when a heavy vehicle 
rolls over, crash statistics provide guidance on what kinds of treatments are likely to be 
beneficial.  The statistics in this section form part of the basis of the benefit-cost analysis in 
Section 7. 
 
This section contains tables with the most prominent findings and accompanying discussion.  
The appendices have many more tables, with more numerical details. 
2.1.1 Databases 
 
Four crash databases were searched for this analysis:  
 
• Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS),  
• Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS),  
• Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) and the  
• General Estimates System (GES).   
 
The MCMIS data analyzed consist of data that were sampled, enhanced, and analyzed for the 
second phase of FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Serious Crash Analysis (HMSCA) project 
[Battelle, 2005].  The MCMIS data referenced in this report represent a further analysis of the 
data from that study. 
 
The national traffic safety databases all contain descriptive data primarily collected from police 
accident reports.  FMCSA’s MCMIS includes a limited amount of descriptive data on all trucks 
and buses involved in serious accidents and are submitted to FMCSA by the States.  The LTCCS 
was a two-year study involving field investigations promptly after crashes occurred.  It 
supplements the ongoing safety databases but includes more emphasis on pre-crash factors.  
NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), which was not used directly in this 
study, includes descriptive data on vehicles, drivers, roadways, and environmental conditions.  
The TIFA database from UMTRI supplements FARS data with additional data from interviews 
with involved parties.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) GES is a 
nationally representative sample of all police-reported fatal, injury, and property-damage-only 
crashes.  
 
Summary information about how the four databases were queried for this project is provided in 
Table 2-1.  The number of records of data describing individual crashes available in each of the 
databases is provided in the second column.  These are important numbers to consider when 
contemplating the uncertainty associated with percentages calculated based on these data.  Two 
sets of data from LTCCS were analyzed in this study.  The first set consisted of all rollovers of 
all cargo body type trucks; the second, of tank cargo body type only.  The analysis of all cargo 
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body type rollover factors was performed because the number of tank cargo body type rollovers 
was so small (89). 
 






Crash Type Subsetting for this Analysis Database 
MCMIS 1,261  2002 Serious Crashes 
The serious incident study [Battelle, 2005] was 
limited to crashes with hazardous materials.  
Data reported below are further limited to cargo 
tank crashes.  Rollovers are reported separately 















89 Cargo Tank body type (rollovers are reported separately in most tables.) 
TIFA 1,837 1999-2003 
Fatal 
Crashes 
Cargo tanks (vans are reported in some tables; 
rollovers are reported separately in most tables.) 




Cargo tanks that rolled over.  (Tables show 
percentages for all cargo tank rollovers, whether 
hazmat or not.  Hazmats are discussed 
specifically following Table 2-8.) 
 
A motor vehicle rollover can be “tripped” or “untripped.”  In a tripped rollover, a fixed object 
helped start the roll by imparting a roll moment to the vehicle.  The vehicle may have struck a 
curb or rolled down an embankment.  An untripped rollover occurs when a vehicle rolls over on 
reasonably smooth pavement without striking an object.  The reason for untripped rollovers is 
often, but not always, taking a curve too fast.  The focus of this project is all cargo tank rollovers, 
both tripped or untripped.  The goal is to reduce the number of rollovers that occur for any 
reason.  Some countermeasures, notably those that automatically apply the brakes as a truck 
enters a curve too fast, are expected to have a greater influence on the untripped variety.  
Approximately 10 to 15 percent of cargo tank rollovers are untripped (Tables 2-8, A-8, and A-9).   
2.1.1.1 MCMIS Database:  The Hazardous Materials Serious Crash Analysis Database 
This database uses 2002 data from the MCMIS that was sampled, enhanced and analyzed for the 
second phase of FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Serious Crash Analysis, project [Battelle, 2005].  
(All MCMIS data analyzed for this report were first sorted for that project.  All references to 
MCMIS data in this report pertain to data that were queried and weighted for that project, 
according to the process described below.)  MCMIS includes only serious crashes, defined as 
those that result in:  a fatality, an injury requiring transport to a facility for immediate medical 
attention, or at least one vehicle towed from the scene as a result of vehicle-disabling crash 
damages.   
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• Of the approximately 105,000 serious crashes reported in MCMIS for 2002, identified 
approximately 2,100 MCMIS crash records involving hazardous materials and initially 
sampled 1,000 crashes for analysis and supplemental data collection to add to a 
HAZMAT Accident Database.  
 
• Added an additional 260 crashes to the sample to compensate for the non-HM crashes 
discovered among the 1,000 originally selected.  This brought the number of HM 
vehicles to be analyzed back up to nearly 1,000 cases.  For the 1,260 selected crashes, the 
fields unique to the HAZMAT Accidents Database were populated for all the vehicles 
that were carrying hazmat.  Data were entered for 966 hazmat crashes that involved 970 
hazmat vehicles.  Since some of these vehicles carried multiple types of hazardous 
material, over 1,000 hazardous material records were associated with these 970 vehicles. 
 
• Identified approximately 100 crashes that were also reported to the Hazardous Materials 
Information System (HMIS) database maintained by the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and electronically transferred the data into the 
HAZMAT Accidents Database.  
 
• Validated and supplemented the data for the 966 crashes by using information on Police 
Accident Reports and by corresponding with the involved carriers using telephone calls, 
faxes, and e-mails. 
 
Bias was introduced to the sample by intentional oversampling, and it was removed by weighting 
factors.  The most frequent hazardous material crashes involved Classes 2, 3, 8, and 9.  While the 
goal was to develop more detail for 1,000 crashes, there was also a desire to obtain as much 
information as possible for crashes involving shipments of the less-commonly shipped materials 
in Classes 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7.  Therefore, all the crashes in 2002 associated with these rarer classes 
were included in the sample.  The decision was also made to include all crashes for which 
complementary records could be identified in the HMIS database.  The distribution of crashes by 
hazard class will over-represent the rare classes and under-represent the more-commonly shipped 
classes.  To remove this bias, weighting factors were used for each class of hazardous material 
based on the initial assignment of classes from the MCMIS crash file.  The weighting factors that 
were developed are shown in Table 2-2.   
 
To estimate the number of serious crashes involving cargo tanks for this report, the HAZMAT 
Accident Database was queried to identify all crashes involving cargo tanks.  These crashes were 
then weighted using the factors shown in Table 2-2.  This resulted in an estimate of 1,261 annual 
serious cargo tank crashes.  Of these crashes, 291 or about 23 percent resulted in rollovers.   
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Table 2 - 2 Weighting Factors Used to Remove the Sampling Bias  
from the MCMIS Analysis 
















For this analysis, the Battelle team examined a number of factors related to rollover in order to 
identify insights into the causes of crashes where a rollover occurs.  The tank truck categories 
carrying hazmat examined in the analysis include straight trucks and semitrailers. 
2.1.1.2 Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) Database 
The FMCSA and NHTSA established a team to study a set of large truck crashes immediately 
after they occurred.  The LTCCS identifies factors that contributed to truck crashes.  Large 
amounts of data were collected by a special team from post-crash field inspections of crash 
vehicles and interviews with drivers.  Data were also developed from interviews with key 
participants and investigations by police.  The LTCCS collected data on crashes that occurred 
within 24 pre-defined areas in 17 States. 
 
A representative sample of large-truck crashes was investigated during 2001 to 2003.  Each crash 
involved at least one fatality or injury.  The sample included 967 crashes, which included 1,127 
large trucks and 959 non-truck motor vehicles.  For this Rollover Project, the team used an early 
draft database because the final database was not available for general research use in May 2006. 
The draft includes 1,241 large trucks (All Trucks) and of these, 89 are cargo tank vehicles (Cargo 
Tank Only). 
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2.1.1.3 TIFA 
The TIFA crash data file is produced by the Center for National Truck and Bus Statistics at 
UMTRI.  The TIFA file is a survey of all medium and heavy trucks (gross vehicle weight rating, 
or GVWR > 10,000 lbs) involved in a fatal crash in the United States.  Candidate truck cases are 
extracted from the NHTSA FARS file, which is a census of all traffic accidents involving a 
fatality in the United States.  To collect data for the TIFA survey, police accident reports are 
acquired for each crash, and UMTRI researchers contact drivers, owners, operators, and other 
knowledgeable parties about each truck.  The TIFA survey collects a detailed description of each 
truck involved, as well as data on the truck operator and a variable on the truck’s role in the 
crash.  Survey data include the physical configuration of the truck, such as the GVWR, weights 
and lengths of each unit, cargo body style, type of cargo (including hazardous materials), and 
cargo spillage.  Motor carrier data include carrier type (private or for-hire) and area of operation 
(interstate or intrastate).  The analysis file constructed from this data includes all variables from 
the FARS file, which captures the crash environment and all other vehicles and persons involved 
in the crash. 
 
The TIFA survey project has operated continuously since 1980.  The most recent year completed 
is 2003.  TIFA is a sample file (approximately a 60 percent sample) for the years 1987-1992 and 
1994-1998.  For all other years, the file provides a census of trucks involved in a fatal crash.  
This analysis uses five years of TIFA data from 1999-2003.  For this period there are records for 
25,704 trucks of all configurations in the file.  These data were filtered to include all trucks that 
had a tank cargo body and one of following configurations:  (1) straight truck with no trailer 
(referred to as “straight truck” in this analysis), or (2) tractor-semitrailer.  There were 1,837 
(Cargo Tanks) trucks that met these criteria.   
 
For comparison, a different filter was also applied to find trucks with a cargo van body and with 
the same two configurations described above.  This yielded 10,396 straight or tractor-semitrailers 
with a van cargo body (Van). 
 
The data from the TIFA database are presented alongside the tables from the other databases in 
the main text and in Appendix A.  Appendix B contains additional data from TIFA, and 
Appendix C presents a model based on the TIFA data. 
2.1.1.4 GES 
The National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES) obtains its 
data from a nationally representative probability sample of police-reported crashes.  Police 
accident reports include crashes resulting in fatalities, injuries, or major property damage, but 
may exclude some crashes in which no significant personal injury and only minor property 
damage occurred.  Neighbor [2001] contains a detailed description of the GES data, including 
sampling design, relevant variable information, and database acquisition.   
 
The two other national databases, MCMIS and TIFA, are intended to be a census, that is, they 
include every appropriate crash that occurred.  GES, on the other hand, is a sample, with a small 
but representative number of crashes included.  Because GES is a sample and not a census, a 
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more sophisticated statistical analysis is required to estimate the numbers of crashes.  
Specifically GES is a clustered, multi-stage probability sample, so both sample weights and 
sample design must be considered to construct population estimates and understand the 
uncertainty associated with these estimates.  SUDAAN [RTI, 2001] was used to construct the 
estimates and associated confidence limits.  SUDAAN is commercially available software for the 
statistical analysis of sample survey data from stratified, multi-stage cluster samples.  It uses a 
Taylor series linearization approximation to account for the inherent clustering or relationships 
present in data collected through a complex survey.  For functions of linear statistics including 
means, proportions, etc. that can be estimated from the sample, variances of sample estimate are 
derived by creating a linearized variable that is defined by the Taylor series expansion of the 
function (typically only first-order terms are used), and then this variable is substituted into the 
appropriate variance formula for the specified design.  Variance estimates for nonlinear statistics 
are estimated using first-order Taylor series approximations of the deviations of estimates from 
their expected values. 
 
GES data from the years 1999 to 2004 were initially considered for this analysis.  Prior to 1999 
GES used different coding schemes for many of the variables that describe the circumstances of 
the crash.  GES often updates the data for the most recent year; therefore, the 2004 data may not 
be complete and final [USDOT, 2004].  The data selected for this analysis include all large (> 
10,000 lbs GVW) tank trucks involved in crashes in which the truck rolls over.  Table 2-3 shows 
the criteria used to select the data from GES.  Each column indicates a GES variable used to 
select the rollover crashes for analysis; the entries in the table reflect the levels selected into the 
data set. 
 
Table 2 - 3 Selection Criteria to Identify Cargo Tanker Rollover Crashes in GES 
Cargo Body 
Type Rollover Body Type 
Step Van 
Single Unit Straight Truck 
Truck-Tractor 
Unknown Medium/Heavy Truck 
Cargo Tank 
10 – Untripped Rollover 
20 – Tripped rollover – by curb 
21 – Tripped rollover – by guardrail 
22 – Tripped rollover – by ditch 
23 – Tripped rollover – by soft soil 
28 – Tripped rollover – other 
29 – Tripped rollover – unknown 
99 – Rollover, unknown whether untripped or tripped 
 
Table 2-4 illustrates the percentage and number of rollover crashes by body type and year, along 
with associated confidence intervals for the percentages and standard errors for the number.  
These summary statistics indicate a steady decline in the number of rollover crashes per year 
from 2000 to 2004.  Discerning the reason for the decline is beyond the scope of this study, but it 
is attributable in part to the replacement of older vehicles with newer, more stable vehicles.  
Electronic stability aids are gaining market share, but there are not yet enough of them in service 
to affect national crash statistics.  The table also shows that the 1999 data are different from the 
data for 2000-2004 in terms of the distribution of rollover crashes across body types.  In 1999, an 
inordinately large percentage of the rollover crashes were among truck tractor vehicles. 
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6 7.59 (2.77,19.15) 129.34 70.56 1999 
10 45.60 (16.90, 77.55) 880.62 517.03 2000 
14 33.66 (22.31, 47.27) 428.84 148.33 2001 
12 32.54 (20.07, 48.09) 429.87 185.97 2002 
2003 12 47.14 (17.96, 78.41) 543.58 269.57 
2004 12 37.38 (14.91, 67.04) 241.2 134.23 
Truck 
Tractor 
34 85.60 (71.72, 93.30) 1458.18 366.75 1999 
2000 36 54.40 (22.45, 83.10) 1050.63 336.93 
28 66.34 (52.73, 77.69) 845.12 391.73 2001 
26 67.46 (51.91, 79.93) 891.26 294.01 2002 
25 52.86 (21.59, 82.04) 609.55 258.53 2003 





5 6.81 (2.22, 19.00) 115.93 56.16 1999 
0 0  0 0 2000 
0 0  0 0 2001 
2002 0 0  0 0 
2003 0 0  0 0 
2 6.18 (1.16, 27.01) 39.85 31.41 2004 
Total 
45 100  1703.45 385.52 1999 
46 100  1931.25 575.47 2000 
42 100  1273.96 517.07 2001 
38 100  1321.13 440.07 2002 
37 100  1153.13 342.46 2003 
34 100  645.31 184.14 2004 
Note that only years 2000-2004 were used in later analysis in this report. 
 
In the interest of determining whether the rollover crash data can be pooled across years, a 
further look into the GES data by year was performed using the accident type variable.  Based on 
these analyses, the years 2000-2004 can be pooled for analysis.  Subsequent investigation into 
the circumstances surrounding rollovers will be made on the basis of the pooled 2000-2004 data. 
2.1.2 Presentation 
Results from the four databases are presented somewhat differently.  For MCMIS, number of 
records in the database by condition factor is presented as well as the percentage of the rollover 
crashes where that condition occurred.  The percentage of rollovers with a particular condition is 
not the number of rollovers with that condition divided by the total number of rollovers, because 
as the sample weights discussed in Table 2-2 must be considered in the analysis.  The total 
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number of records in a category does, however, provide some insight into the variability 
associated with the results presented in this report.  For the LTCCS and TIFA, numbers of 
records in the databases corresponding to each level of each factor are also presented.  For this 
study, sample weights were not used for either of these studies, and thus, percentages are 
proportional to number of records alone; TIFA is a census of fatal truck crashes, so sample 
weights are not necessary for this database.   
 
The tables for the GES analyses do not include the numbers of records assigned to each level of a 
factor.  Instead, 95 percent confidence intervals are constructed for each percentage estimate.  
These confidence intervals account for uncertainty from both the sample design used to select the 
police accident reports included in the database and the number of rollover crashes observed 
from 2000 to 2004. 
2.1.3 Approach 
The purpose of this statistical analysis is to answer the question, “What conditions cause the 
most cargo tank rollovers?”  That is a different question than “What conditions are most likely to 
lead to a rollover?”  The focus of this report is to addresses what circumstances need to be 
ameliorated to reduce the greatest number of future rollovers.  Some of those events, such as 
driving on straight road on a sunny day, may actually be quite safe, leading to a rollover only on 
exceedingly rare occasions.  But if these events occur frequently, they will contribute to a 
significant number of rollovers, and methods should be explored to make them yet safer.  Other 
conditions may be more dangerous in that they are relatively more likely to lead to a rollover 
when they occur.  However, if these conditions occur much less frequently, they contribute to 
only a small number of rollovers.  Although the number of rollovers reduced might be relatively 
small, if these conditions may be easily addressed by cost-effective measures, the return on an 
investment in preventive measures might be worthwhile.  Mathematically, the question being 
answered in this report is, “Given that there was a rollover, what is the probability that a certain 
set of circumstances was present?”   
 
There are four areas for potential interventions to reduce the incidence of rollover—redesign of 
cargo tank vehicles, redesign of highways, vehicle control technology, and driver training.  
Accordingly, the databases used for this analysis were searched for associations between vehicle, 
environmental, and driver factors and rollover.  Vehicle control technologies are gaining a 
presence in the market, but they have not been in use long enough that their presence is 
detectable in national crash databases.  Their benefits will be assessed by noting the crash factors 
they are expected to address.  The following is an outline of the data presented in the report, 
noting the databases that provided the information.  Statistics on the percentage of rollover 
crashes associated with each level of a factor are presented, organized by topic.  Where available, 
data from each of the four databases used for the analysis are included.  Subsections 2-2 through 
2-5 of Section 2 in the main report are organized according to this structure, as is Appendix A. 
  
Crosscutting Factors:  
 
• Primary Reason or Critical Event (MCMIS, LTCCS, GES) 
• Pre-crash Event or Maneuver (TIFA, LTCCS, GES) 




• Body type (MCMIS, TIFA, GES) 
• Hazardous material involvement (TIFA) 
• Load (MCMIS, TIFA, LTCCS) 
• Mechanical problems (LTCCS, GES) 
• Cargo Tank Specification (MCMIS) 
 
Roadway and Environment Factors: 
 
• Road type (MCMIS, LTCCS, TIFA, GES) 
• Population area (MCMIS, TIFA) 
• Roadway surface condition (LTCCS, TIFA, GES) 
• Roadway curvature (TIFA, GES) 




• Driver age (MCMIS, TIFA, GES) 
• Speed (LTCCS, GES) 
• Driver errors or distractions (TIFA, GES) 
2.2 Crosscutting Factors 
Crosscutting factors are those that include more than one category of vehicle, environment, and 
driver.  The analysis of the associations between cross-cutting factors and rollover focused on the 
primary reason or critical event for the rollover and the pre-crash maneuver of the truck.  An 
additional variable, accident type, was considered, and tables on this variable are provided in 
Appendix A.   
2.2.1 Primary Reason or Critical Event 
The primary reason for the rollover is that event that is thought to have the greatest influence on 
the crash occurring.  Three of the four databases (MCMIS, LTCCS, and GES) provide the 
primary reason.  Tables 2-5, 2-6, and 2-7 provide the primary reason category relative frequency 
for MCMIS, LTCCS, and GES, respectively.  The primary reasons of interest were ones that 
correspond to one of the four areas for potential interventions. 
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Table 2 - 5 Rollover Crash Primary Reason Category Relative Frequency (MCMIS) 
Single Vehicle Multiple Vehicles 
Primary Reasons Total 
Rollovers 






Driver Decision Error 92 41.6% 7 16.3% 
Driver Non-Performance 17 7.7% 0 0.0% 
Driver Performance Error 23 10.2% 0 0.0% 
Driver Recognition Error 58 26.3% 4 9.3% 
189 85.8% 11 25.6% Total Driver Errors 
Vehicle Related 9 3.9%   0.0% 
Highway Related 8 3.7% 0 0.0% 
Weather Related 0 0.0% 1 2.3% 
Other Vehicle Induced 12 5.3% 31 72.1% 
Unknown 3 1.3% 0 0.0% 
Total   220 100% 43 100% 
 
Table 2 - 6 Rollover Crash Primary Reason Category Relative Frequency (LTCCS) 
All Trucks Cargo Tanks Only 
Primary Reason Category 
Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers 
No Driver, Vehicle or Environmental Factor 38 15.1% 5 17.9% 
Driver Physical Factor 29 11.5% 3 10.7% 
Driver Decision Factor 92 36.5% 14 50.0% 
Driver Performance Factor 29 11.5% 2 7.1% 
Driver Recognition Factor 30 11.9% 1 3.6% 
180 71.4% 20 71.4%   Total Driver Factors 
Environment – Highway 2 0.8% 0 0.0% 
Environment – Weather 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Unknown Reason 2 0.8% 1 3.6% 
Vehicle Related Factor 30 11.9% 2 7.1% 
Overall 252 100.0% 28 100.0% 
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Table 2 - 7 Rollover Crash Primary Reason Category Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Blow Out or Flat Tire 1.05% (0.3, 3.8) 
Disabling Vehicle Failure 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Non-disabling Vehicle Failure 0.05% (0.0, 0.4) 
Other Vehicle Stopped 4.54% (1.9, 10.6) 
5.71% (2.5, 12.4) Total Vehicle 
Poor Road Conditions 0.94% (0.4, 2.5) 
0.94% (0.4, 2.5) Total Road 
Traveling too Fast for Conditions 28.4% (16.1, 45.1) 
Other Cause of Control Loss 4.44% (2.3, 8.4) 
Unknown Cause of Control Loss 0.53% (0.1, 2.0) 
Over Lane Line Left 3.79% (1.4, 9.9) 
Over Lane Line Right 0.67% (0.1, 3.2) 
Off Edge Road Left 12.04% (6.1, 22.3) 
Off Edge Road Right 23.75% (16.6, 32.8) 
73.62% (58.9, 84.4) Total Driver 
Turing Left @ Intersection 0.61% (0.1, 2.6) 
Turning Right at Intersection 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Crossing Intersection 3.73% (1.6, 8.4) 
Encroaching Vehicle Left 13.36% (6.4, 25.8) 
Animal in Roadway 1.02% (0.2, 5.1) 
Other Critical Event/No Collision 0.93% (0.3, 2.8) 
19.73% (10.9, 33.1) Total Other 
 
In all three databases, driver errors influence a large portion of rollovers.  In all, 85.8 percent of 
the single vehicle rollovers and 25.6 percent of the multiple vehicle rollovers in MCMIS,  
71.4 percent of the rollovers in LTCCS, and 74.1 percent of the rollovers in GES had driver error 
as the primary reason.  Vehicle related primary reasons account for 3.9 percent of the single 
vehicle rollovers and none of the multiple vehicle rollovers in MCMIS, 11.9 percent of the truck 
rollovers and 7.1 percent of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS, and 5.71 percent of the rollovers 
in GES.  Roadway and environment related primary reasons account for 3.9 percent of the single 
vehicle rollovers and 2.3 percent of the multiple vehicle rollovers in MCMIS, 0.8 percent of the 
truck rollovers and none of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS, and 0.9 percent of the rollovers in 
GES. 
 
Table 2-8 illustrates the number of cargo tank rollover crashes by crash type and preceding 
conflict.  Records were selected according to the criteria presented in Table 2-3 to produce the 
numbers in the column “All Rollovers.”  The “Untripped Rollover” column in Table 2-8 
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enumerates the crashes where the GES Rollover variable had a value of 10, as shown in Table 2-
3.  The “Accident Type” variable in GES is separate from the “Rollover” variable.  The “Crash 
Type” in Table 2-8 was determined from the “Accident Type” variable in GES.  Crashes in GES 
where the rollover variable was set to “untripped rollover” but without a Crash Type designation 
are identified in Table 2-8 as an “Untripped Rollover” crash type.  The “Driving Conflict” was 
determined from a combination of the Critical Event and Movement Prior to Critical Event 
variables in GES.  Thus, the procedure to determine the frequencies included the following five 
steps: 
 
1. Subset to relevant data (the criteria listed in Table 2-3) 
2. Parse data by crash type (i.e., the first column in Table 2-8) 
3. Identify the predominant critical events that led to the truck’s involvement in the crash 
for the crash type of interest 
4. Identify the movements prior to those critical events 
5. Use the combination of the critical events and the movements prior to define the driving 
conflicts. 
 
The annual average number of all cargo tank rollovers is 1,265, as indicated in Table 2-8.  
According to the GES database, only 640 of those were specifically recorded as carrying a 
hazardous material, with the presence of a hazardous material unknown in 75 rollovers.  If the  
75 unknown cases are allocated in proportion to the known cases, the total annual number of 
hazmat cargo tank rollovers is 680.  (Note that this represents all vehicle configurations.   
See Table 2-14 below.)  For benefits estimates, though, we will apply an equal proportion  
(53.8 percent) to all crash counts where we want to deal with hazardous cargo in a cargo tank.  
(Table 2-20, from TIFA, shows a 50/50 split of HM and not for tank rolls, so the databases are 
consistent.)   
 
“Driving Conflicts” are the unsafe events that occur prior to a crash and lead to the crash.  They 
are recorded in the GES database.  Crash avoidance strategies aim to prevent these conflicts from 
occurring or to keep the conflicts from resulting in a crash.  Some crash avoidance approaches 
are intended to address certain conflicts, so is important to know what fraction of the rollovers 
result from the various conflicts.  In particular, note that conflicts 1.1 and 1.4 for single-vehicle 
roadway departures are parallel to 4.1 and 4.4 for untripped rollovers.  There are similarities 
between the untripped rollovers and rollovers accompanying roadway departures (and, as well, 
roadway departures without a rollover, which are not shown in the table).   
 
Roadway departures accompany more than half of all cargo tank rollovers.  Separate studies 
have addressed roadway departures more thoroughly.  Drowsiness, inattention, and speed are 
commonly implicated [Pape, et al., 1999].  Section 3.4.1 briefly reviews in-vehicle 
countermeasures for roadway departure crashes.  Infrastructure-based countermeasures (i.e. 
roadside rumble strips) have been used as well. 
 













1.1 Truck is traveling at constant speed and travels over the edge of the road 138 16 
1.2 Truck is turning or negotiating a curve and travels over the edge of the road 195 17 
1.3 Truck is traveling at constant, excessive speed and loses control 23  
1.4 Truck is turning or negotiating a curve at excessive speed and loses control. 185 72 
1.5 Truck loses control due to vehicle related failure 41  
1.9 Other 129 8 
712 113 Subtotal 
Rear-Ends 
 
2.4 Truck encounters a stopped vehicle in lane. 11  
2.9 Other 1  
Subtotal 12  
Lane Change and 
Merge 
 
3.2 Both vehicles are traveling in the same direction and the other vehicle encroaches 
into the truck’s lane while truck is traveling at constant speed. 
4  
3.4 Truck is traveling at a constant speed and another vehicle encroaches into its lane 
from a yield. 
1  
3.9 Other 1  




4.1 Truck is traveling at constant speed and travels over the edge of the road 5 5 
4.4 Truck is turning or negotiating a curve at excessive speed and loses control. 55 55 
4.9 Other 5 5 
Subtotal 65 65 
5.9 Other 471  
Other 
Subtotal 471  
Total  1,265 178 
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2.2.2 Pre-crash Maneuver 
The pre-crash maneuver for the rollover is the final normal action prior to the crash sequence.  
Tables 2-9, 2-10, and 2-11 provide the relative frequencies of pre-crash maneuvers from LTCCS, 
TIFA, and GES, respectively.  A large number of rollovers occurred either after straight travel or 
after the truck negotiated a curve.  The tables show the following fractions of vehicles were 
traveling straight prior to the rollover:  
 
• 41.7 percent of all trucks (35.7 percent of the cargo tanks) in LTCCS, 
• 59.5 percent of the straight tank trucks (53.6 percent of the tractor-semitrailer tanks) in 
TIFA, 
• 41.5 percent of all trucks in GES,  
 
and the following fractions were negotiating a curve prior to the rollover:   
 
• 40.1 percent of all trucks (57.1 percent of the cargo tanks) in LTCCS,  
• 27.9 percent of the straight tank trucks (36.1 percent of the tractor-semitrailer tanks) in 
TIFA,  
• 31.8 percent of the rollovers in GES.   
 
GES indicates that an additional 22.2 percent (11.7 + 10.5) of rollovers are preceded by turning 
left or right; this percentage is estimated to be much smaller (4.4 percent) based on LTCCS.  
 
The layout of the highway is related to the maneuver in that it determines whether the vehicle 
should be going straight or curving.  Section 2.4.4 will have tables showing that roughly equal 
numbers of rollovers occur on straight and on curved sections of road. 
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Table 2 - 9 Rollover Crash Pre-crash Maneuver Category Relative Frequency (LTCCS) 
All Trucks Cargo Tanks Only 
PreEvent Movement 
Rollover 
Percent of  
All Rollovers Rollover 
Percent of  
All Rollovers 
Going Straight 105 41.7% 10 35.7%
Negotiating a curve 101 40.1% 16 57.1%
Successful avoidance maneuver to a 
previous critical event 13 5.2% 2 7.1%
Turning right 7 2.8%  
Decelerating in traffic lane 6 2.4%  
Changing lanes 5 2.0%  
Passing or overtaking another vehicle 4 1.6%  
Turning left 4 1.6%  
Accelerating in traffic lane 2 0.8%  
Merging 2 0.8%  
No driver present 1 0.4%  
Other (specify) 1 0.4%  
Starting in traffic lane 1 0.4%  
Backing up (other than for parking 
position)  0%  
Disabled or parked in travel lane  0%  
Making a U-turn  0%  
Stopped in traffic lane  0%  
Unknown  0%  
Overall 252 100.0% 28 100.0%
 
 
Table 2 - 10 Rollover Crash Pre-crash Maneuver Category  
Relative Frequency (TIFA) 




Percent of All 
Rollovers Roll 




Going Straight 66 59.5% 199 53.6% 
Negotiate Curve 31 27.9% 134 36.1% 
Other 14 12.6% 38 10.2% 
Total 111 100.0% 371 100.0% 
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Table 2 - 11 Rollover Crash Pre-crash Maneuver Category 
Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Going Straight 41.46% (28.0, 56.3) 
Decelerating in traffic lane 1.86% (0.5, 7.3) 
Passing or overtaking 
another vehicle 1.48% (0.3, 6.1) 
Turning right 11.69% (4.7, 26.3) 
Turning left 10.46% (4.5, 22.6) 
Negotiating a curve 31.77% (18.6, 48.6) 
Changing lane 0.9% (0.2, 5.2) 
Merging 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Other 0.31% (0.0, 2.2) 
 
2.3 Vehicle Factors 
 
The analysis of the associations between vehicle factors and rollover focused on body type, 
cargo tank type, whether the truck was carrying hazardous material, the load the truck was 
carrying, and any mechanical problems that existed during the time of the rollover.   
2.3.1 Vehicle Configuration and Body Type 
Tables 2-12, 2-13, and 2-14 provide the body type of the truck which rolls over for MCMIS, 
TIFA, and GES, respectively.  There were more semitrailer rollovers than straight truck 
rollovers.  In all, 59.8 percent of the rollovers in MCMIS and 79.9 percent of the van rollovers 
and 77.0 percent of the tank rollovers in TIFA occurred among semitrailers.  Conversely,  
36.1 percent of the rollovers in MCMIS and 20.1 percent of the van rollovers and 23.0 percent  
of the tank rollovers in TIFA occurred among straight trucks.  In GES, most of the straight truck 
rollovers occurred among trucks with no trailing units and most of the semitrailer rollovers 
occurred among trucks with one trailing unit.  This is not surprising as these are the normal 
configurations for these body types. 
 
The tables in Appendix D, from the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS), are the best 
available estimate of the number of miles driven by various kinds of tanks, which is their 
exposure to possible rollovers.  The definitions of vehicles differ from those in the crash 
databases, so direct comparison is not possible.
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Table 2 - 12 Rollover Crash Configuration Category  




All Rollovers Vehicle Configuration 
Tractor/Semitrailer 174 59.8% 
Tractor, Two Trailers 7 2.4% 
Straight Truck, No Trailer 90 30.9% 
Straight Truck, One Trailer 15 5.2% 
Other / Unknown 5 1.7% 
Overall 291 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 13 Rollover Crash Body Type and  Configuration Category  




All Rollovers Configuration 
Van 









Table 2 - 14 Rollover Crash Configuration Relative Frequency (GES) 
Number of 
Trailing Units 





None  39.76% (25.36, 56.18) 
Single-Unit 
Straight Truck 1 0.15% (0.02, 1.15) 
2 0% -- 
None  0% -- 
Truck Tractor 1 55.58% (43.32, 67.2) 
2 3.88% (0.81, 16.6) 
None  0.16% (0.02, 1.27) 
Medium Heavy 
Truck 1 0.47% (0.06, 3.61) 
2 0% -- 
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2.3.2 Cargo Tank Type and Specification 
Table 2-15 provides the relative frequency of the cargo tank specification for MCMIS.  The 
DOT-series tanks are the more modern tanks.  The lion’s share of rollovers of specification tanks 
occur in fuel (306 and 406) vehicles. 
 
Table 2 - 15 Rollover Crash Cargo Tank Specification Category  













MC306 61 283 21.5% 53.0% 
DOT406 23 130 17.3% 20.0% 
MC307 24 47 51.0% 20.9% 
DOT407 7 30 23.5% 6.1% 
Total 115 490 23.4% 100.0% 
 
Table 2-16 shows the population of tank trucks involved in fatal accidents.  The proportion of 
straight trucks that are dry bulk is much lower than in VIUS.  (This is likely a difference in 
classification, as mentioned above, with a large number of feed bodies and similar configurations 
called dry bulk tankers.  TIFA defines a dry bulk tank as pneumatically discharged, and bodies 
that unload using an auger as classified as “other.”)  Note that in VIUS, tractor combinations 
have a higher proportion of dry bulk than the crash population.  In the VIUS, 26 percent of 
tractor-semitrailer and double tankers are dry bulk, and dry bulk accounts for 25 percent of the 
travel of tractor combination tankers.  But in the crash population, only 18.4 percent are dry bulk.  
Although the uncertainty in these estimates has not been assessed to determine if the observed 
differences are real (and there are coding differences between VIUS and TIFA) this implies that 
dry bulk trailers have a lower probability of crash involvement. 
 
Table 2 - 16 Tank Type, All Crashes Whether Roll or Not (TIFA) 
TS & Double Straights Total Tank 
Type Number % Number % Number % 
Dry bulk 281 18.4 9 2.2 290 15.0 
Liquid/gas 1,247 81.6 398 97.8 1,645 85.0 
Total 1,528 100.0 407 100.0 1,935 100.0 
 
Table 2-17 shows the additional split between gas and liquid tankers that can be determined in 
TIFA, but only for tanks with loads.  If gas and liquid tanks are expected to have similar crash 
probabilities, then the split between gas and liquid tankers here could be applied to the 
population estimates from VIUS.  (This assumes that loading increases crash probability for a 
gas tanker about as much as it does for a liquid tanker, or that loading does not bias the 
distribution of tank type.)  Note that the sum of liquid and gas percentages in Table 2-17 
(86.1 percent) is about the same as the 85 percent from Table 2-16. 
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Table 2 - 17 Tank Type of Tanks with Loads, All Crashes, Whether Roll or Not (TIFA) 
TS & Double Straights Total Tank 
Type Number % Number % Number % 
Dry bulk 178 17.8 5 1.6 183 13.9 
Gas 63 6.3 47 15.0 110 8.4 
Liquid 757 75.9 262 83.4 1,019 77.7 
Total 998 100.0 314 100.0 1,312 100.0 
 
Table 2-18 adds some additional detail, showing rollovers by three different types of tank, as 
identified in TIFA.  All the tanks were carrying some cargo, since tanks for gases cannot be 
distinguished from tanks with liquids except by looking at the type of load.  That is, tank cargo 
bodies are either liquid/gas or dry bulk, while cargoes distinguish gases in bulk, solids in bulk, 
and liquids in bulk.  About 27 percent of loaded dry bulk tanks rolled over when involved in a 
fatal crash, compared with 39.1 percent of loaded gas tankers and 37.6 percent of loaded liquid 
tankers.  It looks like dry bulk tanks roll over at a lower rate, compared with liquid and gas tanks.  
This analysis does not include all factors, however.  Dry bulk tank design may result in lower 
centers of gravity, possibly less slosh, etc.  However, both straight trucks and tractor-semi/ 
tractor-double are represented here, and there are very few straight dry bulk tanks.  One would 
expect none, but in fact there are four in the five years of data. 
 
Table 2 - 18 Rollover by Tank Type, Loaded Only (TIFA) 
No Roll Roll Total Tank 
Type Number % Number % Number % 
Gases 67 60.9 43 39.1 110 100.0 
Solids 134 73.2 49 26.8 183 100.0 
Liquids 636 62.4 383 37.6 1,019 100.0 
Total 837 63.8 475 36.2 1,312 100.0 
 
Table 2-19 shows a similar distribution for all load conditions.  That is, all tanks, regardless of 
whether the tank had a load at the time of the fatal crash, are included.  Again, dry bulk tanks 
tend to roll over at a lower rate than liquid and gas tanks. 
 
Table 2 - 19 Rollover by Tank Type, Empty or Loaded, (TIFA) 
No Roll Roll Total Tank 
Type Number % Number % Number % 
Dry Bulk 233 80.3 57 19.7 290 100.0 
Liquid/Gas 1,189 72.3 456 27.7 1,645 100.0 
Total 1,422 73.5 513 26.5 1,935 100.0 
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2.3.3 Presence of Hazardous Materials 
Table 2-20 provides the relative frequency of Hazardous Material (HM) presence for van and 
tanker rollovers for TIFA.  Most (97.9 percent) of the van rollovers occurred among vans which 
were not carrying HM.  About half of the tanker rollovers occurred among tankers which were 
carrying HM cargo.  These statistics are representative of the relative frequency with which 
tankers carry HM as compared to vans. 
 














No Hazmat 238 49.4%
Total 482 100.0%
 
2.3.4 Quantity of Loading 
Tables 2-21, 2-22, and 2-23 provide the load category of the truck at the time of the rollover for 
MCMIS, LTCCS, and TIFA, respectively.  Trucks were classified as empty if they had cargo 
from 0 to 20 percent capacity.  Trucks were classified as partial if they had cargo from 20 to  75 
percent capacity.  Trucks were classified as full if they had cargo greater than 75 percent 
capacity.  As expected, the majority of the rollovers occurred among trucks that had partial to 
full loads.  In all, 94.1 percent of the rollovers in MCMIS, more than 71.3 percent of the 
rollovers in TIFA, and 77.1 percent of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS occurred among trucks 
with at least partial loads.  Note that the TIFA load variable was constructed based on gross 
weight accounted for by the cargo.  Specifically, gross cargo weight was constructed as the ratio 
of cargo weight to gross weight and used to assign the rollover to a load level. 
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Table 2 - 21 Rollover Crash Load Category  
Relative Frequency (MCMIS) 
Total 
Rollovers 
Percent of  
All Rollovers Loading 
Empty 1 2.0% 
Partial 10 19.6% 
Full 38 74.5% 
Unknown 2 3.9% 
Overall 51 100.0% 
 
Table 2 - 22 Rollover Crash Load Category Relative Frequency  
(LTCCS – Cargo Tanks Only) 
Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers Loading 
Empty 0 0.0% 
Partial 7 20.0% 
Full 20 57.1% 
Partial & Full 27 77.1% 
Overall 35 100.0% 
 
Table 2 - 23 Rollover Crash Load Category  








0 to 10% 32 8.1% 
11 to 50% 81 20.6% 
> 50% 281 71.3% 
Total 394 100.0% 
 
2.3.5 Mechanical Defect 
Tables 2-24, 2-25, and 2-26 provide the brake condition for LTCCS, the tire condition for 
LTCCS, and the mechanical condition for GES of the truck at the time of the rollover, 
respectively.  While 53.6 percent of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS had brake defects and  
3.6 percent of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS had tire defects in LTCCS, it is unknown how 
many of these defects really affected the rollover.  Among the rollovers in GES, tire defects were 
implicated in only 2.5 percent and brake defects in 1.2 percent.  GES lacks data on the detailed 
brake inspections found in LTCCS.  Consequently, it is difficult to compare the results in the two 
databases.  One can assume many GES crashes likely included trucks with brake defects that 
were never detected. 
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Tables 2-24 through 2-26, along with 2-5 through 2-7 and A-3 through A-5, implicate a vehicle-
related failure as the primary cause of less than 10 percent of cargo tank rollovers.  It is 
interesting to note that the Large Truck Crash Causation Study found that 32 percent of cargo 
tank vehicles in the crashes studied and 54 percent of vehicles in rollovers had a brake defect of 
some sort (Table A-30).  This is consistent with studies by the Commercial Vehicle Safety 
Alliance (CVSA), which have found that 20 percent of randomly stopped heavy vehicles had a 
brake defect severe enough to put the vehicle out of service [Keppler, 2004].  The present study 
focused on the benefits of improvements to be made in ideal situations, and it did not examine 
the effect of defects in the vehicle.  However, it is worth mentioning that, if brakes are defective, 
neither the driver nor an electronic stability aid can properly slow a vehicle to prevent an 
imminent rollover. 
 
Table 2 - 24 Rollover Crash Brake Condition Category Relative Frequency  
(LTCCS – Cargo Tanks Only) 
Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers Brake Condition 
No Brake Defect 13 46.4% 
Brake System Deficiency 2 7.1% 
Brakes Inoperative 1 3.6% 
Brakes Out of Adjustment 8 28.6% 
Brakes Out of Adjustment and 
Brake System Deficiency 4 14.3% 
Brakes Out of Adjustment and 
Brakes Inoperative   0% 
Brake Defect 15 53.6% 
Overall 28 100.0% 
 
Table 2 - 25 Rollover Crash Tire Condition Category Relative Frequency  
(LTCCS – Cargo Tanks Only) 
Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers Tire Condition 
No Tire Defects 27 96.43% 
Tire Deficiency Present 1 3.57% 
Tire Failure Present  0% 
Tire Failure and Tire 
Deficiency Present  0% 
Any Tire Defect 1 3.57% 
Overall 28 100.00% 
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Table 2 - 26 Rollover Crash Mechanical Problem Category  
Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
None 84.33% (77.4, 89.4) 
Tire 2.51% (0.9, 7.0) 
Brakes 1.21% (0.3, 4.4) 
Other 3.85% (1.3, 10.5) 
Unknown 8.1% (5.4, 11.9) 
 
2.4 Roadway and Environment Factors 
The analysis of the associations between roadway and environmental factors and rollover 
focused on road type, population area, roadway surface condition, roadway curvature, and 
location relative to interchange.  Miscellaneous roadway and environmental factors such as light 
condition, roadway profile, access control, and control device were also available; tables on these 
factors are presented in Appendix A. 
2.4.1 Road Type 
Tables 2-27, 2-28, 2-29, and 2-30 provide the road type where the truck was traveling prior to the 
rollover for MCMIS, LTCCS, TIFA, and GES, respectively.  A large percentage of rollovers 
occurred on non-interstate roads.  Only 15.5 percent of the truck rollovers in MCMIS occurred 
on an interstate.  Less than half (46.4 percent) of the cargo tank rollovers in LTCCS occurred on 
interstate highways, and only 17.0 percent of the truck rollovers in TIFA occurred on the 
interstate.   
 
GES did not break down the road types in the same manner as the other databases.  However, 
only 21.9 percent of truck rollovers occurred on divided highway, the most similar GES 
category; 66.2 percent of rollovers were estimated to occur on undivided roads. 
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Table 2 - 27 Rollover Crash Road Type Category  




All Rollovers Highway Type 
Interstate 45 15.5% 
Primary 144 49.5% 
Secondary 100 34.4% 
Unknown 3 1.0% 
Overall 291 100.0% 
 
In the project from which these statistics were drawn [Battelle 2005], the highway types 
were defined as 
 
Interstate:  roads designated as interstates or built to interstate standards 
Primary:  State and U.S. highways not built to interstate standards 
Secondary:  all other highways and roads including county roads, city streets, township 
roads 
 
Table 2 - 28 Rollover Crash Road Type Category Relative Frequency  
(LTCCS – Cargo Tank Only) 
Rollover 




Interstate 13 46.4% 
U.S. Highway 7 25.0% 
State Highway 4 14.3% 
Other 4 14.3% 
Overall 28 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 29 Rollover Crash Road Type Category  
Relative Frequency (TIFA) 
Total Rollovers 
Percent of 
All RolloversRoute Signing 
Interstate 82 17.0% 
US Highway  120 24.9% 
State Highway 173 35.9% 
County Road 62 12.9% 
Township 5 1.0% 
Municipality 8 1.7% 
Frontage Rd 3 0.6% 
Other 23 4.8% 
Unknown 6 1.2% 
Total 482 100.0% 
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Table 2 - 30 Rollover Crash Road Type Category 






Not Divided 66.24% (52.4, 77.7) 
Divided 21.87% (15.3, 30.3) 
One Way 6.57% (2.6, 15.4) 
Unknown 5.32% (1.1, 21.8) 
 
2.4.2 Population Area 
Tables 2-31 and 2-32 provide the population area where the rollover occurred for MCMIS and 
TIFA, respectively.  A large number of rollovers occurred in rural areas.  A total of 53.6 percent 
of the truck rollovers in MCMIS and 83.0 percent of the truck rollovers in TIFA occurred in rural 
areas. 
 
Table 2 - 31 Rollover Crash Population Area Category  







Urban 18 6.9% 
City 47 18.0% 
Town 56 21.5% 
Rural 140 53.6% 
Overall 261 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 32 Rollover Crash Population Area Category  
Relative Frequency (TIFA) 
Total 
Rollovers 
Percent of  
All Rollovers Area 
Urban 72 14.9% 
Rural 400 83.0% 
Unknown 10 2.1% 
Total 482 100.0% 
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2.4.3 Roadway Surface Condition 
Tables 2-33, 2-34, and 2-35 provide the surface condition of the road where the truck was 
traveling prior to the rollover for LTCCS, TIFA, and GES, respectively.  A large majority of 
rollovers occurred when there were no adverse weather conditions.  Conceivably, driver 
vigilance improves when the surface is slippery.  Overall, 92.9 percent of the cargo tank 
rollovers in LTCCS, 86.7 percent of the tank truck rollovers in TIFA, and 82.7 percent of the 
tank truck rollovers in GES occurred on dry roads. 
 
Table 2 - 33 Rollover Crash Roadway Surface Condition Category  
Relative Frequency (LTCCS – Cargo Tank Only) 
Rollover 
Percent of  
All Rollovers Road Condition 
Dry 26 92.9% 
Wet 2 7.1% 
Ice 0 0.0% 
Overall 28 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 34 Rollover Crash Roadway Surface Condition Category  







Dry 418 86.7% 
Wet 52 10.8% 
Snow or Slush 6 1.2% 
Ice 3 0.6% 
Sand Dirt Oil  1 0.2% 
Other 0 0.0% 
Unknown 2 0.4% 
Total 482 100.0% 
 
Table 2 - 35 Rollover Crash Roadway Surface Condition Category  
Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No Adverse 
Atmospheric Conditions 82.67% (71.7, 90.0) 
Rain 8.38% (3.0, 21.1) 
Snow 7.31% (2.1, 22.2) 
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2.4.4 Roadway Curvature 
Tables 2-36 and 2-37 provide the (horizontal) curvature of the road where the truck was traveling 
prior to the rollover for TIFA and GES, respectively.  About half of the rollovers occurred 
among trucks traveling curves.  In all, 43.8 percent of the tank truck rollovers in TIFA and  40.9 
percent of the tank truck rollovers in GES occurred among trucks traveling curves.  Since 
significantly less than half of the driving mileage is negotiating a curve, the likelihood of a 
rollover is higher in a curve than a straight (tangent) section.  The likelihood is increased 
sufficiently that similar numbers of rollovers are observed during straight driving and curve 
negotiation. 
 
Table 2 - 36 Rollover Crash Roadway Curvature Category  





Straight 270 56.0% 
Curve 211 43.8% 
Unknown 1 0.2% 
Total 482 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 37 Rollover Crash Roadway Curvature Category  
Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Straight 59.07% (43.4, 73.1) 
Curve 40.93% (26.9, 56.6) 
 
2.4.5 Location Relative to Interchange 
Tables 2-38 and 2-39 provide the location relative to interchange for the truck prior to the 
rollover for MCMIS and GES, respectively.  According to MCMIS, most rollovers (53.2 
percent = 19.0 + 34.2) occur not at an interchange or intersection; on undivided highways a large 
percentage of rollovers occur close to an intersection.  Again, according to MCMIS, 7.2 percent 
of rollovers occur on ramps.  GES data estimates that a similar percentage (6.3 percent) of 
rollovers occur at ramps.   
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  31 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
 
 
Table 2 - 38 Rollover Crash Location Relative to Interchange Category  




All Rollovers Location of Accident 
Close to Interchange 11 4.6% 
Not at Interchange 45 19.0% 
On or Off Ramp 17 7.2% 
74 31.2% Total Divided Highway 
Close to Intersection 82 34.6% 
Not at Intersection 81 34.2% 
Not on Roadway 0 0% 
Railroad Grade Crossing 0 0% 
163 68.8% Total Undivided Highway
 Total 237 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 39 Rollover Crash Location Relative to Interchange Category  
Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Non-interchange 92.45% (83.9, 96.6) 
Interchange 1.27% (0.3, 4.5) 
Entrance or Exit Ramp 6.28% (3.0, 12.8) 
 
2.5 Driver Factors 
The analysis of the associations between driver factors and rollover focused on age of the driver, 
the speed that a driver was traveling when the rollover occurred, and driver errors and 
distractions right before the rollover.  Miscellaneous driver factors such as training and years of 
experience were also available, and tables on these variables are available in Appendix A.   
2.5.1 Age 
Table 2-40 provides the driver age at the time of the rollover for MCMIS, TIFA, and GES.   
The majority of the rollovers occurred among drivers who were 25 to 55.  As will be shown in 
Table 7-2, drivers under the age of 35 do have rollovers in slightly greater proportion than their 
representation in the professional driver population. 
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(years) Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
<25 4.8% 4.8% 7.74% (2.4, 22.4) 
25 – 35 23.0% 
75.9% 
23.97% (16.6, 33.3) 
35 – 45 33.0% 32.29% (14.4, 57.5) 
45 – 55 20.6% 24.83% (15.4, 37.6) 
55 – 65 15.5% 
19.3% 
9.18% (5.6, 14.8) 
>65 2.7% 1.98% (0.7, 5.3) 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
 
2.5.2 Speed 
Tables 2-41 and 2-42 indicate if traveling too fast or speeding was a factor contributing to the 
rollover for LTCCS and GES, respectively.  The majority of the rollovers occurred when the 
trucks were not speeding.  Though more than half (52.0 percent of the LTCCS rollovers and  
59.7 percent of the GES rollovers) occurred among trucks that were not speeding prior to the 
rollover, a substantial number were traveling too fast or speeding. 
 
Table 2 - 41 Rollover Crash Speed Category Relative Frequency (LTCCS) 




All Rollover Rollover 
Percent of 
All Rollovers 
Did not realize caution required 41 19.0% 4 16.0% 
Keeping up with traffic 3 1.4% 0 0% 
Other reason 63 29.2% 6 24.0% 
Unknown 9 4.2% 2 8.0% 
No traveling-too-fast factors 100 46.3% 13 52.0% 
Overall 216 100.0% 25 100.0% 
 
 
Table 2 - 42 Rollover Crash Speed Category Relative Frequency (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Not Speeding 59.67% (42.6, 74.7) 
Speeding 38.34% (23.3, 56.0) 
No Driver 1.99% (0.6, 6.3) 
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2.5.3 Driver Errors and Distractions 
Tables 2-43 and 2-44 provide the fraction of crashes due to driver errors and distractions from 
TIFA and GES, respectively.  The number of rollovers where the driver was impaired or 
distracted is greater than the number where vision was obscured.  Thus, reducing driver errors 
due to distractions has more potential to reduce the overall number of rollovers than decreasing 
the incidence of vision being obscured.   
 
Table 2 - 43 Rollover Crash Driver Errors and Distractions Category  
Relative Frequency (TIFA) 




All Rollovers Roll 
Percent of 
All Rollovers 
None 26 23.4% 87 23.5% 
Physical or Mental Condition 
Inattentive 13 11.7% 39 10.5% 
Drowsy, Asleep 3 2.7% 31 8.4% 
Other Physical 1 0.9% 8 2.2% 
Miscellaneous Driver Errors 
Run Off Road 60 54.1% 203 54.7% 
Driving too Fast 25 22.5% 102 27.5% 
Erratic/Reckless 8 7.2% 29 7.8% 
Over Correcting 17 15.3% 26 7.0% 
Failure to Yield or Obey 9 8.1% 14 3.8% 
Other Driver Error 7 6.3% 14 3.8% 
Other 
Avoiding, Swerving or 
Sliding 11 9.9% 15 4.0% 
Misc. Non-Driver Causes 2 1.8% 9 2.4% 
Miscellaneous Violations 4 3.6% 7 1.9% 
Possible Distractions 
(Inside the Vehicle) 2 1.8% 7 1.9% 
Vision Obscured 2 1.8% 5 1.4% 
Total 
Total 111  371  
(Note that a driver may have been coded with more than one condition, so the numbers add to more than 100 
percent.) 
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Table 2 - 44 Rollover Crash Driver Errors and Distractions Category  
Relative Frequency (GES) Physical Impairment 






None 83.53% (78.0, 87.9) 
Drowsy, Sleepy, Fell 
Asleep, Fatigued 6.63% (4.0, 10.9) 
Ill, Blackout 2.50% (0.7, 8.2) 
Other Physical 
Impairment 0.31% (0.0, 2.2) 
Unknown If Physically 











None 43.94% (24.9, 64.9) 
Inattentive 13.9% (5.6, 30.4) 
Sleepy 6.68% (4.0, 11.0) 
Adjusting Music/Other 
Devices 1.72% (0.3, 9.4) 
Other Person/Object 1.66% (0.3, 9.7) 
Other 0.19% (0.0, 0.8) 











No 74.59% (60.6, 84.9) 
Yes 6.35% (1.5, 23.5) 
Unknown 19.06% (9.8, 33.7) 
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2.6 Conclusions Concerning Crash Statistics 
The tables in this section and in Appendix A confirmed some suspicions as to the factors present 
when rollovers occur, but the numbers dispelled some myths, too.  One ordinarily thinks of 
rollovers occurring because a truck took a curve too fast.  For untripped rollovers of tank 
vehicles, taking a curve too fast does indeed account for a large majority (Table 2-8).  However, 
when all cargo tank rollovers, tripped and untripped, are considered, there are many other 
factors.  Certainly, speed is a factor in many rollovers, but there are roughly an equal number of 
rollovers where speeding was not a factor (Tables 2-41, 2-42, A-75, A-76, A-79, and A-80). 
 
A significant number of rollovers occur at or near the interchange on divided highways, but they 
are by no means the bulk of the rollover problem.  In fact, two-thirds of cargo tank rollovers 
occur on undivided highway, and fewer than 10 percent occur on freeway entrance or exit ramps 
(Tables 2-38, 2-39, and A-45). 
 
The primary reason for a majority of rollovers is driver error (74 percent in Tables 2-6 and 2-7).  
The various databases categorize driver errors in different ways, but decision errors are the most 
common errors, followed by roughly equal numbers of performance and recognition errors. 
 
Most rollovers occur in single-vehicle crashes (Tables A-12 and A-14).  The cause for the 
rollover is different if the rollover was the first event in the crash or if it followed an earlier 
event.  If the rollover is listed as the first event, which occurs about 10 percent of the time, it is 
necessary to look at the pre-crash condition to determine the precursors to the rollover event.  
Again, in the majority of these cases, the pre-crash event is a decision error on the part of the 
truck driver in a single vehicle accident (Tables 2-5, A-1 and A-2).  Since in more than  
90 percent of the accidents, rollover is not the first event, then there was some other dangerous 
event that occurred before rollover.  In the case of an accident involving another vehicle, the first 
event is normally collision with a motor vehicle in transit.  For single vehicle accidents, the most 
common first event is the truck running off the road (Table A-13.) 
 
The data confirmed the expectation that cargo tanks are more likely than van trucks to roll in a 
crash.  The rollover rate for all vehicles is about 20 percent compared to about 32 percent for 
cargo tanks (Table A-16, see also Table A-20).  Liquids in bulk have the highest rollover rate of 
about 47 percent while gases in bulk, (only one case) combined with solids in bulk, have a 
rollover rate of 40 percent (Table A-18). 
 
If they are in a crash, straight trucks and combination trucks both roll at about the same rate 
(Table A-15).  A truck-tractor pulling one trailer accounts for about 60 percent of all rollovers, 
while straight trucks account for only about 30 percent of rollovers (Tables A-15 and A-17). 
 
The benefit-cost analysis in Section 7 will draw on the numbers that have been presented in this 
section to quantify the number of crashes that can be avoided by the various rollover mitigation 
approaches.  The absolute number of crashes (from Table 2-8), the portion following the action 
of driving too fast in a turn (also from Table 2-8), the fraction that are combination trucks 
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(Tables 2-12 and 2-14), and the relative portions of drivers of various ages (Table 2-40) all figure 
directly in the benefit-cost analysis.   
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3.0 Driver Training 
The statistics in Section 2 showed that a driver error of one form or another figured in about 
three quarters of cargo tank rollovers.  Therefore this section answers the question:  “What can 
be done to reduce accidents through the influencing of human performance?” 
 
Tank truck operators must perform all the tasks that other combination vehicle drivers perform.  
The additional tasks for tanker operators are more matters of degree than discrete new tasks. 
3.1 Introduction 
This section will examine several possible interventions to improve the performance of tank 
truck vehicle operators:  training, truck operator monitoring technologies, and carrier operations.  
The training discussion will be two-fold:  the current state of tank truck vehicle operator training 
by both schools and carriers will be reviewed, based on a survey of managers at tank truck 
carriers as part of this project.  A second survey of truck driving schools and carriers, which was 
performed for an earlier FMCSA project, provides additional data for this study.  Some 
instructional technologies that could lead to better trained (and presumably safer) drivers will 
also be examined. 
 
The truck operator monitoring technologies discussion will be a brief overview of various 
options available to the industry.  Finally, carrier operations will be reviewed, to see what effect 
company policies, procedures, scheduling protocols, and dispatcher performance have on driver 
performance. 
3.2 Task Analysis  
The Commercial Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 called for the Secretary of Transportation to 
establish minimum Federal standards for the states to use in testing and ensuring the fitness of 
persons who operate commercial motor vehicles.  The standards were to include both knowledge 
tests and driving tests, and required that the driving tests take place in a vehicle that was 
representative of the type of vehicle the driver operates or will operate.  If appropriate, different 
minimum testing standards were to apply to different classes of commercial motor vehicles.  The 
rule subsequently issued by the FHWA (49 CFR Part 383), containing the minimum standards, 
stipulates specific knowledge, skills, and abilities which drivers of different types of commercial 
motor vehicles must possess [Brock et al., 2007].  The research and development efforts to 
produce those minimum standards produced the best documentation yet of the tasks and 
knowledge needed to operate commercial vehicles. 
 
CDL knowledge tests were developed that reflected both the general knowledge required of all 
commercial drivers and the specialized knowledge required of operators of particular classes of 
vehicles or vehicles hauling particular kinds of cargo.  The knowledge tests to be taken by a CDL 
applicant directly reflected the type of vehicle and he or she operated or proposed to operate.  
They included: 
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• A General Knowledge test of safe driving principles  
• An Air Brakes test  
• A Combination Vehicles test  
• A Tanker test 
• A Doubles/Triples test 
• A Passenger Transport test 
• A Hazardous Materials test. 
 
In addition to the knowledge tests, there was also a requirement for the development of three 
driver skills tests that would determine whether the applicant: 
 
• Had an adequate understanding of how to ascertain the condition of key operational and 
safety systems of the vehicle 
• Had the fundamental psychomotor and perceptual skills necessary to control and 
maneuver heavy vehicles 
• Was capable of safely driving the vehicle in a variety of road environments and traffic 
conditions. 
 
These tests were designed to be adaptable to different vehicle sizes and configurations.  Each  
met professional standards for reliability and validity, and each measured an important, yet 
relatively independent, area of driver skill.  It is important to note that to receive a CDL 
endorsement to drive tankers, an applicant must pass the CDL knowledge test on tankers but may 
use any Class A vehicle for his or her skills tests.  In other words, applicants do not have to 
demonstrate their ability to drive a tanker in order to receive a CDL with the tanker endorsement. 
 
Vehicle operators are to inspect their vehicle before every trip as well as periodically while on 
the road.  Additional inspection tasks for tank truck operators are: 
 
• Inspect tank vehicle’s markings, including product ID number, and lessee or owner’s 
name. 
• Refer to vehicle’s manual to ensure that the particular characteristics of the vehicle are all 
inspected. 
• Check tank’s body or shell for dents or leaks. 
• Check the intake, discharge, and cut-off valves to ensure that they are in correct positions 
for each vehicle operation. 
• Check pipes, connections, and hoses for leaks, particularly around joints. 
• Check manhole covers and vents. 
• Ensure that covers have gaskets that close completely. 
• Ensure that all vents are clear. 
• Ensure that all special-purpose equipment is present and working correctly. 
• Find out what emergency equipment is required on the vehicle and ensure that it is in 
place and in good working order. 
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In terms of driving, tank truck operators have tasks that are similar to those of any good driver, 
but the standards for performing those tasks are much higher: 
 
• Adjust the vehicle speed to allow a “Speed Cushion” for maneuvering (at least 10 MPH 
below the posted speed limit is recommended) when approaching a curve. 
• Slow down and downshift early.  Don’t shift in the curve. 
• Look at both the speed limit sign and the speedometer to ensure that the vehicle is below 
the posted speed. 
• Slowly accelerate out of the curve. 
• Maintain a “Space Cushion” (distance between your vehicle and other traffic) so there is 
a safe maneuvering distance despite misjudgment, weather, road conditions, and poor 
driving by other motorists. 
• Select travel routes that are best suited to the type of vehicle and loads being driven in 
order to avoid adverse road conditions, such as sharp curves and steep grades that make 
rollovers more likely to occur. 
• If a rollover appears imminent, attempt to straighten out the vehicle and bring it to a 
gradual stop, even if it means driving off the pavement. 
• Drive smoothly. 
• Maintain steady pressure on the brakes to minimize surge. 
• Avoid oversteering, over-accelerating, and over-braking. 
 
As noted, the tasks required to operate a tanker are the same as for the operation of any Class A 
vehicle.  The major difference for tankers is the proficiency with which the operator must 
perform those tasks. 
3.3 Training Gap Analysis  
Staplin, et al. [2004], had the following to say about training to prevent rollover: 
 
Techniques used to train beginning drivers in rollover prevention include classroom 
training, supplemented by video.  One school teaches the “No Lean” policy: if you never 
go fast enough to cause your cab or yourself to lean, you have less chance to roll over.  
Another school respondent indicated that in the classroom, they talk about center of 
gravity, shifting and surging cargo, and speed on curves, and they practice this daily on 
the road.  One school utilizes a high-fidelity simulator to train rollover prevention for 
standard tractor trailers.  A truck carrier with no simulator indicated that a simulator 
would be a great tool, but hands-on with various loads on a test track works best to let the 
driver get a feel for the shifting of weight and truck response.  This type of hands-on 
training is risky with an inexperienced driver, so it is imperative that the instructor be 
competent.  This company reinforces the fact that warning sign advisory speed limits are 
designed for cars and that truck drivers must keep speeds well below postings in curves 
and on ramps (p. 25). 
 
FMCSA has developed minimum training requirements (49 CFR 380) for operators of double 
and triple trucks, also known as longer combination vehicles (LCVs).  LCV training will consist 
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of driving and non-driving activities, such as route planning and checking cargo and weight.  
Because LCV doubles and triples have different operating characteristics, FMCSA established 
different training courses for each vehicle group.  The rule also establishes two types of LCV 
driver instructors, classroom instructors and skills instructors.  Table 3-1 shows the specific 
content requirements for these special classes of vehicles.  Although tanker vehicles do not fall 
into the specific classes of vehicles for which this curriculum was developed, tanker training 
practices can be compared to the LCV curriculum serving as a benchmark.  With the exception 
of specific LCV topics (e.g., 1.1 in the table), these general topics apply to tank truck driver 
students as well. 
 
Table 3 -  1 Course Topics for LCV Drivers 
1.1 LCVs in Trucking 
Section 1:  Orientation 
1.2 Regulatory Factors 
1.3 Driver Qualifications 
1.4 Vehicle Configuration Factors 
2.1 Coupling and Uncoupling 
2.2 Basic Control and Handling 
 Section 2:  Basic Operation 2.3 Basic Maneuvers 
2.4 Turning, Steering and Tracking 
2.5 Proficiency Development 
3.1 Interacting with Traffic 
3.2 Speed and Space Management 
Section 3:  Safe Operating Practices 
3.3 Night Operations 
3.4 Extreme Driving Conditions 
3.5 Security Issues 
3.6 Proficiency Development 
4.1 Hazard Perception 
Section 4:  Advanced Operations 4.2 Hazardous Situations 
4.3 Maintenance and Troubleshooting 
5.1 Routes and Trip Planning 
Section 5:  Non-Driving Activities 
5.2 Cargo and Weight Considerations 
 
Rollover prevention is treated under Section 4.2 of the FMCSA minimum standards for LCV 
drivers as follows:   
 
Unit 4.2-Hazardous situations.  This unit must address dealing with specific procedures 
appropriate for LCV emergencies.  These must include evasive steering, emergency 
braking, off-road recovery, brake failures, tire blowouts, rearward amplification, 
hydroplaning, skidding, jackknifing and the rollover phenomenon.  The discussion must 
include a review of unsafe acts and the role they play in producing hazardous situations. 
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In the federal code applicable to hazardous material transportation, driver training is addressed 
twice:   
 
• 49 CFR 172, Subpart H—Training, and  
• 49 CFR177.816 Driver training.   
 
Although both sections address who is to be trained and what the training’s content will be, it is 
left up to individual carriers to develop specific training programs.  The rule in 49 CFR 172, 
Subpart H addresses all employees who have any connection to the transportation of hazardous 
materials.  As a result, it is has no prescriptive regulations unique to driver training generally or 
anti-rollover training specifically.  It does, however, prescribe that persons handling hazardous 
materials, including drivers have function-specific training in safety.  The text of 49 CFR177.816 
addresses the safety of the vehicle more directly.  All drivers of hazardous materials must be 
trained in “vehicle characteristics including those that affect vehicle stability, such as effects of 
braking and curves, effects of speed on vehicle control, dangers associated with maneuvering 
through curves, . . .  and high center of gravity.”  In addition, it recognizes the special needs of 
cargo tank vehicles and requires that their operators be trained in handling the high center of 
gravity and the surge of a partial fluid load, including baffled and compartmented tanks.  
Rollover is not named explicitly in 177.816, but the high center of gravity is mentioned twice, 
strongly suggesting that anti-rollover training be included.   
 
Staplin, et al. [2004] contains an in-depth description and discussion of current commercial 
driver training practices in Europe and the United States.  That report reviews the work of  
Horn and Tardiff [1999], which found that private schools most commonly offer a 150-hour 
curriculum that includes classroom, range, and on-road training.  They also found that nonprofit 
schools tended to offer a more extensive curriculum, with some countries providing 700 hours of 
training.  In France, the curriculum can require up to two years to complete, depending on the 
entering student’s experience and knowledge.  
 
Kuncyte’ et al. [2003], compared the training programs for HM drivers in Europe and North 
America.  The authors selected Sweden and The Netherlands to represent Europe, and Canada 
and the United States to represent North America.  The differences among the four countries 
reflect both various regulatory pressures and diverse cultures.  They found:  “In Canada and the 
US, it is the role of the employer to ensure appropriate truck-driver training for the transportation 
of dangerous goods.  In Sweden and The Netherlands, a competent national authority must 
accredit training institutions or trainers and monitor the examination of truck drivers.  However, 
all training system approaches pursue the same goal: to ensure appropriate training and prevent 
the accidental release of dangerous goods during transportation. . . . The involvement of national 
authorities is important for truck-driver training quality and control.  Hence, without some 
standards, training does not always meet actual driver tasks and employer expectations 
[Kuncyte’, et al, 2003, p. 1999]. 
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Battelle team developed a survey (see Appendix E) 
to determine how training is currently being 
conducted for new tank truck drivers.  The survey 
specifically asked about training to prevent 
rollover.  The surveys were distributed to all 
members of the National Tank Truck Carriers.  The 
team received 23 completed surveys from managers 
or executives of carriers managing tank truck fleets.  
Only one of these carriers trains aspiring drivers 
before they have obtained their CDL.  Table 3-2 
shows the frequency of use of the various available 
training methods. 
Table 3 -  2 Carrier Frequency of Use: 
Training Methods (N=23) 
Lectures 16
Films/videos 19






On road driving 19
 
All respondents report that they provide specific 
training in rollover prevention.  They all reported using video material in their rollover 
prevention training.  A few companies have developed their own videotape training packages, 
but most purchase commercial off-the-shelf products that provide both graphic and visual 
demonstrations of good and bad driving effects on the risk of rollover as well as the 
consequences of rollover accidents.  In addition to traditional training materials, the NTTC 
provides motivational posters and safety documents on the consequences of tanker rollovers.  
The three sources of materials most often identified were:   
Other 5
J. J. Keller, the NTTC, and Smith Systems.  Other vendors named included the Institute of 
Driver Behavior, Coastal Training Technologies, Great West Casualty Company, and various 
other insurance companies.  Several also reported receiving some training materials from 
customers and various state and province associations. 
 
The challenge facing the tank truck industry is that they are trying to modify human performance 
by imparting information.  It is possible to train superior driving habits with a combination of 
instruction and guided practice.  Many of the videos combine motivational materials with visual 
and graphic presentations of the dynamics of rollovers.   
 
The survey asked each respondent to rate the quality of the instruction from each of the methods.  
Table 3-3 shows those ratings.  Some raters provided their opinions of various materials even 
when they do not use those materials themselves. 
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Lecture  1 7 7 1 
Films/video  3 6 4 3 
CBT  2 2   
Web Based  2 1   
Textbooks 1 2 3 2 1 
Restricted In-vehicle  1 1 4 1 
Simulation  1 1 1  
Demos   1 9  
On the Road   1 8 4 
 
Many of the carriers who responded to the survey have identified rollover prevention as more of 
a motivational issue than a skill acquisition issue.  That is, fatigue, distraction, and poor general 
driving behaviors may have a greater effect on a driver’s performance than lack of a particular 
skill.  With one exception the carriers in the survey do not engage in the initial training of the 
student.  Most carriers leave the basic driving behavior training to schools.  However, the carriers 
evaluate the general driving skills of each incoming student driver. 
 
The student driver is supposed to acquire skills under the supervision of an experienced driver in 
the truck cab.  One in-truck method that attempts to provide more realistic training to prevent 
rollover is to affix an outrigger on a tank truck, which prevents the vehicle from completing a 
rollover when the student driver has exceeded the vehicle’s limits.  Several schools (but no 
carriers in the survey) provide areas which, when wetted, provide an area to experience skids.  
These skid pad and outrigger solutions are expensive and do not completely remove the risk of 
actual damage to the vehicle or injuries to the driver and instructor.  Driver training instructors, 
therefore, must closely monitor the normal driving performance of the student driver to ensure 
that he or she is following sound driving practices. 
 
The conclusion from the literature and the survey is that those carriers who responded to the 
survey and those carriers who are members of professional organizations are aggressively trying 
to train new tanker drivers to be safe.  Included in this training are instruction and practice on 
avoiding rollovers.  Unfortunately, there is no way to practice avoiding rollovers that doesn’t 
include the risk of causing a rollover.  This is a risk prudent carriers and drivers avoid.  
Therefore, the gap that exists between what is optimum for training the new tanker driver and the 
current training programs is caused by public safety concerns, common sense, and a lack of a 
safe and reliable technology for providing practice opportunities for modifying driver 
performance to reduce the risk of rollover crashes.  
 
The gap between what needs to be taught and what is actually taught to reduce the risks of 
rollovers is relatively small with the tank truck carriers who responded to this survey.  This is not 
surprising:  no one gains from rollover accidents.  However, there are two critical pieces missing 
in current practices in rollover prevention training:  (1) the technology to allow student drivers to 
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see the consequences of poor driving without putting either the driver or the general public at 
risk and (2) a lack of objective measures that carriers can use to determine that a new driver is 
ready to drive a tank truck. 
 
Rollover prevention training tends to lack instructional opportunities where incorrect driving 
performance can actually cause a rollover.  Even when the training sessions include various tank 
configurations and loads (full, half full, empty), students and instructors are still limited in what 
can be accomplished on the road.  Students are taught about safe loading practices, load 
distribution, and the effects that loads have on vehicle dynamics.  Hours of service regulations, 
fatigue countermeasures, and distraction control can all be taught.  But the actual driving skills 
required to avoid rollovers can only be estimated by both the student and the instructor. 
3.4 Technologies for Monitoring Drivers 
Technologies monitoring driver behavior and detect unsafe patterns fall into two broad 
categories.  The first kind monitors for indications that the driver is fatigued at the moment and 
should take a break or a nap.  The second kind examines patterns of risky behavior over weeks or 
months.  They allow a fleet manager to identify drivers who might benefit from counseling or 
specialized training to avoid the risky behaviors.  The two categories will be discussed 
separately. 
 
Devices to Detect Fatigue, Inattention, or Drowsiness 
 
The surveys conducted for this research consistently identified driver fatigue and inattention as 
major contributors to rollover accidents.  Tables 2-43 and 2-44 cite inattention as a factor in 12 to 
14 percent of cargo tank rollovers.  By the time a driver realizes that the vehicle is going out of 
the lane and off the road, it is often too late to recover and, in fact, any attempt to do so may 
actually cause a rollover.  Therefore, drowsiness or lane-departure warning systems (LDWSs) to 
alert a driver before the vehicle is at great risk of leaving the road or the intended path should 
help to reduce rollovers. 
 
Extensive research has been conducted regarding in-vehicle fatigue countermeasure technologies 
for truckers, and in some cases products have been commercialized.  Systems have been 
developed which monitor and measure eye closures.  An Attention Technologies product based 
on this approach is now being evaluated by NHTSA.  The product, dubbed “Copilot,” is a small 
device that mounts on the dashboard with a rotating base for easy adjustment.  It is powered 
through vehicle auxiliary power and faces the driver so it can detect eyelid closure patterns, 
which is a key indicator of drowsiness.  Additionally, head movement monitoring has shown 
very good results, and the HeadTRAK system from Applied Safety Concepts is now being 
offered to commercial drivers and the general public.  Companies in Japan have had success in 
monitoring driver inputs (steering, brakes, and throttle) to assess fatigue.  Most of the research 
for this product has been completed and the focus is now on commercialization, such as driver-
vehicle interface, packaging, and generating cost/benefit data that are compelling to fleet buyers.  
[Brock et al., 2004]. 
The most common warning systems are LDWSs.  The FMCSA web site has a review of 
currently available LDWSs [USDOT, FMCSA, 2007].  They are typically forward-looking, 
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vision-based systems that “use algorithms to interpret video images to estimate vehicle state 
(lateral position, lateral velocity, heading, etc.) and roadway alignment (lane width, road 
curvature, etc.).  These LDWSs use a forward-facing camera that is mounted to the windshield in 
the cab of the vehicle.  The systems also include an electronic control unit and a warning 
indicator.  Some LDWSs may issue directional warnings to alert the driver to which side of the 
lane the vehicle is drifting.  A directional warning may be audible, such as rumble strip sounds in 
left or right in-cab speakers, or tactile.  LDWSs may graphically indicate on a user interface 
display how well the vehicle is centered in the lane on a time-averaged basis.”  Some LDWSs 
function as early indicators of fatigue or drowsiness and can alert a driver to get rest.  If drivers 
heed these warnings, the devices can help reduce the number of rollovers that result from fatigue 
and drowsiness.  The warnings of imminent lane departure will help to reduce the number of 
rollovers that result from single-vehicle road departures followed by impact with roadside 
furniture or tumbling down an embankment. 
3.4.1 Devices to Detect Patterns Risky Behavior Over Time  
When a driver trainer rides with a new driver, the senior driver will observe the trainee’s 
practices for potentially unsafe actions such as following too closely or not beginning to slow 
soon enough for a curve.  Feedback is immediate.  During a driver’s long career alone in the cab, 
bad habits can develop, whether consciously or subconsciously.  Programs have been proposed 
to monitor a driver’s practices and, by various means, encourage better adherence to safe driving 
practices.   
 
Major vendors of fleet tracking systems (Cadec http://www.cadec.com/solutions/hardware.html  
and Qualcomm http://www.qualcomm.com/qwbs/solutions/prodserv/fltadvisor.shtml) provide 
the capability of recording trips and scanning the data for instances of risky behavior, such as 
exceeding the corporate speed limit or braking suddenly.  Some versions of the electronic aids 
for roll stability reviewed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 allow fleet managers to count the number of 
times the system activates and to associate the activation with individual drivers.  Information 
from electronic stability aids is beginning to be available through the fleet tracking systems. 
 
Figure 3-1 is adapted from Figure 5-4 in [Battelle 2003a].  The data came from a study of cargo 
tank driver behavior in revenue service.  The “proximity to rollover” on the horizontal axis was 
calculated from the lateral acceleration and the speed of the trucks as they negotiated curves.  
The quantity approximates how close a truck came to rolling over.  A value of 50 percent means 
that the lateral acceleration (the cornering force) was about half what it would have taken to roll 
the truck over.  The line with solid circles indicates that more severe events occurred less 
frequently.  There were only three events at the 80 percent level in the year-long study.  If the 
line is extrapolated to the lower right, it points roughly to the diamond, which represents the 
historic rollover rate of the carrier in the study.  An electronic stability aid would activate only 
when the risk of rollover is higher than in most of the maneuvers represented in Figure 3-1, so 
the data is not directly applicable to interpreting events from an electronic stability aid.  The 
figure does suggest, though, that the rate of near misses is indicative of the probability of a crash. 
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Figure 3 -  1 Data Recorded During a Previous Field Operational Test Indicates that 
 
How the data is then related back to the driver is a matter of corporate policy and agreements 
with the drivers.  Good human relations are necessary to ensure the drivers welcome constructive 
feedback.  Some carriers may post a month’s results so all drivers can see their records along 
with those of others at the terminal.  Others have found it beneficial for a driver trainer to meet 
individually with drivers and discuss specific events.  (This is possible because the tracking 
systems record the exact time and location of the events.)  An honest, objective discussion, soon 
after the event, is a useful training opportunity.   
 
A recent study on the drivers of light vehicles [Toledo and Lotan, 2006] found that objective 
measures of risky behavior could be correlated with an individual’s crash history.  Allowing 
drivers access to their own records produced an improvement in their behavior, but the effect 
was temporary, at least in part because the vehicles were family cars and there was no manager 
to ensure continued self-monitoring.  An ongoing FMCSA study is evaluating the effectiveness 
of feedback to commercial vehicle drivers. 
3.5 Review of Modern Training Technologies 
Although instructional technologies can apply to anything from slide projectors to satellite linked 
distance learning programs, this discussion will focus on two general technology applications 
that have the highest probability of directly influencing the training of commercial vehicle 
operators:  Computer-based instruction (CBI) and simulation.  
3.5.1 Computer-based Instruction 
The power of computers to instruct is significant.  A computer can provide graphics, video, and 
sound.  Computers can adapt the pace, mode, and content of an instructional program to meet the 
learning needs of each student.  A well designed CBI program will test each student as he or she 
progresses through the program and, based on those test results, provide the next appropriate unit 
of instruction. 
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The most fundamental question about CBI is:  Does it work?  Recent research, which has applied 
meta-analytic techniques to answer that question, suggests that it does [Fletcher, 1995; Kulik, 
1994; Kulik and Kulik, 1991].  Meta-analysis is a technique first proposed by Glass [1976].  It 
basically applies statistical analysis to an accumulation of studies around the category of interest.  
In a 1995 paper, Fletcher proposes a method by which these statistical findings can be converted 
to a percentile measurement to compare student performance. 
 
Recent studies in the military services, academia, and large corporations, using the approach 
presented by Fletcher [1995], have indicated that the appropriate application of CBI across a 
wide range of a large population of students can lead to a 33 percent increase in the amount of 
material learned or a 33 percent decrease in the time needed to reach previously established 
learning criteria [Dodds and Fletcher, 2004]. 
 
Table 3-4 identifies the minimum qualities one should find in a CBI program for commercial 
vehicle operators.  It is based on prior work in CBI [e.g., Eberts and Brock, 1987; Brock, 1997; 
Brock, 2006], driver training [Brock, 1998; Hodell, Hersch, Lonero, Brock, Clinton, and Black, 
2001; Brock, 2006] and commercial vehicle operations [Llaneras, Swezey, Brock, and Rogers, 
1993; DTDA, 1996; Brock, Krueger, Golembiewski, Daecher, Bishop, and Bergoffen, 2005].   
A complete discussion of the characteristics in Table 6-4 can be found in Brock, et. al. [2007]. 
 
Table 3 -  4 Minimum Qualities for Computer Based Instruction  
Commercial Vehicle Operators 
Interactive learning 
Students enter and exit as needed 
Easy to use 
Visually rich 
Can be customized to include company policies, vehicles and drivers 
High retention by students 
Information collected on a common data base 




CBI is popular among users, although its contribution to traffic safety has not been 
systematically studied.  One company has provided over 500,000 hours of training using both 
CD-ROM based and Web based training since 2001 [Voorhees, 2006].  Some commercially 
available driver training CBI, whether for commercial drivers or the general public, target 
specific aspects of vehicle operation (e.g., risk recognition and compensation, defensive driving).  
Others provide either complete instructional packages (e.g., CDL in a box), or computer-based 
products that integrate into a complete training course. 
 
According to Staplin, et al. [2004], United Parcel Service (UPS) states that its CD and web-based 
training programs are much more efficient and yield better results than paper manuals.  
Smithway Motor Xpress uses a computer-based training program to teach load securement 
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procedures.  The drivers learned the material more quickly with the new program, and the cost to 
train a driver, originally $1,000, dropped to $150 per driver.   
 
Ryder Truck [2000] describes a computer program that delivers 32 1-hour lessons on trucking 
fundamentals based on a model curriculum produced by the Professional Truck Driver Institute 
(PTDI) for the basic training of commercial vehicle drivers.  Lessons are delivered via a high-
speed Internet connection to where the students are, rather than having the students travel to a 
single location.  Thompson [1996] describes a CD-ROM training program implemented by Frito 
Lay to train drivers about DOT regulations, focusing on alcohol and drug requirements.  CD-
ROMS and PCs have been placed in 40 company locations throughout the United States.  
However, a few carriers are measuring the effectiveness of advanced technology training that 
includes both CBI and simulator-based training, which is discussed below. 
3.5.2 Simulation Technology 
Simulation is an instructional method that requires students to interact with specific instructional 
events based on real-world scenarios.  Students must see or experience the consequences of their 
interaction.  All interactions should result in similar real-world outcomes or effects.  The primary 
learning outcome of a simulation should be the demonstration of a real-world process, procedure, 
or specific behavioral change. 
 
As Brock, Jacobs, and McCauley [2001] point out in a study for the Transit Cooperative 
Research Program, there is a long and rich body of scientific and technical literature on 
simulators and their use for training that goes back to at least the early 1950s.  The literature can 
be broadly characterized as falling into four main domains: 1) descriptions of simulators, or 
simulator components, their characteristics, and how they are being used, 2) advice on what 
characteristics are required in a simulator, 3) results of research on the effects of simulator 
characteristics on performance, and 4) results of research on the effects of simulator 
characteristics on training. 
 
Data regarding the effectiveness of simulator training for truck drivers is better documented than 
that for CBI.  In their review of practices in the European Union and North America, Horn and 
Tardif [1999] state that truck driver training has generally remained low-tech, with the majority 
of training done using traditional methods of teaching.  Although training simulators are 
appearing in some schools, they will remain the exception for years to come because the trucking 
industry and the private training schools do not have the resources to invest in these tools.  
However, where there are simulators there is good record keeping that establishes the value of 
such costly devices. 
 
Pierowicz et al. [2002] evaluated the adequacy of six simulators for use in a three-part study to 
determine whether simulator-based training can enhance training effectiveness and improve the 
performance of tractor-trailer drivers, compared with conventional training methods.  The bulk 
of the Pierowicz et al. [2002] report describes the functionality of the six simulators and their 
adequacy for use in validation studies.  The simulators were evaluated on 183 factors to 
determine their adequacy in supporting the research design of the three study phases.  
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Regarding the use of driving simulators for training drivers, Brock et al. [2001] conducted a 
literature review, surveys, and site visits for the Transit Cooperative Research Program.  They 
concluded that transit bus operator training can be improved with selective use of transit bus 
simulators.  They also noted that a critical feature in the success of simulator training programs is 
the competence and enthusiasm of the instructional staff. 
 
The Brock et al. [2001] report discussed three current applications of simulator technology:   
(1) an open-loop video simulator; (2) a low-end simulator, and (3) a so-called midrange 
simulator.  All three simulators are used to train new drivers; they are also often used to retrain 
more experienced drivers.  However, each device trains a subset of the skills required by drivers 
of transit buses, but none trains them all.  Table 3-5 describes these three levels of simulation, 
which represent the key characteristics of currently available commercial driving simulators.  
None of the current crop of simulators specifically address either tank truck driving or the 
specific problems of rollover prevention in tank trucks. 
 
Brock et al. [2001] note that the use of simulation decreased trainee drop-out rates by 35 percent 
for an agency using the midrange simulator, decreased student failure rates by 50 percent in an 
agency that uses the open-loop and the low-end simulators, and decreased the collision rate by  
10 percent in an agency using a combination of open-loop and low-end simulators.  In addition, 
the use of simulation reduced training time in one agency from 19 days to 17 days by replacing 
classroom bus training with simulator training.  In another agency using just the open-loop 
system, training time was reduced by 5 days when simulation was employed. 
 
Listed below are the three current driving simulator vendors for the commercial truck and bus 
industry.  Each offers different versions of the three levels of simulation described in Table 3-5.  
In addition, all three are capable of building driving simulators which provide some motion 
simulation.  None of the companies currently offers an off-the-shelf simulator specifically for 
tank truck rollover prevention training.  However, all three have the capability of designing and 
developing such a device.  One, L3, has developed a simulator with rollover training capability 
for trucks, generally.   
 
The three vendors are  
• Doron Precision Systems, Inc. (http://www.doronprecision.com/driving.html),  
• MPRI, a division of L3, (http://www.mpri.com/driver/about.html), and  
• FAAC, Incorporated (http://www.faac.com). 
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Table 3 -  5 Levels of Transit Bus Operator Simulators (From Brock, Jacobs, and Buchter, 2001) 
Level 1 – Open-Loop Video  
The most popular method of driver training delivery in use in transit agencies.  It uses Open-Loop 
Video to display traffic and other instructional information.  It consists of several student stations, each 
with a steering wheel, gas and brake pedals, and a rudimentary dashboard.  This device is 
characterized as an “open loop” system because it is non-interactive.  Although each station is 
equipped with a steering wheel, gas pedal, and brake pedal, the student’s engagement of any of these 
controls will not produce any appreciable effect on the video display.  
The system, as designed, trains and tests very specific bus operator activities (e.g., reaction time and 
visual recognition).  Stopping distances, road conditions, the relationship of speed to both, and the role 
of reaction time can be shown and then practiced.  Because the instructor station for the system 
measures performance in each learning station, the instructors can monitor and identify students who 
are not correctly responding as the scenarios play out.   
Level 2 – Low-End Simulator  
The second method of driver training delivery is a model-board system.  In this low-end simulation, a 
miniature camera is installed in a small model of a bus that physically moves about on a small terrain 
board in an adjoining room.  This system replicates the visual, auditory, and vibratory effects of driving 
a bus in an urban, crowded environment in order to train student operators to maneuver a transit bus in 
relatively tight and unforgiving situations.  The system demonstrates basic maneuvering of transit 
buses in typical urban areas.  Such skills as approaching a bus stop, parking, tight turns, and backing 
can be taught to a single student without risk of damage to either an actual bus or to platforms, other 
vehicles, or pedestrians.   
Level 3 – Midrange Simulator  
The third driver training delivery method is a mid-range simulator that uses realistic audio and video; 
including rear projection, to deliver a fuller replication of the driving experience.  A larger field-of-view 
(FOV), on the order of 180 degrees forward, a vertical FOV of at least 45 degrees, and 60 degrees to 
the rear, distinguishes this simulator from the low-end simulator described above.  Additionally, a more 
sophisticated vehicle model is provided, along with more complex environmental effects (weather, day-
night, and road friction), and motion cues to replicate the look and feel of the outside world as seen by 
a driver looking out of the windows of a bus cabin. 
One of the very strong features of this device is the fact that the mirrors in the simulated cab are actual 
mirrors; they can be physically manipulated to reflect the imagery that is projected behind the simulator 
cab.  The visual imagery for this system was developed for the specific driving environment of the 
transit buses for which the operators are being trained.  Therefore, the device provides high fidelity 
simulation of actual driving situations that trainees are likely to encounter upon completion of the 
training program.   
 
Purchasers can expect to spend in the neighborhood of $300,000, plus construction costs, for a 
full motion-base simulator.  A fixed-base simulator similar to the Level 3 in Table 3-5 retails for 
$80,000 to $100,000.   
 
Driving simulators are also being extensively used in research settings, often with interesting and 
relevant experimental results.  For instance, Strayer and Drews [2005] found that drivers who 
spent 2 hours in a simulator learning to shift to maximize fuel efficiency were “assessed over a 
six-month interval using measures of fuel consumption obtained by drivers in their own vehicles 
driving their normal route.  Training increased fuel efficiency by an average of 2.8 percent over 
the six-month interval” (p.190).  These findings held steady even for those drivers who drove 
vehicles not specifically simulated in the training sessions, suggesting that simulators can be 
used to teach general driving skills. 
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It seems clear from reviewing the simulation literature and the current industry use of simulators 
that the real payoff from simulation technology is in the larger context of a training program.  
The New York and New Jersey transit training facilities use quite different simulators.  Each 
training program capitalized on the specific capabilities of the individual device.  The key 
similarities of the two training programs were:  enthusiasm of the instructors, management 
support of simulator costs, and careful mentoring of each student as he or she cycles through the 
training program.  However, both agencies also report data supporting the use of simulation 
technology to reduce accidents and enhance the training experience [Brock et al., 2001]. 
3.6 Benefits to Advanced Training Approaches 
In the survey of tank truck carriers, only one carrier reported training more than 1,000 drivers 
annually.  On the other hand, 25 percent of respondents reported training fewer than 100 drivers 
annually.  These numbers are important because investing in instructional technology has its 
highest payoffs with high throughput. 
 
The research data from the Department of Defense, universities, and various commercial 
enterprises are clear:  well designed computer based training programs can reduce the cost of 
traditional training by one-third.  The savings come from two factors:  (1) Students complete the 
training at their own pace; many complete the training much more quickly than with 
conventional lock-step training programs.  (2) Fewer instructors are needed.  Of course, good 
instructors are always needed.  In a technology-based program, driving instructors can 
concentrate on student motivation and counseling, measuring performance, and setting 
professional standards. 
 
Transit agencies have been using driving simulators for close to six years.  The agency surveyed 
in Brock et al. [2001] that used the midrange simulator reported that 90 days after training,  
32 percent of their conventionally trained drivers had experienced a crash, compared with  
18 percent of their simulator trained drivers.  In this agency, simulator training in tasks related to 
overtaking and being overtaken by vehicles on the left and right sides of the bus resulted in fewer 
crashes by the students performing these maneuvers in the real world (17 crashes by the 
simulator-trained students compared with 154 crashes for the non-simulator-trained students). 
 
The transit agencies surveyed by Brock et al. [2001] reported that simulators are also able to 
replace some of the hours spent in the actual vehicle.  This can have a significant effect on 
training costs, as simulator costs can run as low as $3 per hour per student versus $40 per hour 
per student for in-vehicle training.  Results of a survey of bus operator trainers conducted by 
Brock et al. [2001] indicate a high level of satisfaction with their training simulators.  Fifty-eight 
percent of the respondents indicated that simulator training is more effective than traditional 
training for teaching certain types of knowledge, skills, or attitudes.  In particular, simulator 
training validates defensive driving techniques taught in the classroom, provides an opportunity 
to experience hazardous situations without putting the students or the bus at risk, reinforces 
proper driving habits and defensive driving principles, and allows instructors to check reaction 
time, eye-hand coordination, and driving skills.  Instructors indicated that trainees with little or 
no experience were better prepared for their initial driving assignment.  Seventy-five percent of 
the drivers surveyed reported that their bus simulation training enhanced their learning 
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experience, although 6 of the 51 respondents reported motion sickness, dizziness, and 
disorientation after bus simulation training. 
 
Throughout Europe, driving simulators are becoming an important enhancement for cost-
effective, safe driver training [Hartman, et al, 2000].  They are cost-effective because they allow 
year round training and cost less than behind-the-wheel training.  Hartman, et al. [2000] observe 
that “because simulators cannot capture real-life terrain and vehicle dynamics, the optimal blend 
of simulator/computer/behind-the-wheel training needs has not yet been determined” (p.5).   
 
The Association for the Development of Professional Training in Transport-Institute of Training 
and Warehousing Techniques (AFT-IFTIM) in Menchy Saint-Eloi, France, has recently 
introduced driving simulators as a key component of their comprehensive commercial driver 
training program.  First-year deployment of the AFT-IFTIM’s driver simulator yielded 
impressive results.  Reports indicate both time saving and training effectiveness.  Most notable 
was enhanced maneuvering training.  AFT-IFTIM considers 1 hour on the simulator and 4 hours 
behind the wheel to be more effective than 8 hours behind the wheel [Hartman, et al, 2000]. 
 
Schneider National in Green Bay, Wisconsin, has recently implemented an innovative and 
technology-based training program for entry-level commercial drivers.  The training course 
included traditional classroom instruction, CBI, simulation, behind-the-wheel training, and 
reading assignments as homework.  Since the new program was put into effect, Schneider is 
reporting that the graduation rate has increased from 75 percent to 81 percent, decreased average 
time to going on the job by 38 percent, and significantly decreased the 0- to 90-day accident rate 
from 31 percent to 10 percent.  They also estimate that in their program, which trains 10,000 
students annually, each one-day reduction in training time saves $7,000,000 annually. 
 
One manufacturer has developed a simulator for general truck driving that includes a rollover 
module.  The module even simulates an electronic roll stability aid, so students can experience 
the same scenario with and without the aid.  While the simulator is not specific to cargo tank 
trailers, the characteristics of the trailer, including the height of its center of gravity, can be 
changed.  Simulators are more effective when the eventual user is involved in their design.  
Therefore, the tank truck carrier community should work with the manufacturers of the large-
scale, motion-base simulators to design the ideal training device for tank truck drivers.   
 
A simulator, albeit expensive to procure, can repay its owner if there is sufficient throughput of 
students to drop the cost per student below that of conventional training using actual vehicles.  
Even without the savings from having safer drivers and fewer rollovers, simulators in large 
student populations have proven to be cost-effective through reductions in training time. 
 
The greatest obstacle to implementation is that individual tank truck carriers, like commercial 
motor freight carriers generally, are training only small numbers of drivers.  The vendors of 
simulators are working to find a viable business model to expand their customer base beyond a 
few large carriers.  Two possible models are: 
 
The Simulation Center Model.  Simulation Centers could be established throughout the country.  
Both schools and carriers could schedule drivers for simulator-based training.  If a carrier hauls 
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only one kind of tank trailer or the student will be driving only one kind of tank trainer, the 
simulator would train only in those configurations.  However, the student could still experience 
full, half, and empty loads, as well as rain, ice, wind, different levels of traffic, night and day, 
and mechanical failure in a two- or three-hour session.  Specific scenarios could be designed that 
would let the student experience the visual and physical conditions of a tank truck in a potential 
rollover situation.  The second advantage of such a simulator is that it can precisely measure 
student performance, providing exact feedback to the student and progress reports to the school 
or carrier.  The downside to such a center would be the need for the carriers and schools to get 
their students to the center, which could involve overnight travel. 
 
The Portable Simulator Model.  Another option would be to install the simulators in trailers 
which can then be taken to the schools and carriers on a set schedule.  Several current and former 
simulator vendors have had such installations with little or no difficulties.  Again, the simulator 
would have all the same characteristics as described above.  Students would be assigned to the 
simulator when it was at their training facility.  Portable simulators can have high fidelity, but 
they cannot be the full motion-base kind. 
 
A motion-base simulator would be a cost-effective device for training drivers of tank truck 
vehicles.  Such a device could provide guided practice on driving various configurations of 
tractors, trailers, loads, weather and road conditions, and mechanical failures of tractor and 
trailer.  Such a simulator could provide a successful business and safety model for the tank truck 
industry. 
3.7 Effect of Operations on Rollover Experience 
The Driver Training and Development Alliance, an organization of trucking professionals 
dedicated to improving the safety performance of the trucking industry, has published the Driver 
Training and Development Resource Handbook [DTDA, 1999].  Although the handbook was 
originally conceived to address driver training, it expanded to include discussions and guidelines 
on, among other things, carrier operation’s effects of driver safety. 
 
In the survey of safety managers at tank truck carriers and in discussions with NTTC members, 
many of the points of that ten year old resource guide came up again.  It is therefore incumbent 
upon the carriers to avoid putting drivers into situations where those factors grow too large. 
 
The Handbook recommended a set of company activities that could reinforce the idea that drivers 
are professionals.  For tank truck carriers, having a professional driver corps can work to instill 
the safety attitude that will minimize poor driving and increase the risk of rollover.  Some of the 
recommendations from the Handbook are found in current tank truck carrier operations and are 
discussed below: 
 
• Orientation program.  Many of the survey respondents described in some detail the 
programs they have for newly employed drivers.  Safety is emphasized and many of the 
materials described in the training discussion, above, are used in these early sessions.  
The message from the very beginning is safety first. 
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• An active and committed safety program.  Given the multiple sources of rollover 
prevention materials identified in our survey, it is clear that the NTTC members who 
responded to the survey have active safety programs in effect.  Rollover prevention 
training is one component of those programs, but other components include posters, 
newsletters, safety briefings, and other reminders of the importance of driving to avoid 
rollovers. 
 
• Driver recognition programs.  Professional drivers are proud of what they do.  The tank 
truck driver should be singled out as representing the top tier of the profession.  Among 
the tank truck carriers who responded to our survey, entrusting experienced drivers to 
vouch that new drivers are ready to take to the road on their own is a sign of respect of 
and recognition for high professional standards. 
 
But the key factor in day-to-day company operations that can increase or decrease the risk of 
tank truck rollover lies in the hands of the carriers’ dispatchers.  Dispatchers, often called by the 
better descriptor, “Fleet Manager”, are at the center of a carrier’s operations.  This is the 
individual who must assigned specific loads to drivers, track the drivers as they perform their 
assignment, maintain both regular and opportunistic communications with the drivers on the 
road, and also coordinate with shippers and receivers. 
 
Besides the surveys we interviewed safety managers and current and former dispatchers.  This 
section also benefits from one of the report authors recently working with dispatchers to develop 
training programs for their profession. 
 
The last ten years of carrier operations have seen a number of technological aids for 
dispatcher/driver communications and tracking.  Many drivers now receive their assignments, 
questions, and information over computers in the truck cab.  These automatic tracking systems 
allow the dispatcher to ensure that drivers are in compliance with hours of service regulations 
and following prescribed routes and schedules. 
 
The tank truck carrier provides special challenges to the dispatcher.  Ideally, tank truck drivers 
should be consistently assigned to the same kind of tractor-trailer configuration for each trip.  It 
is the dispatcher who matches the vehicle to the driver.  The dispatcher also needs to know what 
routes are best for each kind of load.  HAZMAT restrictions in various state and country 
jurisdictions mean that a truck carrying orange juice may have a different route from a truck 
carrying gasoline, even though both trucks leave from the same place and both have the same 
destination. 
 
The dispatcher must be able to track the driver’s status in meeting hours of service regulations.  
More importantly, he or she must be able to anticipate when the driver must stop driving and 
make route and delivery decisions based on that information.  Driver fatigue is a major 
contribution to rollover accidents for tank trucks, according to the survey results for this study.  
If dispatch operations can prevent fatigue in the driver workforce, this could well be the biggest 
single contribution the dispatchers can make to rollover prevention.  The second thing 
dispatchers can do is to ensure that each driver’s schedule of deliveries does not force drivers to 
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use excessive speed, since it is the combination of curves and too much speed that produce many 
rollover crashes. 
 
There are numerous software products to assist the companies in managing their fleet of 
vehicles.  Carriers can identify multiple driver related variables, beyond hours of service and 
proficiency operating particular vehicle configurations.  Personal and emergency information 
freely provided by the driver can help the driver manage his or her personal life while on the 
road.  A dispatching system that encourages courtesy and open communications between the 
driver and his or her dispatcher will lead to a driver who feels respected.  This is a driver who 
will be more likely to drive safely, avoiding not only rollovers, but other kinds of accidents as 
well. 
 
One such system, designed by a carrier to improve traffic operations, functions as follows:  A 
dispatch board is displayed on large 32-inch wide-screen liquid crystal displays for easy viewing 
and gives dispatchers a clear graphical view of drivers, loads, start time, expected work hours, 
running hours-of-service (HOS), load details, pick up points, and status of each load with color 
coding. 
 
Load information is dragged and dropped around the board with the click of a mouse. Load 
changes, including pin numbers or any traffic or safety conditions, can be forwarded to driver 
cell phones.  HOS records are updated and reflected immediately on the dispatch board through 
color coding. Should a dispatcher be making changes to a driver's work when the driver is 
logging in and printing out his work, the dispatcher receives a warning message. 
 
Dispatchers are the point of contact between the tank truck operator and the tank truck carrier.  
An individual dispatcher cannot stop a driver from performing dangerous practices.  But he or 
she can ensure that the driver is not pushed into those dangerous practices (HOS violations, 
speeding) through the demands of the route and load assignments.   
 
It is important to remember that the managing and scheduling the tank truck operators is only 
one part of the dispatcher’s job.  Other responsibilities include coordinating all daily dispatch 
functions, coordinating and scheduling equipment, ensuring equipment is in compliance with 
DOT regulations, and administrative and billing support.  Within the context of these functions, 
the dispatcher can best help prevent rollovers by following these best practices: 
 
• Always be calm and polite when communicating with drivers. 
• If communicating by telephone or radiotelephone, ask that the driver repeats back to the 
dispatcher all information and instructions.  
• Ensure, no matter the mode of communications, that load, route, and schedule 
information is clear, concise, and unambiguous. 
• Become aware of any personal issues that may be affecting driver performance (financial 
difficulties, children or spouse problems, health problems). 
• Ensure that HOS limitations are anticipated and accounted for in scheduling and route 
planning. 
• Ensure that every driver is assigned to equipment with which they are familiar and which 
the carrier has cleared the driver to operate. 
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• Let the drivers know that although dispatch cannot accommodate every personal need or 
request, those needs and requests are considered in the scheduling and assignment 
process. 
• Listen to the drivers to keep updated on weather, road conditions, unique and unexpected 
events on the routes, and any equipment problems. 
3.8 Conclusions 
This section has discussed three potential interventions to improve the driving performance of 
tank truck operators – monitoring, skills, and working environment.  Driver error is at least a 
contributing factor to 75 percent of cargo tank rollovers.  Errors might be a failure to notice a 
situation in time, a misjudgment, or driving off the road edge.  Clearly, a key to reducing 
rollovers is helping and supporting the driver. 
 
The tasks required to safely operate a tanker are essentially the same as those to operate another 
Class A heavy vehicles, but they must be mastered to a greater proficiency.  The primary method 
carriers use to bring drivers to this greater proficiency is to present them information about 
rollover causations and then have them drive tank trucks under the supervision of an experienced 
driver/instructor until they are judged ready to drive solo. 
 
Modern motion-base simulators can deliver better training than actual driving because of their 
ability to simulate dangerous situations without actually posing a danger.  The disadvantage of 
simulators is that they are quite expensive, and there is no demonstrated business model for 
incorporating them in training for drivers of smaller carriers.  Several medium and large carriers, 
who are early adopters, are currently using fixed-base and motion-base simulators to train new 
drivers the skills, including in a few instances rollover prevention skills, for dry freight.  Their 
experience has been that training that includes simulator time is both faster and more thorough 
than conventional training.  An initial step to improving the training for cargo tank drivers would 
be to provide this training for tank drivers.  Existing simulators can vary the properties of the 
trailer, so the next step would be to tailor the dynamics of the simulators to model various cargo 
tanks.  This includes at least the CG height and roll inertia of tanks, but input from experienced 
tank trainers would be needed to ensure enough effects were captured to produce proper fidelity.  
Drivers of heavy vehicles should be trained to stay well away from the high-speed conditions 
that lead to untripped rollover, so simulating these conditions may not be essential.  Perhaps a 
more important use for simulators is to teach proper techniques for recovering from a pavement 
drop-off.   
 
Given the right subject matter and adequate adherence to instructional principles, providers of 
anti-rollover training could both improve performance and shave time off the instructional 
process.  There are no “magic bullets” to improve human performance through training.  In our 
survey, carrier safety and training managers cited driving over the road as the most effective 
training they currently can provide. 
 
Our review for driver performance monitoring systems suggests that such systems can provide 
early enough alerts to drivers for them to avoid rollovers.  Other systems, which record 
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performance data over time for management review, may serve as databases for driver 
counseling and additional training to improve general driving abilities. 
 
In terms of carrier operations, we found some evidence that drivers who are satisfied with the 
way a carrier treats them also maintain a better awareness of safe driving practices.  The above 
discussion listed several organization programs that tend to reduce driver attrition and improve 
driver safety habits.  However, it is the dispatcher who has the most day-by-day influence over 
the driver’s world.  A dispatcher who understands the speed limitations of tank trucks will 
schedule deliveries that do not require drivers to ignore those limits.  If speeding on curves 
causes rollovers, the dispatcher can reduce the motivation for using higher speeds.  Human 
fatigue is also a major contributor to rollover accidents.  Dispatchers must track and collaborate 
with drivers to ensure, first of all, that Hours of Service regulations are adhered to and, secondly, 
that drivers can get adequate breaks on the road and between shifts. 
 
Improving the performance of tank truck operators will reduce rollover accidents.  If training can 
improve skill proficiency, if warning systems can provide better information, and if the carrier 
can provide a supportive working environment, the returns on investment to the carrier and the 
driver will be significant. 
 
In the benefit-cost section to follow, the benefits estimate will be that improved training 
programs will eliminate 10 percent of the excess rollovers experienced by younger drivers (i.e., 
those under 35 years of age).  Schneider National reported that their new drivers experienced a 
68 percent (drop from 31 to 10) reduction in all crashes in the first 90 days.  Such a large 
reduction will not persist over the career of a driver, but the assumption will be that there is an 
enduring benefit.  The benefits estimate for driver training cannot be based on engineering 
calculations, as were the estimates for vehicle design improvements and electronic stability aids.  
The benefit-cost analysis section will discuss the sensitivity of the benefits calculation to this 
estimate. 
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4.0 Electronic Stability Aids 
Electronic stability aids automatically slow a vehicle when it is rounding a corner too fast and is 
in danger of rolling over. They are incorporated into the braking system.  These devices are the 
least expensive to implement among the four approaches.  Multiple suppliers are offering them, 
and all tractor and trailer manufacturers are offering them as options or standard equipment.  
They are beginning to appear on single-unit trucks as well [Mack Trucks, Inc., 2006].  The 
development costs of the systems have already been borne by the suppliers, who are now 
recovering the costs through volume sales.  The systems, where they are an option, add on the 
order of hundreds of dollars to the retail list price of tractor.  When vehicles are sold to fleets, 
they are at negotiated prices, so the actual cost per tractor is probably less.   
 
The discussion and analysis in this section address the question, “How can modern electronic 
technologies help prevent rollovers?”  This section describes the electronic stability aids that are 
on the market.  It briefly reviews other kinds of stability aids that provide information to the 
driver but do not intervene with the vehicle’s control.  The crash reduction benefits of the 
systems are estimated. 
4.1 Introduction 
Systems to automatically apply foundation brakes are intended prevent the kind of rollover that 
is most common for tank vehicles—those that result from traveling through a corner too fast.  
The volume of tables in Section 2 indicates that there is no single reason that trucks roll over.  
One of the largest single reasons, particularly for cargo tanks, is taking a curve too fast.  Because 
the systems that slow the vehicle in a curve do not change the inherent roll stability of the 
vehicle, they are not effective for rollovers caused by other situations, such as driving over a 
pavement dropoff on a straight segment.   
4.2 Review of Automatic Stability Systems 
Electronic stability aids continuously measure the side-to-side force imposed on the vehicle by 
cornering.  They contain a device called an accelerometer that senses the lateral (sideways) 
acceleration of the vehicle.  When the device determines that a rollover is possible, it gives 
signals to slow down the vehicle.  The aids typically consist of additional electronics and features 
that are built into the control units for the ABS on a truck. 
 
Some electronic stability aids are mounted on tractors.  They slow the tractor by applying the 
foundation brakes and by sending signals through the vehicle’s internal communication bus (the 
J1939 standard) to cut fuel to the engine or engage the retarder (e.g. an engine brake) if one is 
present.  The tractor-based roll stability systems will apply brakes on the trailer as well as those 
on the tractor.  With a conventional pneumatic system in the North American market, the control 
system on the tractor cannot know whether the trailer is equipped with ABS.  Therefore, the 
devices limit the trailer brake pressure and pulse the pressure to avoid locking the trailer brakes.  
A tractor itself is usually fairly stable in roll; it is a top-heavy trailer that pulls over the vehicle in 
a rollover.  Therefore, a tractor-based roll stability system needs information about the trailer and 
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its load to avoid being too sensitive or not sensitive enough.  The electronic control unit for the 
stability aid communicates with the engine through the bus.  It estimates the trailer’s weight, and 
from there its stability, through measurement of the engine torque and vehicle acceleration.   
 
Trailer-based electronic stability aids sense the impending rollover through measurements in the 
trailer, and they apply the trailer brakes when warranted.  Because the trailer, in nearly all 
situations, begins to roll before the tractor does, trailer-based systems have a direct indication of 
the impending rollover when the roll angle becomes too great.  The systems on the market today 
will first briefly apply the brake to ensure there is traction.  Then they apply the trailer-axle 
brakes to slow the vehicle.  In a situation of near-rollover, one side of the trailer axles is more 
lightly loaded than the other, so the device will apply greater torque to the more heavily loaded 
outside tires.  The ABS continues to function to ensure that the wheels do not lock. 
 
The first electronic stability aids to reach the market for heavy vehicles would simply slow the 
vehicle when a high lateral force was detected.  An optional feature in modern tractor-based 
electronic stability aids, in addition to providing the above functions, is to help to maintain the 
yaw (turning) stability of the tractor by applying individual brakes when an uncontrolled tractor 
spin begins.  Their purpose is to correct situations of understeer or oversteer, which leads to 
jackknife in a combination vehicle.  Their function is similar to Electronic Stability Control, 
which NHTSA has recently proposed to require on all light vehicles [U.S. Department of 
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, April 6, 2007].  Any system 
that helps a driver maintain control of the vehicle will certainly eliminate some rollovers, 
especially those that follow other collision events.  Yaw stability systems have demonstrated 
their effectiveness for light vehicles, and they undoubtedly have their place in the heavy vehicle 
market as well, but analysis of their performance and estimation of their benefits are beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
The tractor-based systems can be installed only at the factory as part of the build.  They cannot 
be retrofitted because they need to be integrated with the sensors and internal communication 
system of the vehicle.  They also need to be adjusted for the particular dynamics of each tractor, 
and that is best done at the factory.  The trailer-based systems can be retrofitted to existing 
trailers.   
 
These electronic control systems for these stability aids have interfaces so that mechanics can 
communicate with the device using a computer or a proprietary tool.  In addition to maintenance 
and diagnostic information, the devices keep records of when the control systems were activated.  
The amount of information stored on each activation varies between vendors.  This information 
can be useful for educating drivers when they are approaching the limits of stability, as was 
discussed in Section 3.4. 
 
Braking regulations in Europe require a form of brake proportioning between the tractor and 
trailer that is different from requirements in the U.S.  The European regulation is met most 
economically by controlling the brakes through an electronic signal rather than conventional 
pneumatic pressure.  These are still air brakes because brake application itself is accomplished 
by air pressure; only the control is electronic.  These electronically controlled braking systems 
naturally lend themselves to sophisticated enhancements, including roll stability aids.  This is the 
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primary reason that electronic stability aids first appeared in Europe.  There has been research on 
electronically controlled braking systems in the North America, but the market remains largely 
pneumatically controlled, and most of the electronic stability aids work with conventional 
pneumatic systems. 
 
There are three major suppliers of brake components to the North American heavy vehicle 
market, all three of which offer electronic stability aids.  All three are vigorously marketing  
their products, and, as with other modern electronic devices, advancements in capability are 
rapid.  All three perform the basic functions as described above, but their implementation and 
features differ.  Bendix’s stability aid is part of its “Advanced ABS6” product 
(http://www.bendix.com/bendix/abs6/).  The Roll Stability Program (RSP) provides the functions 
described above for slowing the vehicle to prevent rollover.  The Electronic Stability Program 
(ESP®) provides additional features for yaw stability.  Meritor WABCO calls its tractor-based 
product the Roll Stability Control (RSC) (http://www.meritorwabco.com/rsc.asp).  Their trailer-
based product is Roll Stability Support (RSS) (http://www.meritorwabco.com/rss.asp).  Haldex 
sells brakes only for trailer axles, and their Trailer Rollover Stability System (TRS) is contained 
entirely on the trailer (http://www.hbsna.com/en/Products/TRS_-_Trailer_Roll_Stability/). 
4.3 Review of Systems that Inform the Driver 
Another class of electronic stability aids merely inform the driver of the need for caution and do 
not take partial control of the vehicle.  Some indicate the current cornering load, some warn of 
curves ahead, and one advises caution after a corner was taken too fast.  Only a few of the 
systems got past the research stage, and they are in limited deployment.  Aside from the 
following few paragraphs, the term “electronic stability aid” in this report refers to the systems 
that automatically slow the vehicle in an emergency, as described in Section 4.2. 
 
Stability Dynamics Ltd., of Campbellford, Ontario, markets a product called LG Alert™ lateral 
acceleration indicator.  This simple device measures the lateral acceleration of the vehicle, and a 
multi-colored display indicates the level to the driver.  The sensitivity is set manually, so this 
device is best suited for vehicles that have essentially the same roll stability on every trip.  It is 
marketed to airport fire vehicles, which usually travel with an identical full load.  A table in the 
user manual indicates how to set the sensitivity according to various lateral acceleration levels, 
which are presumably somewhat below a roll threshold of the vehicle that may have been 
measured or calculated.   
 
Meritor WABCO, in addition to its RSC system, markets a Roll Stability Advisor (RSA).   
This device advises a driver, after a curve, that the curve was taken faster than may have been 
desirable.  It calculates and displays a recommended speed reduction for the next trip through a 
similar curve.  The electronics for the RSA are mounted to the frame of the tractor, and the 
system communicates with the driver message center through the vehicle bus.   
 
An early research attempt at developing a device to increase the driver’s awareness of rollover 
risk was also called the roll stability advisor [Ervin et al., 1998 and Winkler et al., 1999].  The 
device actually measured the vehicle’s roll stability by sensing its roll angle as it went through 
curves.  It continuously displayed to the driver the current lateral acceleration, as a fraction of the 
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measured roll threshold.  As would be expected, the system could measure the roll stability most 
accurately when it had input from sensors mounted on both the tractor and the trailer.  Estimates 
were somewhat less accurate when information only from sensors at the trailer axles was 
available.  Performance was adequate but further diminished when all instrumentation was on the 
tractor.  This research effort may have inspired some of the devices that came later and it 
contributed to the knowledge of rollover dynamics, but the equipment was far too complicated to 
be commercialized in that form at the time.   
 
Electronic stability aids that anticipate the road ahead, rather than reacting to it, have been 
proposed.  A partnership led by Mack Truck began to develop a system called TSA (Trucker 
Safety Advisory) for a demonstration project [Battelle, January 2006].  The TSA is intended to 
increase the driver’s awareness of surroundings and attentiveness to the driving task in locations 
where the probability of a crash may be greater.  The TSA displays text in on the dashboard and 
sounds a tone when the vehicle enters a Trucker Advisory Zone (TAZ).  A zone is a segment of 
road up to about 5 miles long that is known to be hazardous (e.g., a segment having an 
historically high crash rate) or potentially hazardous (e.g., construction zones, potentially icy 
roads or foggy conditions, sharp curves, steep grades).  The TSA requires a database of TAZs.  
The message stays on the monitor until the truck exits the TAZ.  The TSA displays a fixed 
message for each geographic location; the message does not vary with the vehicle’s speed.  This 
system potentially can address all types of crashes associated with TAZs encountered by a truck.  
While the conventional stability systems that respond to current conditions can be effective at 
any location, these anticipatory systems depend in part on maintaining up-to-date information on 
TAZs, which may change over time (e.g., construction zones, road alignment changes, speed 
limit changes).  Anticipatory systems will be more viable in future years, when communication 
between vehicles and the infrastructure becomes more common. 
 
A separate project conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory [Stevens, et al., 2001] had a 
slightly different idea focused more on rollovers.  The concept was to collect roadway design 
elements of many curves and ramps to be stored in a database on trucks.  As a truck approached 
a road segment, the device would compare the truck’s current speed with what it calculated to be 
a safe speed for the segment.  The Trucker Safety Advisory would be able to advise a driver of a 
potentially difficult road segment farther in advance than the Oak Ridge system, but the Oak 
Ridge system, by taking the vehicle’s present speed and stability into account, would provide 
more specific warnings. 
 
The reverse of the Oak Ridge system is an infrastructure-based system posted ahead of a 
dangerous curve that warns trucks if they are approaching too quickly.  They detect the presence 
of a truck by its height and measure its speed with radar.  If a tall vehicle is approaching at a 
speed that is too fast for most trucks, a flashing sign warns the driver to slow down.  Such 
systems have experienced only limited deployment [Strickland and McGee, 1998, and Bola, 
1999]. 
4.4 Estimate of Benefits 
The effectiveness of active tractor-based electronic stability aids in preventing rollovers was 
estimated using a computer simulation and comparison to historical crash statistics.  Through an 
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agreement with one of the vendors, a mathematical description of their system was incorporated 
in a vehicle dynamics computer model.  The behavior of identical tank trucks, with and without 
the roll stability aid, was simulated as the trucks drove through a series of maneuvers that had 
been recorded in revenue service in a field operational test on the data collection.  The behavior 
of the model was verified by comparison with test track maneuvers in both projects.  Background 
on data collection and details of the procedure are in earlier reports [Battelle, 2003a] and on the 
original benefits estimate [Battelle, 2003b]. 
4.4.1 Approach 
During a U.S. DOT-sponsored Field Operational Test as part of the Generation 0 Intelligent 
Vehicle Initiative, the independent evaluation identified 126 rollover “conflicts” [Battelle 
2003a].  These were events that had dynamic characteristics that precede a rollover crash.  
Specifically, the lateral acceleration measured during the event was a significant fraction of the 
estimated static rollover threshold of the vehicle at the time of the event.  If each of these 126 
events were to occur again many thousands of times, each occurrence would differ slightly.  For 
example, the speed may be slightly higher, the load may be a little fuller, or the driving path may 
be slightly different.  These differences can be considered to be perturbations of the actual event.  
A small fraction of the combinations of these perturbations will result in a rollover crash.  It is 
this fraction that must be calculated to assess the ability of an electronic stability aid to eliminate 
crashes. 
 
In short outline form, the procedure is: 
 
1. Simulate the conflict exactly as it was recorded in the Field Operational Test (FOT). 
2. Simulate the conflict again with the speed 1 ft/s faster, but other conditions unchanged. 
3. Keep repeating Step 2 until the vehicle rolls over or can no longer maintain its path. 
 
The result of these three steps is a measure of the severity of the conflict.  These steps are carried 
out separately for each conflict.  A statistical procedure then estimates the probability of a 
rollover crash if all the conflict scenarios were repeated, say, ten thousand times, each time with 
a small perturbation.  This process is illustrated in greater detail below under the heading, 
“Simulation Example” in Section 4.4.2. 
 
The vehicles were modeled in Vehicle Dynamics Analysis, Non-Linear (VDANL)1  Version 6.0.  
This tool has been in development since the 1980s.  It has been applied in contracts for various 
agencies within the DOT, including light vehicle rollover work for NHTSA, and in contracts for 
private companies.  By selecting parameters to describe the vehicle, VDANL can be applied to 
vehicles from race cars to tractor-semitrailer combinations.  This rigid-body model incorporates 
equations of motion that explicitly describe vehicle dynamics in the longitudinal, lateral, and 
vertical directions in addition to independent wheel spin modes.  The sprung and unsprung mass 
motions are modeled separately in the pitch, roll, heave, and lateral modes.  The longitudinal 
motions are for the total vehicle, while the sprung and unsprung masses rotate together in yaw.  
                                                 
1 VDANL, Systems Technology Inc., Hawthorne, California.  Phone 310-679-2281.  Web page at 
http://www.systemstech.com/vdanl1.htm  
The model also contains a model of a two-axle trailer connected to the tractor through a 
compliant fifth wheel.  The model integrates the nonlinear equations of motion, incorporating 
driver actions and external inputs.  The VDANL model, including the equations of motion and 
the methods for measuring parameters, is documented in Allen et al. [1992]. 
 
The procedure was followed first using a simulation model of an ordinary truck—one without 
the electronic stability aid.  The whole procedure was repeated with a simulation model of a 
truck equipped with the stability aid.  The reduction in probability of a rollover attributable to the 
aid was calculated, and, from this, the expected number of rollovers prevented was calculated 
based on historical crash data. 
 
The 126 conflict cases identified in the field operational test were used as the basis for a special 
simulation analysis to determine the efficacy of the electronic stability aid.  For each conflict, 
vehicle speed was perturbed to induce a vehicle rollover.  Starting with the speed profile 
recorded for the conflict, the speed was incremented by 1 ft/s (about 0.7 mph) for the entire 
maneuver, and the simulation was run.  If no rollover was observed, the speed profile was 
incremented by an additional 1 ft/s and the simulation repeated.  Increasing the speed in 1 ft/s 
increments, each conflict was perturbed until a vehicle rollover was observed.   
 
The simulations quantified the speed perturbations that could be tolerated by the vehicle in each 
of the conflict cases before it rolled over.  The simulated truck equipped with the roll stability aid 
could enter a curve at speed perturbations higher than an identical truck without the aid and not 
roll over. 
4.4.2 Simulation Example 
Figures 4-1 through 4-4 illustrate how this 
process was carried out for one of the 126 conflict 
events.  The first figure is a “bird’s eye view” of 
the intended maneuver.  The truck was coming 
from the upper left and turned right through two 
curves before driving off to the south.  The black 
dot in the Figure 4-1 indicates the point of 
interest—where the highest lateral acceleration 
was measured during the actual maneuver in 
revenue service.  In Figure 4-2, the lower, lighter 
line is the speed history of the truck as it drove 
through the path.  It began around 17 mph, sped 
up gradually, slowed briefly again as it made the 
curve, and then accelerated out of the curve.  In 
the first simulation of this maneuver, the 
simulated truck followed the path shown in 
Figure 4-1 at the speeds shown in the lower line 
of Figure 4-2—the same path and speed measured on the real truck in the FOT.  The black dot on 
this trace at 18.2 mph indicates the speed at the moment where the peak lateral acceleration was 
observed.  This is the reference speed for calculating the probability of a crash in Section 4.4.3. 
Figure 4 -  1 Path of an Actual Truck in Revenue 
Service 
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Figure 4 -  2 Speed through the Path of Figure 4-1, as in the FOT  
and Increased Nearly to the Point of Rollover 
 
The simulation was then repeated through the same path with each subsequent speed increased 
slightly, until the simulated truck rolled over.  The upper, heavier trace in Figure 4-2 shows the 
speed of the truck when it was 4 mph faster than the original speed.  This was as fast as the truck 
could go through this path without rolling over.  At the next speed increment, the simulated truck 
rolled over.  That is the first piece of important information from the simulation:  if everything 
were identical to the actual event, except that the driver entered the maneuver 4.8 mph faster than 
the actual speed, the truck (without the stability aid) would have rolled over. 
 
The model of the roll stability aid was implemented for the next simulation of this maneuver.  
When the vehicle was about to roll over, the electronic device called for the brakes to be applied, 
so an appropriate brake application was simulated.  The truck slowed down and did not roll.  
Figure 4-3 shows how the device affects the speed of the simulated truck.  The solid line is the 
speed of the truck without the device, just below the rollover threshold.  The dotted line indicates 
the speed of the truck equipped with the stability aid.  Up to the point of intervention, the two 
trucks had the same speed.  At the point indicated by the arrow, the brakes were applied, the 
simulated vehicle slowed down, and a rollover was avoided. 
 
Figure 4-4 shows the lateral acceleration calculated at the trailer center of gravity during these 
simulations.  As the acceleration reaches about 0.3 g, the device activates and reduces the rolling 
tendency of the trailer.  The static rollover threshold of the actual vehicle was measured to be 
about 0.37 g [Figure 4-6, Battelle 2003a].  At the next higher speed increment, the vehicle 
without the electronic stability aid would have reached a peak trailer lateral acceleration of 
nearly 0.40 g and rolled over.  When the vehicle with the aid was simulated at the next speed 
increment, the peak lateral acceleration was limited to 0.29 g. 
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Figure 4 -  3 Simulation of the Electronic Stability Aid  
to Reduce Speed and Avoid a Rollover 
 
 
Figure 4 -  4 The Electronic Stability Aid Limits  
the Lateral Acceleration of the Trailer 
 
Figure 4-5 compares the roll angles of the trailers on the unequipped and equipped vehicles.  The 
plot with the wide swings in roll angle is on the truck without aid.  The roll angle reaches about 
15 degrees, well beyond the point of safe maneuvering.  The roll angle of the trailer on the 
vehicle equipped with the aid is limited to a much safer 5 degrees. 
 
 
Figure 4 -  5  The Electronic Stability Aid Limits the Roll Angle of the Trailer 
 
Finally, the simulated truck was launched into this same path at successively higher starting 
speeds until eventually the electronic stability aid could not prevent a rollover.  This gave the 
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second piece of necessary information for the conflict—how much faster than the actual speed 
would the driver have had to enter the maneuver to roll the truck, had the truck been equipped 
with the aid.  In the maneuver of Figure 4-1, the driver would have had to begin the maneuver at 
24.5 mph, 7.5 mph faster than the driver actually did in the FOT, to overcome the benefit of the 
stability aid and roll the vehicle. 
 
This simulation procedure was repeated for the 126 conflicts.  The simulation exercise produced 
two data points for each of the 126 maneuvers.  The first point is how much faster the driver 
would have to have driven to roll the truck without the electronic aid (4.8 mph in the illustrated 
case), and the second is how much faster the driver would have had to have been driving to roll 
the truck with the aid (7.5 mph in the illustrated case). 
 
This example illustrates how the severity of a single conflict was characterized for two 
conditions—trucks with and without the aid.  The next section shows how these results were 
used to compute how the electronic stability aid reduces the probability of a crash and, from 
there, how many rollovers it can be expected to prevent. 
4.4.3 Probability Calculation 
The results of the simulations can be used to calculate the probability of a crash for the conflicts, 
which is a step toward estimating the overall benefits of the system. 
 
Using simulations such as the one just illustrated, the probability that each conflict would result 




where  indicates conflict number j,  jS ,1
 is the probability of a crash resulting from conflict j )|( ,1 jSCP
Rjv ,Δ  is the increase in speed of conflict j that results in a rollover,  
Mjv ,  is the speed during the FOT of conflict j at the peak lateral acceleration, and 
()Φ  is the Gaussian cumulative distribution.   
 
The scaling factor,σ , was estimated to be 0.0010 in the independent evaluation [Battelle, 2003a, 
pages 5-36 through 5-40].  As an example, Equation 1 can be applied to the conflict that served 
as an example in the previous section.  The probability of a crash, given that the conflict 
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The numerator in this equation, 4.8 mph, is the speed increment required for this maneuver to 
lead to a rollover.  The value of 0.0010 is the variance scaling factor, and 1.1 is a units 
conversion factor.  The final value in the denominator, 18.2 mph, is the speed of the vehicle, 
measured during the FOT, at which the lateral acceleration of the tractor’s steer axle reached a 
peak value.  The probability of this conflict resulting in a crash even without the aid is extremely 
small.  Indeed, crashes are rare events, so the probabilities are expected to be remote, and this 
conflict is among the least likely to result in a rollover. 
 
The second set of simulations, those where the truck was equipped with the aid, yielded a second 
set of speed increments,  .  The formula in Equation (4-1) was computed again to determine the 
probability that a truck equipped with the electronic stability aid would crash, given that it 
entered one of the 126 conflicts.  Again as an example, Equation 4-1 can be applied to this same 




Thus there were two numbers for each conflict—the probability of a truck without the aid rolling 
over and the probability of a truck with the aid rolling over. 
 
The difference between these probabilities is the reduction in probability of a crash that is 
attributable to the electronic stability aid.  With the appropriate scaling factors, the probabilities 
can be summed to determine the total probability of a crash, and multiplied by the number of 
miles driven by a given fleet, to estimate the number of rollovers the aid will prevent. 
4.4.4 Benefits Formula 
The prevention ratio is estimated as the ratio of the overall probability of a crash with the aid to 
the overall probability of a crash without the aid, both given that a driving conflict has occurred.  
The overall probability of a crash is estimated as the average probability of a crash given the 126 
specific conflicts as described in the following equation, 
 
 
    (4-2) 
 
The example illustrated in Section 4.4.2 is now one of the 126 elements in the sum.  The value of 
Equation (1a) is one of the elements in the denominator, where the probability of a crash without 
the aid is summed.  The value of Equation (5-1b) is one of the elements in the numerator.  
Expressing this equation in words, the probability of a rollover is 47 percent as high for a vehicle 
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equipped with the aid as it is for a vehicle without the aid.  The benefit of the electronic stability 
aid, therefore, is that it is estimated to prevent about 53 percent of the rollovers resulting from 
excessive speed in a curve.  
 
Note that this estimate is based on a model of an electronic stability aid as it existed in 2003.  
These devices have certainly been improved in the intervening years, so the estimate is a 
conservative lower bound. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Electronic stability aids can prevent rollovers in two ways.  First is their direct intervention in 
slowing the vehicle as it enters a curve too quickly.  But they can also have a training benefit if 
drivers are made aware of instances where they took a curve with a smaller safety margin than 
they should have.  The training benefit was discussed in Section 3.4.2.   
 
These aids can be inexpensively incorporated with the braking components that are already on 
modern heavy vehicles.  Though they address only a particular kind of rollovers, those cases are 
a significant fraction of the overall rollover problem and electronic stability aids are quite 
effective in preventing them.  Thanks to the vendors’ marketing efforts, which include 
convincing motion pictures and opportunities to ride in equipped trucks, the devices are already 
gaining acceptance.   
 
The devices require no training for the driver to use.  However, there have been anecdotal reports 
of drivers complaining of a “loss of power in curves” and not recognizing the safety intervention.  
A prudent carrier certainly would advise drivers of the presence of the aids so the drivers would 
understand that a potentially dangerous event occurred and would know how to respond if the 
aid activated.   
 
The simulation analysis predicted that 53 percent of the rollovers due to excessive speed in a 
curve can be prevented by the particular kind of electronic stability aid that was modeled.  That 
number, along with the $619 retail cost of the option, will serve as input to the benefit-cost 
analysis for these devices in Section 7.  Because the prevention estimate was made with a model 
of a 2003 system and vendors are continuously improving their products, the estimate of the 
economic benefits of the system will be conservative. 
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5.0 Vehicle Design 
Cargo tank vehicles, particularly semitrailers, tend to be more “top heavy” than other 
commercial vehicles.  That is, they have a relatively high center of gravity, due to constraints on 
their design.  For proper structural strength, the cross section of the tank must be rounded, either 
a circle or an oval.  This shape lifts much of the payload well above the frame rails of the truck.  
At the same time, the width of the vehicle is limited both by regulation and by practicalities of 
delivery routes.  Nevertheless, improvements are available to be made in the design of cargo tank 
vehicles to improve their inherent stability.  The focus for this part of the study is to address the 
question: what are the feasible tank and trailer design changes that can increase the rollover 
threshold of a tanker?   
5.1 Introduction 
The approach was to hypothesize an initial set of design change options prior to contacting tank 
and trailer manufacturers, and use personal interviews to determine the likely feasibility and 
costs, both in terms of manufacture and operations.  Basic mechanical principles show that 
rollover threshold is predominantly influenced by the ratio GhT  [e.g., Winkler et al., 2000] 
where T is the mean track width and Gh  is the height of the center of gravity of the trailer mass 
above ground – increasing T and reducing Gh  reduces the likelihood of rollover in any particular 
circumstances.  Reducing tire and suspension compliances and improving roll damping may also 
reduce the risk of rollover and are worthy of at least some consideration.   
 
Regarding the desirable changes in T and  , there are only limited opportunities to change 
existing design practices, so the major part of this study is to establish in some detail where 
opportunities for change are indeed feasible: 
 
• What structural design changes could be made to the trailer or the tank, and what would 
be the general cost implications? 
• What changes could be made to tires and suspension to improve roll stability, and again 
what are the approximate cost implications? 
• What operational constraints, if any, might limit the suggested design changes? 
 
From the interview responses, feasible limits were determined and a number of representative 
cases extracted.  In particular, representative cases of “modest” and “aggressive” design changes 
were considered for further analysis using simulation. 
 
Roll stability benefits will also depend on the preponderance of cargo tank rollovers found in the 
field, so a smaller parallel activity was undertaken to gather representative crash data and suggest 
priorities based on the major tanker types involved; once again this helps focus the study on 
critical sub-classes of tanker.  Based on the above, a small set of feasible design changes can 
then be prepared and a representative subset put forward for further cost-benefit analysis. 
 
As stated above, it was considered essential to hypothesize a library of plausible design change 
options, to help achieve a consistent approach when dealing with very different tank trailer 
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organizations, particularly for structural design.  The viable options considered are shown in the 
left column of Table 5-1, and involve: 
 
• Lowering the center of gravity height of the tank (modest or aggressive – see below) 
• Increasing the track width, either with or without increasing the tank width and hence 
allowing a simultaneous reduction in tank CG height  
• Changing suspension type. 
 
Table 5 -  1 Design Change Framework 
Design Options and Assumptions Comments, Suggestions and Questions 
Lowering the center of gravity is perhaps the most effective 
way to improve roll stability of a vehicle.  How much could 
the center of gravity of the tank be lowered by the following 
approaches?  What would be the additional costs?  How 
applicable are these changes? Who could use them?  Who 
could not?  
1. Lower the Center of Gravity of 
Tank Trailers 
1.1 Replace straight-bore tanks with conventional double 
conical tanks. Modest design changes to lower the 
center of gravity of the tank trailers. 1.2 Use low profile 5th-wheel couplers and minimize the 
height of frame over suspension. 
1.3 Extreme double conical tank shapes. Aggressive design changes to lower 
the center of gravity of the tank 
trailers. 
1.4 Drop section tanks and/or low-profile tires on the trailer. 
1.5 Are there other approaches? 
Widening the track width of a vehicle also improves roll 
stability.  Wider vehicles might also allow lower tanks.  For 
the following approaches, what are the additional costs?  
Are there weight penalties or advantages? Can tanks be 
lowered as a result? How much? 
2. Increase Track Width and 
Tank Width 
 2.1 Replace dual tires with wide-base single tires. 
2.2 Replace 96-inch axles with 102-inch axles. Assuming 102-inch width became 
legal on all roads: 2.3 Increase tank width from 96 to 102 inches 
Modern air suspensions typically provide better roll stability 
then the more traditional highway leaf-spring suspensions.  
To what extent have air-spring suspensions already 
replaced leaf-spring suspensions in your trailers?  Are there 
either cost or weight penalties or advantages for using air-
suspensions? 
3. Changes in Suspensions 
 
Of course other approaches may be considered, but these three general areas seem the most 
likely and plausible.  Options 2 and 3 in the table are self-explanatory, but in the case of reducing 
CG height, a number of options were considered possible, and these are developed in the 
following figures.  Figure 5-1(a) shows the dimensions of a standard DOT 406 trailer for 
gasoline transport, with a 9500 gallon oval-section tank; assuming a specific gravity of 0.7 for 
(gasoline) content, the gross loaded trailer weight is 63,300 lb and the CG height is 77.3 inches.  
Two simple variations are then considered, either keeping the basic oval tank unchanged (case 
(b)) or additionally employing a tapered cross section that increases the tank diameter in the 
central portion of the tank (case (c)). 
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Figure 5 -  1(a) Standard Case (406 oval tank, CG height   77 inches) 
 
 




Figure 5 -  1(c) Tank Lowered, Tapered Tank Design (CG height   68 inches) 
 
In case (b) the reduction in CG height is achieved by developing a low-profile 5th wheel (with an 
estimated 2 inch height reduction at the front of the tank) and low profile tires (215/75R17.5J 
tires) at the rear, which would enable around 8 inches of height reduction.  Adding to this a 
reasonably compact design to integrate the trailer frame rail with the tank support frame might 
reduce the rear mounting of the tank by a further 4 inches, giving an expected 12 inches 
reduction overall at the rear – see Figure 5-1(b).  In case (c), a modest geometric change is also 
proposed, with the central tank diameter some 12 percent larger than at the ends. 
 
Figure 5-2 shows similar design possibilities in a DOT 412 trailer used to transport hazardous 
waste, acids, or other chemicals.  Here the tank has a circular section and the fixed 5200 gallon 
fluid is assumed to have a specific gravity of 1.2.  The results are essentially the same, except 
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that a further case is considered – in case (d) the cylindrical tank is assumed to hang down 
between the supporting axles, while maintaining a maximum clearance of 22 inches above the 
ground (12 inch legal minimum ground clearance per 49 CFR 178.345-8(a)5 plus an estimated 
10 inches for pipes and valves).  In this case there is clearly no purpose in using a low profile  
5th wheel or tires, and the potential reduction in CG height is quite impressive (from 77 inches to 
61 inches). 
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Figure 5 -  2(b) Tank Lowered, No Change to Tank Geometry (CG height   70 inches) 
 
 
Figure 5 -  2(c) Tank Lowered, Tapered Tank Design (CG height   68 inches) 
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Figure 5 -  2(d) Tank Lowered, Aggressive Drop Design (CG height   61 inches) 
5.2 Interviews and Results Summary  
Interviews were conducted with some of the largest cargo tank trailer manufacturers in the 
United States, some medium and very small manufacturers, and representatives of other 
stakeholders.  The aim was to gather information from diverse, experienced viewpoints.  To 
maximize the consistency of responses, an initial framework for possible design changes was 
undertaken ahead of the interview.  The information in Table 5-1 was sent to each of the 
organizations.  Table 5-2, in a similar format, has a digest of the responses. 
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Table 5 -  2 Interview Response for Design Options 
Design Options and Assumptions Comments and Suggestions 
1. Lower the Center of Gravity of Tank Trailers 
For Gasoline tankers a double taper tank is becoming 
accepted, with center heights reduced in the range 5-10 
inches.  Double conical relatively rare but feasible. 
1.1 Replace straight-bore tanks with 
conventional double conical tanks. 
At least two manufacturers produce a trailer that uses this 
general approach, together with an increased tank width, 
but without the low profile tire option.  It is feasible though 
not especially popular with customers.  Manufacturing 
issues for smaller companies in integrating tank support 
and trailer frame rails.  Some concern over 5th wheel 
kingpin flexibility and fore-aft load transfer. 
1.2 Use low profile 5th-wheel couplers 
and minimize the height of frame 
over suspension. 
Feasible but there is some operational resistance to 
reducing the tank bottom more than 10 inches.  In any 
case 30 inches may be a practical limit on ground 
clearance.  In some cases the double-conical has been 
applied for packaging advantage, rather than stability 
improvement. 
1.3 Extreme double conical tank shapes. 
Possible, and has the advantage of allowing circular 
section drop tanks.  Structural integrity of complex tank 
geometries a concern for smaller manufacturers.  Low 
profile tires on the tractor also likely to be required (though 
feasible).  Lowering only the rear of the tank, as in Figure 
5-1(b), will prevent gravity draining a compartmented tank, 
so the design will not be accepted by carriers of finished 
petroleum products. 
1.4 Drop section tanks and/or low-profile 
tires on the trailer. 
2. Increase Track Width and Tank Width 
2.1 Replace dual tires with wide-base 
single tires. 
Many advantages if triple rear axle used, but currently only 
low sales volumes. 
2.2 Replace 96-inch axles with 102-inch 
axles. 
Feasible and best case of “low hanging fruit” if legislation 
permitted on all road classes. 
Feasible, but limited appeal currently to operators.  
Extreme tank ovality may be a problem for manufacturing 
and structural stiffness. 
2.3 Increase tank width from 96 to 102 
inches 
Air and composite leaf springs already common – little 
scope for improvement over current use (on new trailers).  
Air suspension popular for ride quality and height control 
on discharge. 
3. Changes in Suspensions 
 
5.3 Tank and Trailer Design Change Analysis 
Based on the above considerations, a detailed computational analysis was carried out to estimate 
the effect on center-of-gravity heights for a number of feasible and representative design 
changes.  Initially it was assumed that improvements would be made simply from tank shape 
changes.  The oval tank case was considered, though as seen above the results for circular 
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section tanks are very similar.  Five feasible cases of “double taper” oval tanks were analyzed 
based on the “center drop” parameter, defined as the difference between the maximum and 
minimum vertical diameters of the tank.  The tank width was kept constant (to fully utilize the 
available lateral space, either at the standard 96 inches or the wider 102 inches).  With the tank 
length, volume, and width all fixed (see data in Table 5-3) the center drop parameter fully 
defines the tank geometry.  A final constraint is for the mounting heights at the front and rear of 
the tank – the standard 53-inch tank mounting height is assumed to be applied at reference points 
60 inches longitudinally from the end of the tank. 
 
Table 5 -  3 Basic Assumptions for a DOT406  
Semitrailer Design Case 
Value Units Parameter 
Fluid (gasoline) volume  9,500 gallons 
Tank wall thickness 1 inch 
Reference point on tank base:  
height about ground 53 inches 
Reference points on tank base: 
longitudinal distance from tank ends 60 inches 
Length of tank   460 inches 
 
 
Table 5 -  4 Tare Weights and Mass Center Heights 
wt, lb CG ht, in. 
axles 3,600 20
landing gear 500 35




Total Empty 13,090 
Sprung Empty 9,490 
 
The data for the straight-tank cases were derived from a combination of information from the 
manufacturers’ archive data, and from UMTRI files on geometric measurements of 406 tanks, as 
well as experiential knowledge of the weights and heights of trailer components – UMTRI has 
previously partially or totally disassembled trailers for mass measurements.  Estimates for all the 
tapered cases derive from modification of the straight-tank case.  The 5-, 8-, and 10-inch center 
drop cases have been seen in production and can be considered to define a range of typical and 
modest center of gravity (CG) reduction options.  The “aggressive” case of the 26.4-inch center 
drop corresponds to a 30-inch ground clearance at the tank center, previously noted as a practical 
lower limit. 
 
The CG height of the cargo was calculated using a spreadsheet “integration” in which the tapered 
tank is defined by its length, width, center drop, and volume – plus base height as described 
above.  (To be more precise the volume is calculated from the other parameters, and an iterative 
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selection of tank height is used to derive the prescribed volume.)  In the spreadsheet, the double 
taper tank is “cut” into 200 oval sections, the mass and CG height of each section is calculated, 
and the results are summed.  
 
Table 5-5 presents the results of these five cases for 96-inch-wide semi tankers and for 102-inch-
wide semi tankers, where in the latter case, the tank is assumed to have been widened as well as 
the running gear. 
 
Table 5 -  5 Heights – Oval Tank Geometry Change Only (height above ground in inches) 
Tank Top of Tank
Center of Gravity of 
Tank Sprung Total 
96 x 65 straight 117.0 85.0 82.6 79.0 
96 5-inch drop 115.2 83.1 81.0 77.5 
96 8-inch drop 114.0 82.0 80.1 76.6 
96 10 inch drop 113.3 81.2 79.4 76.0 
96 26.4-inch drop 107.4 74.9 74.1 71.0 
      
102x60.5 straight 113.5 83.2 81.1 77.6 
102 5-inch drop 111.6 81.4 79.6 76.1 
102 8-inch drop 110.5 80.2 78.6 75.2 
102 10 inch drop 109.8 79.5 78.0 74.6 
102 26.4-inch drop 103.4 72.8 72.4 69.4 
 
Many combinations of feasible design changes are clearly possible, and a complete set will not 
be presented here.  However, it is worth considering the effect of the modest and more 
aggressive changes to tires and frame considered above, where a compact fifth wheel installation 
may be combined with structural integration of the tank carrier with the trailer frame rails.  
Additional height reductions are also possible using low-profile tires, and these are all 
summarized in Table 5-6, where the basic tank design has been chosen as the modest 10-inch 
center drop.  In the case where a wide track is combined with frame optimization and low-profile 
tires, a marked reduction in CG height is achieved, from the original 79 inches down to  
62.9 inches, and without any radical change in tank geometry. 
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Table 5 -  6 Heights – 10 inch Center Drop Case from Table 3-6 with Additional  
Frame Height Reductions (height above ground in inches) 
96-inch tank with 10-inch drop (59:69 inside minor diameters)   
   Heights above ground, inches   
Lower tank, inches  center of gravity    
Front  Rear top of tank tank sprung total 
3 4 110.3 77.7 75.9 72.7 
3 12.4 110.3 73.5 71.7 68.4 
11.4 12.4 101.9 69.3 67.5 64.5 
   
102-inch tank with 10-inch drop (59:69 inside minor diameters)   
   Heights above ground, inches   
Lower frame by 
inches  center of gravity    
Front  Rear top of tank tank sprung total 
3 4 106.8 76.0 74.2 71.0 
3 12.4 106.8 71.8 69.9 66.8 
11.4 12.4 98.4 67.6 65.8 62.9 
 
5.4 Estimate of Benefits 
Several possible design modifications to improve the roll stability of cargo tank trailers have 
been discussed.  A commercially available computer model was used to estimate the roll 
threshold of the three selected cases for use in the benefit-cost analysis of Section 7.  This roll 
threshold was then used to estimate the number of crashes that could be prevented compared to 
the nominal case. 
5.4.1 Approach 
The nominal design case and three proposed improved designs were modeled in a commercial 
simulation package.  The four vehicles were simulated as they drove through a curve of constant 
radius at increasing speed.  The point at which the simulated vehicles rolled over was used to 
estimate the roll threshold of the four designs in a simple maneuver.  Then these four thresholds 
were used, along with historical rollover crash data, to quantify the expected rollover rates of the 
vehicles.  Comparisons of the rollover rates were carried forward to the benefit-cost analysis in 
Section 7. 
 
An alternative approach to estimating the rollover reductions from the proposed designs would 
have been to simulate a representative set of maneuvers with all four vehicle models and to 
compare their crash rates.  This approach was actually taken to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
electronic stability aids, as described in Section 5.4.  This alternative approach was appropriate 
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  80 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
for the electronic stability aids because their effectiveness is limited to untripped rollovers (i.e., 
those arising from maneuvering too quickly), and a representative set of maneuvers to evaluate 
them was already available.  Improvements in the basic stability of the vehicle are expected to 
reduce rollovers arising from all causes, tripped and untripped.  No set of roll-inducing 
maneuvers that includes a representative mix of trips from guardrails, embankments, and other 
vehicles is available.  On the other hand, the relationship between basic vehicle stability and 
rollover involvement, as evidenced in crash statistics, has been calculated, as is explained in 
Section 5.5.3.  As this relationship accounts for rollovers arising from all causes, it is appropriate 
to use. 
5.4.2 Vehicle Model and Simulation Methodology 
The nominal and modified vehicles were modeled in a commercially available simulation tool, 
VDANL, which was described in Section 4.4.1.  The basic VDANL model contains a number of 
parameters for describing a complete tractor-semitrailer combination.  These parameters are 
easily modified from the base case to simulate the designs that are being studied.  The design 
modifications being studied in this analysis are the height of the trailer and its track width.  Table 
5-7 shows the four cases that were simulated and the associated values that changed from case to 
case.  All parameters not listed in the table remained the same between cases.  These parameters 
were selected from the cases in Table 5-5.  The “nominal” case is the first row in the table, a 
straight tank on a 96-inch wide chassis.  The “Lower CG” case is the “10-inch drop” line in the 
Table 5-5, and the “aggressive” case is the 26.4-inch drop.  The “wider track” case in Table 5-7 
is identical to the “nominal” case but with the track widened on both trailer axles by six inches.  
It does not correspond to any of the cases in Table 5-5 and does not take advantage of the 
opportunity to lower any of the mass, so the improvement in roll threshold is conservative.   
 







Improvement   
82.6 79.4 82.6 74.1 Trailer Sprung CG height 
Trailer Sprung CG mass 59,800 59,800 59,800 59,800 
Trailer UnSprung CG height 18 18 18 18 
Trailer UnSprung CG mass 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 
96 96 102 96 Track Width (all 5 axles) 
78.9 75.9 78.9 70.9 Calculated trailer total CG height 
Note:  Masses are in pounds, lengths are in inches. 
 
A constant-radius, increasing speed maneuver was simulated to estimate the roll threshold of the 
four vehicles.  The simulation began with the truck motionless on a large flat surface.  The driver 
model was commanded to follow a constant radius circle as the vehicle slowly increased in 
speed.  The driver model would continue to attempt to hold this curvature as the truck reached 
higher speeds.  At a sufficiently high speed, the lateral acceleration would become great enough 
that the vehicle could no longer sustain the maneuver and the truck would roll over. 
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Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show representative data from a simulation.  Figure 5-3 simply shows that 
the speed increased linearly as the simulated truck drove in a circle.  Figure 5-4 is the time 
history x-y coordinates of the trailer’s center of gravity, illustrating the constant radius maneuver 
from a bird’s eye view. 
 
The data were then analyzed to determine at what dynamic state the vehicle encountered a 
rollover.  This process was repeated for all four cases.  In addition, each case was modeled while 
negotiating constant-radius circles of several sizes in order to generate several data points to use 
in correlation with available rollover data.  The two data points of primary interest were the 
forward velocity and instantaneous curvature in the trailer’s path at the moment of rollover.  
These two quantities could be used to calculate rollover threshold according to the following 
relationship: 
 
      (5-1) 
 
Where: 
Tr = Rollover Threshold, g 
V = Velocity at Rollover, ft/s 
r = radius at rollover, ft 
g  = gravitational acceleration (32.2 ft/s2). 
 
 
Figure 5 -  3 A Constant-radius, Increasing Speed Maneuver was Simulated to Estimate the Rollover  
Threshold of the Nominal Trailer Design and Three Proposed Improvements 
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Figure 5 -  4 Time History of Trailer’s Path in the Simulated Maneuver 
 
Table 5-8 lists the roll thresholds of the nominal and three improved designs.  All designs were 
simulated in circles of 50- and 75-ft radius.  The 75-ft values are more realistic, in part because 
the driver model is better able to hold the desired curvature.  Only the 75-ft nominal radius 
values were used for further calculation. 
 









radius of the 
trailer’s path 
at rollover, ft 
Roll 
threshold, 
V2/r, g Case 
Nominal 78.9 96 30.5 69.1 0.418 
75.9 96 31.1 68.1 0.441 Lower CG 
78.9 102 31.4 67.9 0.451 Wider Track 
Aggressive 
Improvement 70.9 96 34.7 77.9 0.480 
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5.4.3 Estimate of Reduction in Rollovers 
The solid curve in Figure 5-5 is based on historical crash data.  It is taken from Winkler et al. 
[2000], where it is Figure 5 on page 5.  (The scale is different here because the book uses metric 
units.)  The formula is calculated from a series of rollover crash databases, as explained in 
Appendix C of that book.  It quantifies the rate at which vehicles are involved in rollover crashes 
and how the rate decreases as the roll stability of the vehicle increases.   
 
The lines in the figure show how the roll rates for the respective trailer designs are estimated 
from their roll thresholds.  The thicker solid line on the figure begins on the x axis at the roll 
threshold of the nominal case, which is 0.418 g in Table 5-8.  The line rises to the solid curve 
and then moves to the left, where it meets the vertical axis at the value of 0.388.  This means 
that, based on historical crash data, a truck with a roll threshold of 0.418 g would be expected to 
experience 0.388 rollovers in one million miles (or 388 rollovers in one billion miles).  These 
two numbers appear in the first two columns of Table 5-9.   
 
The finely dotted line in Figure 5-5 is labeled LCG because it represents the trailer with a 
slightly lowered CG.  It begins at 0.441 g on the x axis and ends at 0.441 on the y axis.  
Lowering the CG from 82.6 in. to 79.4 in (Table 5-8) raises the roll threshold from 0.418 g to 
0.441 g (Table 5-8).  According to Figure 5-5, raising the roll threshold by this amount lowers 
the expected crash involvement from 0.388 to 0.342 rollovers per million miles of travel.  The 
ratio of predicted rollover rates is 0.342/0.388 or 0.88.  That means, for every 100 rollovers of a 
nominal trailer (CG height is 82.6 in.), the Lower CG trailer (CG height is 79.4 in.) would 
experience only 88 rollovers.  That is a 12 percent improvement because 100 – 88 is 12.  These 
are the numbers in the next two columns of Table 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5 -  5 Expected Rollover Rates for the Four Tank Designs, as Predicted  
from Estimates of Historical Crash Rates 
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In Figure 5-5, the fine, solid line represents the roll threshold and expected crash rate for the 
trailer with a 102-in. track width.  The dot-dash line represents the trailer with the aggressive 
improvement in CG height.   
 
Thus we have used a computer simulation in Section 5.4.2 to estimate the rollover threshold of 
each vehicle, and we used historical crash data in this section to predict the rollover frequency.  
All subsequent analysis will be based on ratios, or comparisons to the nominal case, so the minor 
assumptions required in the analysis are taken out.  The numbers in Table 5-9 were carried 
forward to Table 7-4 for the benefit-cost analysis in Section 7. 
 
The improvements will be considered only individually, not in combination.  If a certain portion 
of the market has already adopted the improvement, then the cost and benefit will be applied to 
only the remaining portion.  Similarly, if a certain portion of the market cannot adopt an 
improvement, its costs and benefits are excluded, too.  This is the case for carriers who deliver 
gasoline to stores with limited maneuvering room and who cannot tolerate any extra width to 
their trailers. 
 




















Nominal 0.418 0.388 1.00 -- -- 
Lower CG 0.441 0.342 0.88 12% $1500 to $4000
Wider Track 0.451 0.323 0.83 17% $150 to $800 
Aggressive 
Improvement 0.480 0.272 0.70 30% About $12,000 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Feasible approaches to improving the roll stability of cargo tank trailers are already on the 
market.  The advantages of a wider track width (i.e. 102 instead of 96 inches) are appreciated by 
many, but the benefits of a lowered tank are not as widely recognized.  A significantly lowered 
tank is feasible from an engineering perspective, but is limited by loading rack standards and, 
more fundamentally, by the drivers’ ability to repeatedly bend down to operate them. 
 
Analysis largely focused on structural design changes ranging from modest (e.g., reducing the 
mean height of the tank by slightly increasing its central diameter) to aggressive (either by 
radical tank re-design or through a combination of changes to tank, support structure and low 
profile tires).  It is interesting to note that several of the options proposed had already been 
developed and tested in some form or other.  Results for circular and oval tank shapes were very 
similar, and results presented are for the oval (gasoline) tanker design.  Track width increases are 
feasible, and both manufacturers and operators are receptive to this approach if standards were to 
permit legal use on all classes of highway.  Change in suspension is not a major source of 
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potential benefit, since air springs are almost universally purchased now.  No “other approaches” 
were suggested in the investigation, leaving just two relatively obvious and major methods of 
reducing rollover risk by mechanical design: making structural (and tire) alterations to lower the 
mass center, or increasing the track width, or both.  Overall, significant reductions in CG height 
are feasible compared to current standard designs. 
 
Of the several designs considered, three were selected for a quantitative benefits analysis and 
inclusion in the economic analysis of Section 7.  The model with the modest improvement in the 
lower center of gravity is similar to a model actually sold by at least two manufacturers.  Its cost 
premium over conventional trailers ranges from $1,500 to $4,000, depending on other factors.  In 
Section 7, this modification will be assigned a cost of $2,000.  The aggressive improvement in 
center of gravity height was estimated by its manufacturer to cost an additional $12,000.  Trailers 
with wider tandem axles are also on the market as existing products.  Manufacturers quoted cost 
premiums ranging from $150 to $800 for 102-inch-wide tandems.  The assumed cost in Section 7 
is $500, which was the quote from one manufacturer.  The expected benefits of these three trailer 
modifications are in Table 5-9. 
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6.0 Highway Design  
Some rollovers occur in part due to features of the highway itself.  Traffic patterns or mixes may 
have changed since the highway was designed, or drivers unfamiliar with the route may not 
appreciate the nature of the care required to negotiate a certain segment of the road.  This portion 
of the project undertook the nationwide identification of site-specific elements that may 
contribute to rollover crashes.  The question being answered in this section is “What lessons can 
be learned from the ways that difficult geometrics have been handled in the past?” 
6.1 Introduction 
Two national databases were used to identify sites of high rollover incidence:  the Motor Carrier 
Management Information System (MCMIS) Crash file and the national Highway Performance 
Management System (HPMS) database for the years 2003 and 2004.  The states with “top-
ranking” rollover crash experience, when normalized by the number of road miles per county, 
were Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.  The rollovers in these states geo-located 
using linear referencing data, and crash clusters were identified.  Those states with site-specific 
crash clustering were Florida and Wyoming.  While Illinois and Pennsylvania ranked high due to 
crash numbers, the crashes did not cluster at specific sites.  The Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) provided the road plans for the cluster sites and supplemental 
information about past and ongoing improvement measures. 
6.2 Site Selection  
The search for highway sites with a large number of rollovers began with the MCMIS Crash file.  
It was selected because it is the only national crash file that both allows crash locations to be 
identified and includes nonfatal rollovers.  UMTRI’s TIFA file can be used to identify specific 
locations, but the TIFA file is limited to fatal crashes, so the number of rollovers is not sufficient 
to efficiently identify rollover clusters.  There are about 650 fatal truck rollover crashes annually 
and the rollover is the first event in fewer than 200 of them.  Even combining multiple years of 
data would not result in a sufficient sample to effectively identify clusters.  In the two years of 
the MCMIS Crash file data, there were almost 5,100 first-event rollovers. 
 
The MCMIS Crash file is compiled by the FMCSA from reports by the states of truck and bus 
crash involvements that meet a specific crash severity.  Table 6-1 provides the reporting criteria.  
The file essentially covers all serious truck and bus crash involvements, though, as will be 
discussed below, it is known that reporting to the MCMIS Crash file is incomplete.  States are 
required to report a relatively limited set of data about each involvement, though the data are 
adequate for the purposes here.  These data include a simple vehicle configuration variable, 
which distinguishes trucks from buses and identifies the primary truck configurations; the state 
and county of the crash; the crash location in the form of a text string in which the states identify 
the location by any method; and a set of variables that capture the sequence of events.  Rollovers 
that occur as the first event in the crash can be identified, as the MCMIS file includes data fields 
for the sequence of events. 
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Table 6 -  1 Vehicle and Crash Severity Threshold for MCMIS Crash File 
Truck with GVWR over 10,000 or GCWR over 10,000, 
 or 
Bus with seating for at least nine, including the driver, 
 or 




Injury transported to a medical facility for immediate medical 
attention, 
 or 
Vehicle towed due to disabling damage. 
Accident 
 
The MCMIS Crash file is known to suffer from significant underreporting of cases.  UMTRI has 
evaluated reporting rates for a number of states, and shown that reporting varies widely.  Overall, 
it appears that less than 70 percent of reportable cases are reported, with rates varying by state 
from 9 percent to about 83 percent [see Green et al. 2005a and 2005b for a representative 
sample].  The UMTRI evaluations have shown that reporting typically varies by crash severity.  
The more serious crash involvements are more likely to be reported.  Trucks are more likely to 
be reported than buses, and large trucks are more likely to be reported than small trucks. 
 
However, these defects do not significantly constrain the purpose for this project.  The goal here 
is to identify locations with a high number of rollovers. The reporting bias that has been 
demonstrated in MCMIS does not prevent this, since the underreporting that has been found is 
not biased against high-crash locations.  In fact, rollovers are actually more likely to be reported 
than non-rollovers, since a rollover crash is much more likely to be serious.  Moreover, there is 
no reason to think that crashes that occur in clusters are less likely to be reported than other 
crashes.  Non-reporting might limit sample size, but should not bias the identification of rollover 
clusters. 
 
The goal of this exercise is to identify clusters of truck rollover crashes.  A cluster of rollovers 
may indicate that some characteristic or condition of the infrastructure increases rollover risk. 
Roadway curvature, lane width, shoulder construction, super-elevation, profile, and improper 
signage may all contribute to rollovers at a specific location.  Note that a cluster does not 
necessarily indicate a roadway problem.  The site may experience higher exposure to high-risk 
truck configurations or just a higher volume of traffic.  Location of an industrial facility or 
terminal that increases truck traffic at certain sites may also result in more rollovers.  The data 
available in the MCMIS Crash file is not sufficient to sort out the different risks associated with 
rollover.  Nevertheless, identifying clusters of rollovers is the first step to identifying 
infrastructure characteristics that contribute to rollover. 
 
Two years of the MCMIS Crash file were combined to improve the ability to identify high-
rollover locations.  Crash files for 2003 and 2004 were used.  These were the most recent years 
available at the time the work was performed.  The file was filtered to subset only rollovers that 
occurred as the first event in the crash sequence.  First-event rollovers, rather than those that 
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follow a collision event, are the most likely to be related to roadway characteristics.  All cargo 
body types and truck configurations were included.  Tractor-semi-trailers and tank cargo bodies 
are more likely to roll more than most other truck combinations, and since the goal is to identify 
high-risk locations, there is no reason to exclude the rollovers of lower-risk vehicles.  
 
We attempted to increase the chances of identifying rollover clusters by normalizing the number 
of rollovers by road miles.  The logic is that counties that have an unusually high number of 
rollovers per mile of roadway are more likely to have locations with large numbers of rollovers. 
Rollovers were counted in the MCMIS Crash file for each county in the country.  Estimates of 
the number of road miles were obtained from the FHWA HPMS data.  The number of rollovers 
per mile of roadway was calculated for each county, by dividing the number of rollovers that 
occurred over a two-year period by the total number of road miles in the county.  The fifty 
counties with the highest number of rollovers per mile of roadway were identified for further 
investigation.  The twelve top counties are shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6 -  2 The Counties with the Highest Heavy Vehicle Rollover Rates 
Top Ranking Rollover Crashes Ranked by County 
All Rollover Crashes Were Normalized by the number of road miles in that county 












1 Illinois Cook IL31 80 75 1872.92 0.04271 
2 Florida Duval FL31 37 31 528.36 0.07003 
3 Florida Polk FL105 30 5 588.74 0.05096 
4 Florida Palm Beach FL99 28 8 701.89 0.03989 
5 Florida Hillsborough FL57 28 8 720.05 0.03889 
6 Florida Broward FL11 28 6 722.4 0.03876 
7 Wyoming Platte WY31 25 24 219.77 0.11376 
8 Pennsylvania Luzerne PA79 24 11 554.81 0.04326 
9 Pennsylvania Berks PA11 23 11 500.29 0.04597 
10 Wyoming Carbon WY7 23 22 515.26 0.04464 
11 Wyoming Laramie WY21 22 20 389.52 0.05648 




369 242 7622.98   Total Rollover Crashes Counties –  TOP 12 Counties 
Percent Geo-located 65.58%   
 
While the MCMIS file contains crash location by road name, the record does not include 
latitude/longitudinal coordinates needed to geo-locate the crashes.  The MCMIS field for 
denoting crash location varies widely, with some states including very specific information while 
others include broad information or leave the field blank.  Knowing precisely where the crashes 
occurred is essential to identifying clusters and examining the road geometrics.  
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Using the top fifty ranking counties, the state departments of transportation or traffic crash 
records offices were contacted to get supplemental information to geo-locate the crashes 
identified through the MCMIS records.  Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming provided 
their official state crash records for the identified crashes.  These records contained information 
allowing for the geo-location of the crashes.  In addition to these crash records, states provided 
information on how to reference the crashes using the geographically referenced state base-map 
of their public road system.  The method and type of information needed to locate the crashes 
varies among the states and required the coordination of various data sources to geo-locate the 
crashes.  
 
With the crashes geo-located, clusters were identified.  For the purpose of this project a “cluster” 
was defined to be a location where two or more crashes occurred in 2003-04, along the same 
section of roadway and within approximately a half mile of each other.  This crash clustering 
criterion was necessary to establish whether the geometrics of the roadway experienced by the 
driver prior to the crash had any potential influence on the crash event.  While there were 
numerous clusters observed, for example at an interchange, there were many cases the crashes 
were on different ramps of the same interchange and could not have been caused by the same 
design element.  With the cluster criteria applied, only Florida and Wyoming experienced 
clustering to suggest that further investigation was warranted.  Wyoming crashes that cited 
“high-severe wind effects” as crash causation were filtered out.  This reduced the number of 
Wyoming crashes to 36.  This subset was then examined, and three clusters were identified for 
detailed study.  
 
Department of Transportation representatives in Wyoming were contacted and details of the 
research project and nature of the request were discussed.  Following these conversations, a 
detailed request for information for each site was prepared and forwarded to DOT personnel.  
The request sought road plan details for the identified sections and information on any 
countermeasures undertaken to alleviate large truck crashes along with the details and cost 
associated with these efforts.  Wyoming staff were most cooperative and were able to relate 
experience in a variety of highway situations.  (The team also contacted other states with 
potential clusters identified in the analysis or with locations having known rollover history.   
The other states either did not have sufficient recordkeeping to verify the existence of clusters or 
were not able to provide timely information.) 
6.3 Site Cases 
The three sites investigated in Wyoming are: 
 
• I-25 College Drive North Section – Laramie County 
• I-80 near Buck Sullivan Spring Road, Telephone Canyon Section – Laramie County 
• I-80 Union Avenue, Rawlins-Walcott Junction – Carbon County. 
 
Their locations are indicated in Figure 6-1, and background information on the sites is provided 
in Table 6-3.  The individual discussions of each site include a description of the roadway 
elements, crash cluster map, aerial photo, and crash details.  The discussion of each site 
concludes with a description of the countermeasures and a projection of their effectiveness. 
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Figure 6 -  1 Map Showing the Three Sites in Wyoming that were Selected for Detailed Study 
(Map from the National Atlas, U.S. Geological Survey) 
 
 
Table 6 -  3 Summary of the Three Sites in Wyoming that were Selected for Study 










Road Plans Location 
I-25  
Laramie County College Drive North 
Interstate 
Urban 11,000 +35% 2003 
I-80 near Buck 





Rural 14,500 +40% 1996 





Rural 12,721 +45% 1999 
 
6.3.1 College Drive North Section 
Site Description: 
 
During the years of 2003-04, three rollover crashes occurred on I-25 in the College Drive North 
area along a road section of approximately 2953 ft, which includes a bridge structure passing 
over US-30.  This portion of roadway is a horizontally straight section with 2 vertical curves, a 
crest vertical curve 1469 ft long and a sag curve 1597 ft in length.  The northbound traffic 
encounters a +1.7 percent uphill grade cresting then followed by a -3.9 percent downgrade.  
Southbound traffic travel travels a +2.4 percent grade followed by a -1.71 percent grade.  The 
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cross sectional elements of both northbound and southbound travel are 2 12-ft concrete lanes, 
with paved 4-ft inside and 10-ft outside shoulders. 
 
Table 6 -  4 Crashes in the College Drive North Section 









Factor Truck Cargo 
General Freight Rollover Flatbed NB 9.14 Un-safe Speed 
Livestock Rollover/Cargo Shift Van SB 8.8 Un-safe Speed 
Empty Rollover Dump Truck NB 9.0 Inattentive Driver 
 
Crash and Countermeasures Cost: 
 
All the crashes occurred in daylight on a dry surface indicating that there were no adverse 
pavement conditions.  No horizontal curves were experienced prior to the crash.  This conclusion 
is based on the crash record, which did not record the vehicles entering or exiting from the ramp 
near the site.  One of the NB crash reports noted that the crash was intersection related; however, 
since no other vehicle was involved, it is not clear whether the crash involved the on ramp from 
I-80 or not.   
 
Both vertical curves fall within AASHTO standards.  WYDOT staff reported that they are 
unaware of any pavement surface or other issues that might explain the cluster.  WYDOT is 
currently not considering any truck crash-related countermeasures at this time.  The cluster is 




Since neither adverse whether nor pavement conditions were noted in the crash reports, it 
appears that trucks may be having difficulty negotiating the vertical curves along a bridge 
structure in close proximity of traffic entering and exiting from the nearby interchange ramps.  
The weaving maneuvers of other vehicles and a significant volume of large trucks may be 
contributing to the formation of this cluster.  The site’s urban location and proximity of two 
interchanges make reconstruction countermeasures unlikely.  Based on this information, a non-
construction countermeasure agreeable to WYDOT is the installation of signage warning of 
large, slow moving truck traffic, which would cost approximately $10,000 to$12,000.  (Power 
and communication connections are not included in this estimate). 
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Figure 6 -  2 I-25 at College Drive North Section 
(Map from the National Map, U.S. Geological Survey) 
 
6.3.2 Telephone Canyon Section 
Site Description: 
 
During the years of 2003-04, two rollover and one run-off road crashes occurred on I-80 near 
Buck Sullivan Spring Road along a 3000 ft section.  At the time of these crashes the posted 
speed was 75 mph.  The portion of the roadway experiencing this crash cluster is a continuous 
downgrade comprised of three vertical curves 400-500 ft long with grades between 4.6 and  
5.2 percent.  Along this downgrade are four horizontal curves with a design speed of 65 mph.  
Three of the horizontal curves have radii of 1637 ft (a degree of curvature of 3º 30’) and are 
super-elevated 0.08.  The fourth horizontal curve is 3810 ft (degree of curvature of 1º 30’) and is 
super-elevated at 0.046.  The westbound cross sectional elements are two 12-ft lanes, with paved 
10-ft outside and 4-ft inside shoulders.  There is a 42-in. concrete median barrier between the 
east and westbound lanes.  This median height was chosen to help block large truck traffic from 
losing control and crossing into oncoming traffic.  Road plans for the cluster site with the 
locations of the crashes indicated relative to the geometrics described are included in 
Appendix K.  A 6100-ft acceleration lane is available for eastbound traffic along with outside 
paved shoulder widths varying from 6 to 10 ft along this section. 
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Factor Truck Cargo 
General Freight Rollover Van WB 320.0 Un-safe Speed 
General Freight Rollover Van WB 320.3 Un-safe Speed 
Ran-off 
Road Van WB 320.56 Un-safe Speed General Freight 
 
Crash and Countermeasures Cost:  
 
All three crashes involved trucks traveling along a westbound downgrade comprised of 3 sag 
vertical curves as well as a series of 4 horizontal curves.  The environment and pavement 
conditions for two of the crashes occurred in daylight on a wet surface.  The remaining crash 
occurred at night with dry and clear conditions noted.  This two-lane, westbound concrete section 
of highway is considered by WYDOT as having a significant truck crash problem. 
 
WYDOT is frequently forced to close I-80 due to adverse weather and wind in the mountainous 
terrain.  With no acceptable alternate routes, most truckers are forced to sit out the closures.  
WYDOT actively monitors I-80 and has come under pressure from the trucking industry to keep 
it open to traffic.  Therefore, to improve safety and respond to the concerns of the trucking 




48 Ethernet Radio Antenna 
18 Communication Towers 
6 Remote Video Cameras 
7 Vehicle Monitoring Systems 
1 Highway Advisory Radio System
12 Dynamic Message Signs 
 
In advance of the cluster site is a changeable message sign with flashing lights.  In addition, the 
preceding 17-mile westbound stretch has some 14 ITS message sign installations providing 
drivers a variety of advisory messages such as: road ahead is closed, hazardous conditions are 
present, or directing drivers to tune to radio station 1610 for traffic alerts.  WYDOT also 
permanently lowered the speed limit from 75 to 65 mph within the last year.  
 
WYDOT has also completed a spot blasting treatment to increase the pavement friction.  This 
treatment did not last long and is not considered a long-term solution to increasing the pavement 
surface friction.  Currently, WYDOT is planning to place a textured overlay along the Telephone 
Canyon section to create a more durable increase in the surface friction.  
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Conclusions: 
 
This section of roadway presents both geometric and surface texture challenges.  The horizontal 
curves fall within AASHTO minimums; however, portions of the sag vertical curves exceed the 
recommended maximum of 5 percent for regions described as mountainous with values of 
between 5.1 percent and 5.2 percent.  Highway design in this mountainous area presented 
significant challenges.  As a result the excess grade was approved as an acceptable deviation 
from the recommended maximum values and also dictated the downhill vertical and horizontal 
curve combination.  Due to these design constraints WYDOT sought and received approval for a 
“Non-Conforming Design Criteria Design Exception.”  This exception to AASHTO guidelines 
was prepared by WYDOT engineers, submitted, and approved by the FHWA Division 
Administrator. 
 
Since the completion of the 1996 highway improvement project, WYDOT has taken an 
aggressive approach to improving the safety of this roadway.  Lowering the posted speed, 
providing real-time driver information, restricting traffic due to weather conditions, and 
improving the pavement texture were intended to improve the crash rate and reduce the 
frequency of road closures.  Analyzing the before and after crash figures since the deployment of 
the ITS initiatives and lowering the speed will help reveal whether these methods will 
significantly reduce crashes.  However, at this time WYDOT is not planning a before/after study.  
While improving geometric elements is seen as preferred, the reconstruction necessary to address 
the grade and alignment issues is viewed as cost prohibitive and nearly impossible due to the 






























Figure 6 -  3 Telephone Canyon Section 
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6.3.3 Rawlins-Walcott Junction Section 
During the years of 2003-04, 3 rollover crashes occurred on westbound I-80 near Union Avenue 
along an 850-ft section.  The portion of the roadway experiencing the crash cluster is comprised 
of a sag vertical curve with a 1.4 percent downgrade followed by a 1.8 percent upgrade with a 
length of 656 ft.  Along this section is also a horizontal curve with a design speed of 75 mph, a 
radius of 2249 ft (6º 23’degree of curvature) and a superelevation of 0.08. The westbound cross 
sectional elements are two 12-ft lanes, with paved 5-ft inside and 10-ft outside shoulders.  This 
westbound bituminous concrete section of highway is also referred to as the Rawlins East 
Section of Carbon County. 
 














Trailer/Single WB 219.76 Un-safe Speed 
General 












N/A Passenger Car N/A EB No Violations 
N/A Passenger Car N/A EB No Violations 
 
Crash Countermeasures and Cost: 
 
Two of the three crashes occurred on icy or snowy pavements.  When matching MCMIS crashes 
to the WYDOT crash records, a discrepancy was noted.  MCMIS indicates that these were 
single-vehicle crashes.  However, the WYDOT crash records indicate that passenger vehicles 
were also involved and traveling eastbound.  The driving activity noted for all vehicles prior to 
the crashes was traveling straight.  Therefore, based on the crash records alone it is unclear 
whether merging or weaving maneuvers contributed to the crash clustering.  
 
The horizontal and vertical curve elements of this section meet the AASHTO standards. 
WYDOT is familiar with this area and commented that the horizontal curve is one of the sharpest 
they have along I-80 and may be contributing to truck crashes in the area.  WYDOT completed a 
study of the interchange, which included modification of the horizontal curvature.  However, the 
area is constrained by other crossroads and railroad tracks, making reconstruction unlikely.  The 
suggested countermeasure is a sign warning of large, slow moving truck traffic that is consistent 
with other I-80 installations.  Upstream of the site, westbound traffic travels through the new ITS 
safety initiative between mile points 357 and 318. 
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Conclusions: 
 
Two of the three crashes occurred on icy or snow pavement, and passenger vehicles may have 
been involved.  Therefore, based on the discussions with WYDOT and the crash records it would 
appear that negotiating this sag and horizontal curve combination, pavement conditions, and the 
speed differences between large trucks and light vehicles may be posing problems for trucks. 
 
As part of the 2006 ITS initiative variable message signing, web cameras and atmospheric 
sensors are now located at the I-80 Walcott Junction in advance of the site.  Extending this 
project further to include the crash cluster may help reduce truck crashes.  As was noted above 
for the I-80 Buck Sullivan Spring Road site; this ITS initiative was undertaken to address the 
crash problems encountered along a significant portion the I-80 section.  On average I-80 carries 
an average 10,000 vehicles per day with 50 percent of this figure being large truck traffic. 
6.4 Lessons Learned 
A lesson to be learned from this analysis is that special provisions are needed when geography 
prevents ideal highway geometrics.  The highway geometrics that appear to be contributing the 
most to large truck rollover crashes at the three sites evaluated in Wyoming are the combination 
of vertical and horizontal curves.  Slick pavements and high truck volumes were also factors for 
the crashes examined.  
 
Constraints to the highway design due to terrain required an exception to the AASHTO 
guidelines when designing the downhill/curve portion of I-80 near Buck Sullivan Road.  Since 
significant geometric modifications are cost prohibitive along this section, WYDOT is using 
non-geometric countermeasures to increase traffic safety.  These countermeasures include 
increasing the pavement friction to improve handling on slick roads.  Methods to increase 
pavement friction include spot blasting the pavement or putting down a textured pavement 
overlay.  WYDOT also has installed cameras and atmospheric sensors along 40 miles of I-80 to 
monitor how weather and wind are affecting the roadway surface and traveling conditions.  This 
information is used to provide timely driver warnings using changeable message signs and to 
determine whether road closure is necessary.  These countermeasures are part of a $2.7 million 
ITS traffic safety initiative along I-80. 
 
Wyoming is one of a few states that routinely experiences crashes due to high winds acting upon 
the vehicle.  Winds in excess of 80 mph have been known to snap off power poles and require 
closing highways, particularly I-80.  The Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) 
policy is to monitor weather conditions and release travel advisories for light and high-profile 
vehicles as well as to restrict the travel of trucks carrying hazardous substances and oversized 
loads.  Little can be done with the geometrics of the roadway to mitigate the effects of high 
winds on vehicles.  In a few cases modifying cross sectional grading can be adjusted to keep 
from trapping winds.  Countermeasures to compensate for high winds are related to the direction 
of travel over the geometric elements of the road itself.  For example, a north-south road may be 
traversing an area known for strong east-west winds and experiencing a significant number of 
rollover crashes.  Windbreaks installed along the roadside will help reduce crash numbers.  
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However, long expanses of windbreaks are expensive and to date have been cost prohibitive for 
WYDOT to deploy. 
 
 
Figure 6 -  4 I-80 Near Union Avenue, Rawlins-Walcott Junction – Carbon County 
(Map from the National Map, U.S. Geological Survey) 
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7.0 Benefit-Cost Analysis 
The final question to be answered in this report is, “Are the approaches discussed in the report 
cost effective?”  This question will be answered quantitatively through Benefit-Cost Analysis 
(BCA), a common and widely accepted analytical technique for evaluating how worthwhile 
government or other programs or policies are.  This is accomplished by carefully monetizing the 
benefits and costs of the policy or program across a relevant time period.  Those monetized 
values are then discounted to the present for comparison as both benefits net of costs and benefit-
cost ratios.  As long as the net benefits are positive (comparable to a benefit-cost ratio greater 
than one), a proposed program or policy creates value for society. 
 
Benefits for all mitigation methods take the form of crashes avoided.  Costs are primarily the 
explicit costs of carrying out the mitigation method for the prescribed set of drivers or vehicles 
including the cost of purchase of the technology, labor costs, and other one-time and recurrent 
costs. 
 
Full benefit-cost analyses were conducted for the vehicle design, electronic stability aids, and 
driver training approaches.  The costs of these systems have been listed, and their benefits have 
been estimated in the previous sections of the report.  The highway design approach to avoiding 
rollovers is fundamentally different from the other three, and it is not discussed in this section.   
7.1 General Methodology 
The methodology specific to the development of the monetized benefits and costs are discussed 
in sections 7.2 (benefits) and 7.3 (costs) below.  However, the methodology for how the different 
mitigation approaches are handled moving across time and some assumptions apply across both 
the costs and the benefits.  The values for the costs of each proposed approach and the efficacy 
of each approach (the fraction of crashes it is expected to prevent) were developed in Sections 3, 
4, and 5.  Appendix F lists more of the assumptions for the analysis and sources for many of the 
other numbers used in the calculations. 
7.1.1 Common Assumptions 
When carrying out BCA for multiple programs or policies, a common set of assumptions is 
necessary to keep the individual analyses comparable to each other.  One of the most important 
assumptions to hold in common is the rate used to discount the estimated future benefits and 
costs of each policy to the present.  The BCA for each of the three mitigation methods and the 
different scenarios presented for them use a real rate of 7 percent as suggested by the Office of 
Management and Budget [White House OMB, 2003], though results are also presented using a  
4 percent rate, which is consistent with the discount rate internal to the crash cost estimates 
discussed in Section 7.2.   
 
The same methodology for monetizing the benefits (crashes avoided) is used throughout, and is 
described in Section 7.2.3.  Finally, while different elements of the fleet and population of 
drivers are relevant for the different mitigation approaches, the assumptions used are compatible 
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(for instance, the same ratio of drivers to tractors that pull hazmat tanker trailers is applied in the 
training analysis as well as in the electronic stability control analysis). 
 
The analyses are presented in real dollars using 2007 as the base year, meaning that no price 
inflation is computed for either benefits or costs moving forward.  Therefore, the only inflation 
calculations necessary are to bring past estimates (like crash costs) for years prior to 2007 up to 
the base year level.  This is done using the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Producer Price Index 
(PPI) [U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007], except for wage data, which 
is adjusted up to 2007 dollars using BLS’s Employment Cost Index (ECI).  Another important 
assumption is that none of the methods described will be carried out under the status quo.  This is 
clearly a strong assumption, as some manufacturers are already installing electronic stability 
controls and some carriers are revising their training programs.  Changing this assumption could 
lead to lower benefits, but also lower costs as the cost of any action that would have been taken 
voluntarily would not be counted in the analysis. 
7.1.2 Common Time Period for Analysis and Timing Assumptions 
The time period considered for the benefits and costs must be consistent across the different 
analyses of the approaches.  Generally, the time period for analysis is matched to the economic 
life of the technology under examination.  When considering multiple technologies or 
approaches, the time period under analysis is often set to be the life of the approach with the 
longest economic life.  The method of deployment also influences what the appropriate time 
frame should be for the analysis, particularly when, as in this case, full deployment will not be 
achieved in the first year. 
 
The training approach does not require a fleet profile, but there are new capital expenditures 
required (simulators) and other logistical considerations that would need to be resolved.  An 
instantaneous 100 percent deployment is unrealistic.  For this reason, the training is phased in at 
20 percent per year up to five years beyond which 100 percent of new drivers will receive the 
training.  The base number of drivers was calculated as 1.1 drivers per tractor based on a 
weighted mean from the MCMIS data (see Appendix J).  The number of tractors for this per-
tractor used was the same for the electronic stability control.  While individual carriers may use 
more or fewer drivers, the carrier-level experience is not explored in this analysis, so the number 
is reliable for getting to the national number of drivers that correspond to this segment of the 
trucking industry.  Growth in the number of drivers, 2.2 percent, and the replacement rate of 
drivers including growth and retirement, 4.2 percent, were drawn from a recent study of the labor 
needs of the trucking industry [Global Insight, 2005].  These rates were directly applied to the 
population as there was no need in the analysis to track the specific vintage of the drivers across 
time.  These rates were used to calculate the number of new drivers each year for costs.  The 
benefits do not rely on the absolute number of drivers—only the relative proportions of crashes 
and proportion of drivers receiving the training during the phase-in. 
 
The life of the electronic stability control technology will be the life of the vehicle on which each 
is mounted.  Rapid advances in electronics make it difficult to predict the effectiveness of 
devices that will be on replacement vehicles entering the fleet in 20 years.  As a simplifying, 
lower-bounding assumption, the replacement devices will be imputed with the same 
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effectiveness as the original devices.  The life of the truck tractors the technology will be 
installed on is assumed to be 10 years.  The same procedure described above for building the 
fleet profile was used for the trucks.  In this case, the VIUS data allowed for the specific 
identification of trucks that pull HM tank trailers.  The age distribution was smoothed and scaled 
to reflect all trucks being 10 years or younger.  A different assumption of a longer life for the 
trucks or trailers would reduce the costs, but would extend the phase-in time for the technology 
and thus the benefits.  The base number of truck tractors that haul HM tankers assumed for the 
analysis is 53,450 in 2002 from the VIUS.  Appendix H contains a detailed explanation of the 
development of the fleet profiles for both the vehicle design and electronic stability control. 
 
The analyses assume that the new vehicle designs and the stability technology will be required 
on all new trucks beginning in 2008.  This is why a fleet age profile is necessary—as the existing 
vehicles age and are gradually retired, with the last vehicles being retired at age 15 for the trailers 
and age 10 for the trucks, they are replaced with new vehicles.  The new vehicles make up not 
only for the retired vehicles but also for growth in the fleet.  Growth in the fleet was assumed to 
be 1.5 percent annually, which is consistent with the 5 and 20 year averages in gasoline 
deliveries in the United States as reported by the Department of Energy’s Energy Information 
Administration.  As the fleet grows with new vehicles that have the new designs or technology 
and as old vehicles are replaced with the new vehicles, the share of the fleet made up of the new 
vehicles grows until 100 percent deployment is achieved in the year after the last of the vehicles 
that were bought before the new designs and technology are retired.  The share of the fleet that 
has the new vehicle design or the electronic stability technology is used to modify the efficacy 
rates described in the next section to reflect the phasing in of the improvements. 
 
Even though many trucks retired from hauling HM go on to have useful lives in other parts of the 
industry, the benefits of the new trailer designs and the electronic stability technology in that 
extended useful life are ignored in this analysis.  This was necessary because capturing the 
correct crash statistics in those other parts of the industry would be beyond the scope of this 
study.  However, excluding these benefits leads to a conservative, direct estimate of the crashes 
avoided. 
 
The life of the tank trailers specific to hauling petroleum products is assumed to be 15 years for 
the vehicle design approach.  The current number of trailers was taken to be 20,000, based on 
industry estimates (See Appendix G).  A fleet profile was constructed using the age distribution 
of all heavy trucks from the Census Bureau’s VIUS.  The proportion of vehicles in each age 
category were regressed on the age of the vehicles to smooth out the age distribution, thus 
eliminating “bumps” associated with industry fluctuations.  This age distribution was then scaled 
to reflect 100 percent of the vehicles being 15 years or younger.   
 
While all of the rollover mitigation options discussed in this study will be fully phased in and 
deployed by the 15th year, setting the time frame for the analysis at year 15 would count only 
one year in which the longest-lived mitigation approach was in full effect.  For this reason, the 
time period for the analyses was set at 20 years.  A 30-year time frame was explored, but 
extending the time frame exposes the costs and benefits to significant further discounting.  As a 
result of the heavy discounting in the later years, using the 20-year period leads to the same 
conclusions about the relative merits of the three approaches (meaning the difference in period 
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does not change any signs on the net benefits or lead to a change in BCRs with respect to 
whether they are greater or smaller than one). 
7.2 Benefits 
The analysis for each rollover mitigation approach defines benefits in the same way to allow an 
“apples to apples” comparison.  Each analysis has produced an efficacy rate that, when used 
together with a subset of the national crash statistics described below, yields an estimated annual 
reduction in the number of crashes.  These efficacy rates are modified year by year in each 
analysis to reflect both the degree of overall market penetration expected for the mitigation type 
(in the case of the wide track tank trailers, some markets will not be able to accommodate them) 
and the degree to which the mitigation type has been phased in, which varies in each analysis 
(discussed in Section 7.1.2). 
7.2.1 Estimating the Pool of Relevant Crashes 
Each of the approaches to reducing rollovers works differently and will address a different 
fraction of the rollover population.  The following discussion will select the crashes that are 
available to be prevented by the approaches in this report and state the assumptions used to select 
the numbers. 
 
The assumption for driver training is that the improved training will make the performance of 
new drivers more like that of experienced drivers.  New drivers dominate the youngest brackets 
in the age distribution for drivers.  If these younger, new drivers could be trained better in order 
to perform like more experienced, older drivers, then their crash rates would presumably be more 
similar.  The crashes avoided by the modernized training are based on the proportion of crashes 
that happen to young drivers above the proportion they represent of the driver population.  The 
calculations to determine this number of crashes is carried out assuming that miles traveled per 
driver are relatively evenly distributed across the age brackets.  (Other sources made the same 
assumption; none could be found to provide data to indicate otherwise.)  Table 7-1 contains the 
age distribution of the drivers drawn from a recent study of the labor needs of the trucking 
industry [Global Insight, 2005], as well as two different estimates of the distribution of crashes 
by the driver’s age.  The first is drawn from MCMIS and shows drivers under 35 representing  
28 percent (5+23) of the crashes, while they represent only 24 percent (3+21) of the population.  
The GES data show drivers under 35 representing 32 percent (8+24) of crashes.  The GES 
numbers will be the basis for the upper bound relevant crash estimates. 
 
The assumption is that the training will reduce the number of new-driver rollovers for HM 
semitrailer tankers.  The overall crashes, regardless of age are 405 annually according the  
GES and 181 according to MCMIS.  Calculating the number of crashes that occur 
disproportionately to the younger age groups requires calculating their share of the relevant 
rollovers (405 multiplied by each category’s percent of crashes) and subtracting from it the 
number of crashes that each group would have had, if crashes had been proportional to 
population (405 multiplied by the percent of drivers who fall into each age category).  Table 7-1 
contains the results of these calculations. 
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<25 3% 13.8 6.2 8% 5% 31.3 8.7 17.6 2.5
25-35 21% 85.1 38.0 24% 23% 97.1 41.6 12.0 3.6
35-45 33% 132.8 59.4 32% 33% 130.8 59.7 -2.1 0.4
45-55 26% 106.5 47.6 25% 21% 100.6 37.3 -6.0 -10.3
55-65 14% 56.3 25.2 9% 16% 37.2 28.1 -19.1 2.9
>65 3% 11.3 5.1 2% 3% 8.0 4.9 -3.3 -0.2
 
Summing the less than 25 years category with the 25 to 30 years category produces a lower 
bound of relevant crashes of 6 and an upper bound of 30. 
 
Electronic aids to roll stability are designed to reduce the speed of a vehicle when it is cornering 
too fast.  They are intended to reduce the number of pre-crash conflicts where a vehicle is 
traveling too fast through a curve.  According to Table 2-8 this is the combination of conflicts 
1.4 and 4.4, “Truck is turning or negotiating a curve at excessive speed and loses control.”  
Untripped rollovers can result from this conflict, and single-vehicle roadway departures (SVRD) 
can result as well.  In Table 2-8, there were 185 SVRD crashes accompanying a rollover from 
Conflict 1.4 and 55 crashes categorized as “Untripped rollovers” from Conflict 4.4.  Within the 
SVRD crashes accompanying a rollover, 72 had the “untripped” flag set in the GES database and 
113 did not.  GES does not indicate the sequence of the rollover and the roadway departure.  
However, it is plausible that the trucks in the “untripped” cases rolled on the highway and then 
departed the highway.  The “tripped” cases may represent crashes where the vehicle departed the 
road and was tripped by a curb or dropoff as it departed or an embankment after departure.  
SVRDs accompanied by an untripped rollover will be treated as untripped rollovers, for 
estimating the benefits of the electronic stability aids.  SVRDs accompanied by a tripped 
rollover, for the purpose of this analysis, will be ignored.   
 
The following analysis, however, applies only to the devices that intervene to slow the vehicle—
the number of cargo tank hazardous material rollovers addressed is 72+55 or 127.  Within Table 
2-8, 54 percent of the cargo tank rollovers involved a hazardous cargo.  The number of relevant 
records in the GES database is too small to reliably estimate a separate ratio for all of the 
individual kinds of crashes, so this same ratio will be applied to the crashes addressed by 
electronic stability aids.  Also, within Table 2-8, 60 percent of the rollovers are of combination 
vehicles.  To be as consistent as possible with other analyses, the electronic stability aids will be 
considered for combination unit cargo tank vehicles carrying HM.  That is, the number of 
crashes of the kind that electronic stability aids might prevent is 54 percent of 60 percent of 127, 
or 41.   
 
For the vehicle design approach, the particular vehicles studied were semitrailers for hauling 
petroleum, which are currently manufactured according to the DOT 406 specification.  As shown 
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in Table 7-2, in the MCMIS 2002 data, there were 291 cargo tank rollovers.  Of these, 112 were 
Class 3 (flammable material, primarily but not exclusively petroleum) combination unit trucks.   
 
Table 7 -  2 Rollover Crash Frequency by Cargo Type  






Class 3 (flammable) 112 168 
All Cargo 181 291 
 
By GES estimates in Table 2-8, there are 1265 rollovers of all cargo tanks annually.  Of these 
680 are carrying hazardous material.  By Table 2-14, 60 percent (56 percent + 4 percent) of the 
rollovers are combination vehicles, so 405 rollovers would be combination unit cargo tanks 
carrying a hazardous material.  GES does not have the resolution to determine what fraction of 
these are petroleum, but the ratio in Table 7-2 of Class 3 to all rollovers of hazmat-carrying 
combination unit vehicles is 112/181 or 62 percent.  Applying this ratio to the GES data yields an 
estimate of 251 annual rollovers of petroleum combination vehicles.  The MCMIS is a count of 
actual crash reports, so it establishes a minimum annual number.  The numbers from GES are 
estimates, though 251 total would suggest that MCMIS is subject to much more underreporting 
than it probably really is, so 251 can be taken as an upper bound. 
 
To summarize, the description and number of crashes of the kind addressed by each approach is 
listed in Table 7-3.  All values in the table are limited to cargo tank semitrailers carrying HM.  
To reiterate, these are the estimates of the number of rollovers of the types that that can be 
avoided by each of the approaches.  Because the efficacies of the approaches are less than  
100 percent, not all of these rollovers will actually be avoided.  The efficacies are discussed and 
applied next.   
 
Table 7 -  3 Rollovers Addressed by the Three of the Four Approaches 
Annual Number Notes Category 
Overall Rollovers 680 All HAZMAT cargo tanker rollovers 
Semitrailer Base 405 Subset that does not include straight trucks 
Driver Training  
Subset of rollovers that disproportionately occur for 
younger drivers (under 25 and 25-35) Upper (GES)  30 
 Lower (MCMIS)  6 
41 Subset of rollovers that are single-vehicle untripped rollovers where speed in a curve was a factor Electronic Stability Aids 
Vehicle Design  
Subset of rollovers of DOT406 semitrailers Upper (from GES) 251 
Lower (from MCMIS) 112 
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7.2.2 Estimating the Reduction in Crashes 
Efficacy rates are obtained by explicit modeling of each of the technologies or techniques, 
documented in their sections.  The efficacy rate for the training comes from an observation by a 
major carrier who has implemented similar training that they experienced a 10-percent reduction 
in new driver crashes. 
 
For example, the electronic stability aids are expected to prevent 53 percent of the crashes of the 
type they address, which are untripped rollovers.  The number of untripped rollovers is listed as 
41 in Table 7-3.  The number of crashes expected to be prevented by the aids is 53 percent of  
41 or 22 rollovers every year.  However, that number will not be fully realized until electronic 
stability aids are deployed throughout the industry with new trucks introduced through growth in 
the fleet and replacements from vehicle retirement.  Applying the efficacy rates of Table 7-4 to 
the subsets of crashes described in Table 7-3 (according the phase-in schedules described in 
Section 7.1.2) produces the crash reductions over the 20-year period listed in Table 7-5.  Note 
that, after 10 years, when the electronic stability aids are projected to reach full deployment, the 
annual number of crashes in that column of the table is about 22.  (The fractional number of 
crashes is retained for better precision in the economic analysis to follow.) 
 
Table 7 -  4 Efficacy Rates by Approach 
Approach Efficacy Rate Reference 
Training 10% Section 3.8 
Electronic Stability Aid 53% Section 4.4.4 
Tanker Design    
Slightly lower CG 12% Table 5-9 
 Wider Track 17% Table 5-9 
Aggressive Improvement 30% Table 5-9 
 
7.2.3 Valuing the Reduction in Crashes 
The calculation of the dollar value of these benefits follows from Zaloshnja and Miller [2002]. 
Zaloshnja and Miller examine a wide variety of crashes by different types of trucks and estimate 
aggregate, per crash, and per victim costs associated with large truck crashes.  These costs 
include not only specific medical and injury related costs, but also include comprehensive costs 
such as legal costs, the costs of traffic delays, and property damage.  Note that, 
 
“These costs represent the present value, computed at a 4-percent discount rate, of all 
costs over the victims’ expected life span that result from a crash.  They include 
medically related costs, emergency services costs, property damage costs, lost 
productivity, and the monetized value of the pain, suffering, and quality of life that the 
family loses because of a death or injury. … The cost estimates exclude mental health 
care costs for crash victims, roadside furniture repair costs, cargo delays, earnings lost by 
family and friends caring for the injured, and the value of schoolwork lost.” [Zaloshnja 
and Miller, 2002, p1].




Tanker Design-Upper Tanker Design-Lower 
Year 
Upper 
Bound Lower CG 
Wider 





2008 0.1 0.6 2.6 3.4 2.4 8.6 1.5 1.1 3.8
2009 0.2 1.2 5.1 6.5 4.6 16.6 2.9 2.1 7.4
2010 0.4 1.8 7.5 9.4 6.7 24.0 4.2 3.0 10.7
2011 0.5 2.4 9.8 12.1 8.6 30.8 5.4 3.8 13.7
2012 0.6 3.0 12.0 14.6 10.3 37.1 6.5 4.6 16.5
2013 0.6 3.0 14.0 16.8 11.9 42.8 7.5 5.3 19.1
2014 0.6 3.0 15.8 18.9 13.4 48.0 8.4 6.0 21.4
2015 0.6 3.0 17.5 20.8 14.7 52.8 9.3 6.6 23.5
2016 0.6 3.0 19.1 22.4 15.9 57.1 10.0 7.1 25.5
2017 0.6 3.0 20.5 23.9 16.9 60.9 10.7 7.6 27.2
2018 0.6 3.0 21.7 25.3 17.9 64.3 11.3 8.0 28.7
2019 0.6 3.0 21.7 26.4 18.7 67.2 11.8 8.4 30.0
2020 0.6 3.0 21.7 27.5 19.4 69.8 12.3 8.7 31.2
2021 0.6 3.0 21.7 28.3 20.0 72.0 12.6 8.9 32.1
2022 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.0 20.6 73.8 13.0 9.2 32.9
2023 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.6 21.0 75.3 13.2 9.4 33.6
2024 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.6 21.0 75.3 13.2 9.4 33.6
2025 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.6 21.0 75.3 13.2 9.4 33.6
2026 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.6 21.0 75.3 13.2 9.4 33.6
2027 0.6 3.0 21.7 29.6 21.0 75.3 13.2 9.4 33.6
11 54 341 434 307 1,102 193 137 492TOTAL 
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Note that this benefit-cost analysis is being conducted from the societal point of view rather than 
the carrier’s point of view.  Therefore it includes the cost of emergency response and a 
monetized cost of traffic delays, which are costs borne by society as a whole but are not paid 
directly by a carrier.  This analysis does not include dollars that might be paid by a carrier that 
are not a cost to society.  For example, a fine is a cost to a carrier, but it is a transfer of money 
from one entity to another and not a true cost to society. 
 
The Zaloshnja and Miller per crash cost estimates do not have resolution specific to rollover 
crashes.  However, they do estimate crash costs by injury severity.  Table 7-6 shows the 
distribution of crash severities across the relevant rollover crashes drawn from GES (all cargo 
tank rollovers, as in Table 2-8) and Zaloshnja and Miller’s crash costs by injury severity. 
 
Table 7 -  6 Social Cost of Crashes by Severity (2000 dollars) 
Property Damage Non-Incapacitating Incapacitating Fatal  
29.39% 36.92% 22.82% 10.87% Incidence 
$11,953 $70,680 $225,507 $3,645,273 Cost 
 
When the percentages from Table 7-6 are applied to the costs in the table, the weighted average 
social cost of a rollover crash comes to $477,310.  When this is adjusted to 2007 dollars, it 
becomes $572,038 per HM tanker rollover crash.   
 
The nature of the cargo can be assumed to have minimal effect on the crash itself, but a 
significant difference in a HM rollover is the possibility of a spill.  While some of this may be 
captured in the injury and property damage dimensions of the Zaloshnja and Miller estimates, 
relying exclusively on those aspects would understate the cost of spills related to crashes almost 
to the point of omission.  
 
The fraction of cargo tank rollovers that result in a spill were obtained from an earlier report on 
serious incidents involving hazardous cargo shipments, based on MCMIS [Battelle, 2005].  A 
slight further analysis of the data for that report yielded the following three tables (7-7, 7-8, and 
7-9) regarding the frequency of spills in various kinds of cargo tank crashes. 
 
Table 7 -  7 Totals for all Cargo Tank Incidents (Weighted) 
 Rollover  
No Yes Total Ran off Road 
No 863 96 959 
Yes 102 189 291 
965 285 1250 Total 
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Table 7 -  8 Totals for all Cargo Tank Spill Incidents 
 Rollover  
Ran off Road No Yes Total 
No 30 73 103 
Yes 15 95 109 
Total 45 167 212 
 
Table 7 -  9 Spill Percentage by Category 
 Rollover  
Ran off Road No Yes Total 
No 3.4 76 11 
Yes 15 50 37 
Total 4.7 59 17 
 
The likelihood of a spill given a rollover crash evident from the data in the above table was 
combined with the proportion of crashes in the following representative HM categories from the 
same HM cargo study, and a previous study of the cost of different types of HM spills [Battelle, 
2001] to formulate per-crash costs of HM cargo spills.  The sources of costs that these numbers 
are built from include explicit clean-up costs, environmental damage, and evacuation costs.  The 
per-spill and per-crash costs are presented in Table 7-10. 
 
Table 7 -  10 Costs of HAZMAT Spills (2007 dollars) 
Type Per Spill Per Crash 
HM Category/Division 2.1, Flammable Gases $11,212 $6,609 
HM Category/Division 3.0, Flammable Liquids $47,427 $27,957 
HM Category/Division 8.0, Corrosives $37,759 $22,258 
Weighted Average Per Crash  $23,177 
 
The $27,957 per-crash cost of flammable liquids is applied to crashes in the analysis of the 
vehicle designs, since they are restricted to petroleum products.  The other cases use the 
weighted average per crash of $23,177. 
 
Aggregate benefits are tabulated by applying the per-crash costs developed from Zaloshnja  
and Miller and the per-crash cost of HM spills to the avoided crashes presented in Table 7-5.  
These results are presented in Table 7-11.  These same results discounted to the present using a  
7 percent discount rate are presented in Table 7-12. 
 




Tanker Design-Upper Tanker Design-Lower 
Year MCMIIS 
Assumption Lower CG 
Wider 





$0.357 $0.071 $1.560 $2.029 $1.436 $5.159 $0.905 $0.641 $2.3022008 
$0.714 $0.143 $3.061 $3.915 $2.771 $9.952 $1.747 $1.236 $4.4412009 
$1.071 $0.214 $4.493 $5.659 $4.004 $14.387 $2.525 $1.787 $6.4202010 
$1.429 $0.286 $5.848 $7.268 $5.143 $18.478 $3.243 $2.295 $8.2452011 
$1.786 $0.357 $7.122 $8.746 $6.189 $22.235 $3.903 $2.762 $9.9222012 
$1.786 $0.357 $8.310 $10.100 $7.147 $25.677 $4.507 $3.189 $11.4582013 
$1.786 $0.357 $9.411 $11.335 $8.021 $28.817 $5.058 $3.579 $12.8592014 
$1.786 $0.357 $10.424 $12.454 $8.813 $31.664 $5.557 $3.933 $14.1292015 
$1.786 $0.357 $11.349 $13.464 $9.527 $34.230 $6.008 $4.251 $15.2742016 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.186 $14.367 $10.167 $36.526 $6.411 $4.537 $16.2982017 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $15.168 $10.733 $38.562 $6.768 $4.789 $17.2072018 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $15.870 $11.230 $40.346 $7.081 $5.011 $18.0032019 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $16.478 $11.661 $41.892 $7.353 $5.203 $18.6932020 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $16.994 $12.026 $43.206 $7.583 $5.366 $19.2792021 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.425 $12.330 $44.300 $7.775 $5.502 $19.7672022 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.771 $12.575 $45.180 $7.930 $5.611 $20.1602023 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.771 $12.575 $45.180 $7.930 $5.611 $20.1602024 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.771 $12.575 $45.180 $7.930 $5.611 $20.1602025 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.771 $12.575 $45.180 $7.930 $5.611 $20.1602026 
$1.786 $0.357 $12.934 $17.771 $12.575 $45.180 $7.930 $5.611 $20.1602027 
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Assumption Lower CG Wider Track Aggressive Lower CG 
Wider 
Track Aggressive 
2008 $0.334 $0.067 $1.458 $1.896 $1.342 $4.821 $0.846 $0.599 $2.151
2009 $0.624 $0.125 $2.674 $3.419 $2.420 $8.693 $1.526 $1.080 $3.879
2010 $0.875 $0.175 $3.668 $4.619 $3.269 $11.744 $2.061 $1.459 $5.240
2011 $1.090 $0.218 $4.462 $5.545 $3.924 $14.097 $2.474 $1.751 $6.290
2012 $1.273 $0.255 $5.078 $6.236 $4.413 $15.854 $2.782 $1.969 $7.074
2013 $1.190 $0.238 $5.537 $6.730 $4.763 $17.110 $3.003 $2.125 $7.635
2014 $1.112 $0.222 $5.861 $7.059 $4.995 $17.946 $3.150 $2.229 $8.008
2015 $1.039 $0.208 $6.067 $7.249 $5.129 $18.429 $3.234 $2.289 $8.223
2016 $0.971 $0.194 $6.173 $7.324 $5.182 $18.619 $3.268 $2.312 $8.308
2017 $0.908 $0.182 $6.195 $7.303 $5.168 $18.568 $3.259 $2.306 $8.285
2018 $0.848 $0.170 $6.145 $7.206 $5.099 $18.320 $3.215 $2.275 $8.175
2019 $0.793 $0.159 $5.743 $7.046 $4.986 $17.914 $3.144 $2.225 $7.994
2020 $0.741 $0.148 $5.367 $6.838 $4.839 $17.384 $3.051 $2.159 $7.757
2021 $0.693 $0.139 $5.016 $6.591 $4.664 $16.756 $2.941 $2.081 $7.477
2022 $0.647 $0.129 $4.688 $6.315 $4.469 $16.056 $2.818 $1.994 $7.165
2023 $0.605 $0.121 $4.381 $6.020 $4.260 $15.304 $2.686 $1.901 $6.829
2024 $0.565 $0.113 $4.095 $5.626 $3.981 $14.303 $2.510 $1.776 $6.382
2025 $0.528 $0.106 $3.827 $5.258 $3.721 $13.367 $2.346 $1.660 $5.965
2026 $0.494 $0.099 $3.576 $4.914 $3.477 $12.493 $2.193 $1.552 $5.574
2027 $0.461 $0.092 $3.342 $4.592 $3.250 $11.675 $2.049 $1.450 $5.210
TOTAL $15.791 $3.158 $93.351 $117.785 $83.350 $299.452 $52.557 $37.192 $133.620
7.3 Costs 
Costs for each of the following sections were built up across three categories:  direct capital 
purchase costs, recurrent annual costs, and labor costs.  These are discussed below for each 
mitigation approach.  Where direct capital purchase costs were present for capital equipment that 
would last beyond the time frame of the study, which was the case for each of the approaches, a 
method needed to be used to distribute the costs across time.  Otherwise, all of the costs for 
additions to the fleet in the last year analyzed would be counted, but benefits in subsequent years 
would not.  This study relies on one of the most common and simple methods for accomplishing 
this—straight-line depreciation.  This means evenly spreading the cost of capital investment 
across its economic life.  Straight-line depreciation usually requires taking the salvage value of 
the capital equipment at the end of its economic life into account—here we have made the more 
conservative assumption that the equipment had no salvage value.  To the extent to which 
salvage values do come into play, it is under the assumption that vehicles retired prior to the end 
of their economic life retain enough value to make this retirement cost neutral with respect to the 
remaining depreciation.  Note that since the benefits tied to the investment are also assumed to 
draw down to zero at the end of each unit’s economic life, both the small amount of costs and 
benefits falling outside of the economic life span serve as counterbalancing weights, resulting in 
little or no impact to the analysis. 
 
Additionally, finance charges were taken into account to reflect the likelihood that carriers would 
not buy the equipment outright.  The rates applied reflect the average yield on A through AAA 
rated corporate bonds.  The ten-year rate (5.5 percent) was applied for the tractors, which had a 
ten-year economic life, while the average of the ten and twenty year rates (5.7 percent) were 
applied for the tank trailers which had an economic life of fifteen years.  The simulators last 
considerably longer, but because of the uncommon nature of a thirty year rate for corporate 
borrowing, the 20-year rate (5.9 percent) was applied.  The 20-year corporate bond rate was not 
very different from the 30-year mortgage rate (which was estimated at 5.85 to 6.14).  These rates 
are higher than necessary for the analysis because they reflect expectations about inflation (while 
the rest of the analysis is in real terms). 
7.3.1 Driver Training 
Accurately predicting the difference in cost between existing training methods and the proposed 
enhancements to driver training is a significant challenge.  This is because switching to the 
proposed training would represent a significant change from labor to capital relative to the 
existing training.  Presently, the hours of instructor time per student driver is estimated at  
18.67 hours (40 hours of trainer time with 15 students plus 16 hours of one-on-one training).  
Under the new approach, this would fall to 13.6 hours, meaning 5 hours of instructor time saved 
per new driver.  The total time a student spends in training is presently estimated at 56 hours and 
anticipated to fall to 45 hours based on the increased efficacy of the training through the 
simulators and other technology assisted learning.  The 11 hours of student time saving and  
5 hours of instructor savings are valued using wage data comparable to that used to value the 
hour of training required for the electronic stability control [Department of Labor’s Occupational 
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Employment and Wages Series, for job category 53-3032, “Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-
Trailer.”].  However, because trainees presumably earn less than the average driver, and trainer 
drivers are presumably more experienced and earn more, the 25th percentile wage ($12.98 in 
2005) was used for the trainee and the 75th percentile wage ($20.55 in 2005) was used for the 
trainer.  Both were adjusted to 2007 and adjusted upward by 30 percent to reflect fringe benefits.  
The total labor saving per driver is about $348.  Table 7-13 details the hours of training by 
element. 
 
Table 7 -  13 Training Requirements 
Element 
Hours of 15 to 1 training
Hours of 1 to 1 training
Hours of computer assisted training
Hours of simulator training
Total Hours of Student Time
Trainer Time per Student
 
The most costly pieces of capital equipment required for the new training are the simulators,  
here assumed to cost approximately $300,000 according to manufacturer and industry 
interviews.  How many simulators required depends on the number of new drivers receiving the 
training and how many hours of training are required.  The analysis assumes that there are 1.1 
drivers per tractor—a detailed discussion of the source of this figure follows in Appendix J.   
 
The analysis assumes that each new driver receives three hours of simulator training.  Assuming 
an 8-hour work day with two 3-hour sessions completed per day, and given 52 weeks in a year, 
less 8 holidays, a single simulator would represent 512 opportunities for students to complete the 
3-hour session.  Some carriers operate their simulators around the clock to achieve maximum 
return on their investment in the simulator, so this estimate is quite conservative.  The maximum 
number of new drivers described in the driver profile is 4,196.  This means that absent any 
logistical considerations, eight simulators nationwide could serve all of the new drivers for 
hazardous-material-carrying cargo tanks.  (This is not the total market for truck driving 
simulators.  The number of new Class A CDL drivers is orders of magnitude larger than the 
cargo tank population.  A tank trailer is only a software change from another trailer.  As a 
practical matter, the cargo tank drivers would be sharing a much larger number of simulators 
with dry freight drivers, but this economic analysis is specific to cargo tank drivers.)   
 
Logistical considerations are significant, however.  Any travel by new drivers to a pooled 
training site would raise costs, and create incentives to have more than the minimum number of 
simulators to serve the nationwide new driver population.  Developing a business model for 
providing training with simulators that balances travel costs with economies of scale in providing 
the training to characterize the exact number of simulators required and the magnitude of travel 
expenses is beyond the scope of this study.  However, the labor savings are significant enough 
that on a per-student basis, a simulator has more than paid for itself in two years--rounding the 
labor savings dramatically down to $300 and the annual students served down to 500 per year 
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produces $300 times 500 times two years, or $300,000.  The simulators are assumed to last ten 
years, which makes the potential to build up the stock of simulators over time funded through 
labor savings significant.  Each simulator is assumed to have a recurrent annual $6,000 
maintenance contract after 1 year of warranty coverage. 
 
The simulators are not the only prescribed technology under the training approach.  There is also 
a computer-based element.  Costs for the computer-based element are estimated at $2,000 
annually per piece of required equipment including software, reflecting that the computers would 
not be as durable as the simulators and may be administered under a lease program.  Like the 
simulators, they can be used repeatedly by multiple students per year 
 
Because of the lack of a business model for simulator and computer deployment, and the 
significant labor savings, costs for the training approach will be considered to not be 
significantly different from the existing training methods they would replace.  The costs 
presented in Table 7-14 and Table 7-15 are presented to illustrate the labor savings in the context 
of the minimum investment case for simulators and computers.  The minimum investment case 
reflects the purchase and recurrent costs for the minimum number of simulators and computers 
required to service the students, ignoring the geographic disposition of the students and 
equipment.  The totals should not be interpreted as precise estimates of the aggregate savings, 
because the presumption is that the labor savings will fund equipment. 
 
Table 7 -  14 Undiscounted Training Costs, in Millions 
Purchase Recurrent Labor Total   
$0.022 $0.004 -$0.185 -$0.158 2008 
$0.046 $0.015 -$0.378 -$0.317 2009 
$0.070 $0.026 -$0.579 -$0.483 2010 
$0.096 $0.038 -$0.790 -$0.656 2011 
$0.122 $0.050 -$1.009 -$0.837 2012 
$0.125 $0.058 -$1.031 -$0.848 2013 
$0.128 $0.059 -$1.054 -$0.867 2014 
$0.131 $0.060 -$1.077 -$0.886 2015 
$0.133 $0.061 -$1.101 -$0.906 2016 
$0.136 $0.063 -$1.125 -$0.926 2017 
$0.139 $0.064 -$1.150 -$0.946 2018 
$0.142 $0.059 -$1.175 -$0.973 2019 
$0.146 $0.061 -$1.201 -$0.995 2020 
$0.149 $0.062 -$1.227 -$1.017 2021 
$0.152 $0.063 -$1.254 -$1.039 2022 
$0.155 $0.064 -$1.282 -$1.062 2023 
$0.159 $0.072 -$1.310 -$1.079 2024 
$0.162 $0.074 -$1.339 -$1.102 2025 
$0.166 $0.076 -$1.368 -$1.127 2026 
2027 $0.169 $0.077 -$1.398 -$1.151 
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Table 7 -  15 Discounted Training Costs, in Millions 
Purchase Recurrent Labor Total   
$0.021 $0.004 -$0.173 -$0.148 2008 
$0.040 $0.013 -$0.330 -$0.277 2009 
$0.057 $0.021 -$0.473 -$0.394 2010 
$0.073 $0.029 -$0.603 -$0.501 2011 
$0.087 $0.035 -$0.719 -$0.597 2012 
$0.083 $0.038 -$0.687 -$0.565 2013 
$0.080 $0.037 -$0.656 -$0.540 2014 
$0.076 $0.035 -$0.627 -$0.516 2015 
$0.073 $0.033 -$0.599 -$0.493 2016 
$0.069 $0.032 -$0.572 -$0.471 2017 
$0.066 $0.030 -$0.546 -$0.449 2018 
$0.063 $0.026 -$0.522 -$0.432 2019 
$0.060 $0.025 -$0.498 -$0.413 2020 
$0.058 $0.024 -$0.476 -$0.394 2021 
$0.055 $0.023 -$0.455 -$0.377 2022 
$0.053 $0.022 -$0.434 -$0.360 2023 
$0.050 $0.023 -$0.415 -$0.341 2024 
$0.048 $0.022 -$0.396 -$0.326 2025 
$0.046 $0.021 -$0.378 -$0.312 2026 
$0.044 $0.020 -$0.361 -$0.298 2027 
$1.202 $0.514 -$9.919 -$8.203 Total 
 
7.3.2 Electronic Stability Aids 
The electronic stability control approach has direct purchase costs (retail price of $619 according 
to a December 2006 quote from a dealer) that are applied on an annualized per-vehicle basis to 
new vehicles added to the fleet for replacement or growth, just as the vehicle’s designs did.  
There are recurrent costs associated with this approach.  Because the electronic stability aid 
would be a new system installed on trucks, a parts failure rate of 0.19 percent is applied, 
consistent with previous study of the devices [Battelle, 2004].  This represents a recurrent annual 
cost of $1.82 per vehicle. 
 
Drivers will receive approximately one hour of training familiarizing them with the device.  The 
hour of training is valued using wage data from the Department of Labor’s Occupational 
Employment and Wages Series, for job category 53-3032, “Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-
Trailer.”  In 2005, the average hourly wage was $19.32.  This hourly wage was adjusted upward 
to reflect fringe benefits (31 percent according to information from FMCSA supplied to support 
Battelle, 2004) and to reflect wage inflation between 2005 and 2007.  The final figure used to 
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value each hour of driver training is approximately $31.  As for the driver training analysis, there 
are assumed to be 1.1 drivers per tractor.  The training, however, persists in the analysis only 
until deployment of the electronic stability control has reached 100 percent deployment in the 
fleet, after which it is assumed that the devices will be familiar to existing drivers and will be 
incorporated at negligible cost into training for new drivers.  Undiscounted and discounted costs 
are tabulated in Tables 7-16 and 7-17, respectively. 
 
Table 7 -  16 Undiscounted Costs for Electronic Stability Aids,  
in Millions 
Purchase Recurrent Labor Total   
$0.579 $0.008 $0.211 $0.7982008 
$1.153 $0.017 $0.220 $1.3902009 
$1.718 $0.025 $0.228 $1.9702010 
$2.270 $0.033 $0.234 $2.5372011 
$2.806 $0.040 $0.240 $3.0872012 
$3.323 $0.048 $0.246 $3.6172013 
$3.820 $0.055 $0.251 $4.1262014 
$4.295 $0.061 $0.255 $4.6122015 
$4.746 $0.068 $0.259 $5.0732016 
$5.172 $0.074 $0.264 $5.5102017 
$5.572 $0.080 $0.000 $5.6522018 
$5.656 $0.081 $0.000 $5.7372019 
$5.741 $0.082 $0.000 $5.8232020 
$5.827 $0.083 $0.000 $5.9102021 
$5.914 $0.085 $0.000 $5.9992022 
$6.003 $0.086 $0.000 $6.0892023 
$6.093 $0.087 $0.000 $6.1802024 
$6.184 $0.089 $0.000 $6.2732025 
$6.277 $0.090 $0.000 $6.3672026 
$6.371 $0.091 $0.000 $6.4632027 
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Table 7 -  17 Discounted Costs for Electronic Stability Aids,  
in Millions 
Purchase Recurrent Labor Total   
$0.541 $0.008 $0.197 $0.7462008 
$1.007 $0.014 $0.192 $1.2142009 
$1.403 $0.020 $0.186 $1.6092010 
$1.732 $0.025 $0.179 $1.9352011 
$2.001 $0.029 $0.171 $2.2012012 
$2.215 $0.032 $0.164 $2.4102013 
$2.379 $0.034 $0.156 $2.5692014 
$2.500 $0.036 $0.149 $2.6842015 
$2.582 $0.037 $0.141 $2.7602016 
$2.629 $0.038 $0.134 $2.8012017 
$2.647 $0.038 $0.000 $2.6852018 
$2.511 $0.036 $0.000 $2.5472019 
$2.382 $0.034 $0.000 $2.4162020 
$2.260 $0.032 $0.000 $2.2922021 
$2.144 $0.031 $0.000 $2.1742022 
$2.033 $0.029 $0.000 $2.0632023 
$1.929 $0.028 $0.000 $1.9572024 
$1.830 $0.026 $0.000 $1.8562025 
$1.736 $0.025 $0.000 $1.7612026 
$1.646 $0.024 $0.000 $1.6702027 
$40.107 $0.574 $1.668 $42.349Total 
 
7.3.3 Vehicle Design 
The costs for the vehicle design approach are direct capital purchase costs—with the cost per 
vehicle being the expected additional cost of purchase for each type of vehicle (which overstates 
the cost to society to the extent to which purchase costs include profit for the manufacturer).  
Estimates or quotes for the costs of each of the three improved designs were obtained from cargo 
tank manufacturers.  Table 5-9 presents the range of costs; Table 7-18 presents the values used in 
the benefit-cost analysis. 
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Table 7 -  18 Incremental Purchase Cost for  






To tabulate the total costs across the 20-year period associated with these methods, these per-
vehicle costs are applied on an annual basis to all new vehicles as they enter the fleet due to 
growth or retirement, consistent with the fleet profile described in Section 7.1.2.  The results of 
this are presented in Table 7-19.  The present discounted values for these costs are presented in 
Table 7-20. 
 
Table 7 -  19 Undiscounted Purchase Costs for  New Vehicle Designs,  
in Millions 
Lower CG Wider Track Aggressive   
$0.468 $0.029 $2.8092008 
$0.917 $0.057 $5.5012009 
$1.345 $0.084 $8.0722010 
$1.754 $0.110 $10.5232011 
$2.142 $0.134 $12.8522012 
$2.511 $0.157 $15.0642013 
$2.860 $0.179 $17.1602014 
$3.190 $0.199 $19.1382015 
$3.500 $0.219 $20.9992016 
$3.791 $0.237 $22.7432017 
$4.062 $0.254 $24.3712018 
$4.314 $0.270 $25.8812019 
$4.546 $0.284 $27.2762020 
$4.759 $0.297 $28.5542021 
$4.953 $0.310 $29.7162022 
$5.127 $0.320 $30.7612023 
$5.204 $0.325 $31.2232024 
$5.282 $0.330 $31.6912025 
$5.361 $0.335 $32.1662026 
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Table 7 -  20 Discounted Vehicle Costs, in Millions 
 Lower CG Wider Track Aggressive 
2008 $0.438 $0.027 $2.626 
2009 $0.801 $0.050 $4.805 
2010 $1.098 $0.069 $6.589 
2011 $1.338 $0.084 $8.028 
2012 $1.527 $0.095 $9.163 
2013 $1.673 $0.105 $10.038 
2014 $1.781 $0.111 $10.686 
2015 $1.856 $0.116 $11.138 
2016 $1.904 $0.119 $11.422 
2017 $1.927 $0.120 $11.562 
2018 $1.930 $0.121 $11.579 
2019 $1.915 $0.120 $11.492 
2020 $1.886 $0.118 $11.319 
2021 $1.846 $0.115 $11.074 
2022 $1.795 $0.112 $10.771 
2023 $1.737 $0.109 $10.420 
2024 $1.647 $0.103 $9.884 
2025 $1.563 $0.098 $9.376 
2026 $1.482 $0.093 $8.894 
2027 $1.406 $0.088 $8.437 
Total $31.550 $1.972 $189.302 
 
No labor costs or recurring maintenance costs are attributed to the vehicles, because there was no 
reason to think that the new vehicle designs required specific driver training nor any reason to 
think that the designs significantly changed the maintenance profile of the vehicles. 
7.4 Conclusions 
Table 7-21 contains the tabulated costs and benefits detailed in the sections above.  Additionally, 
it has the calculation of net benefits (total benefits minus total costs) and the benefit-cost ratio 
(benefits divided by costs) that are indicators of whether a project creates value for society or 
not.  Benefit-cost ratios greater than one correspond to positive net benefits for society, while 
ratios less than one correspond to negative net benefits.  Note that training costs are not provided 
in these results because they are assumed to be a “wash,” with no advantage either way, based on 
the assumption that the significant labor savings will be used to fund the equipment investments 
as described in Section 7.3.1. 









Costs Net Benefits  
Benefit Cost 
Ratio  Approach 
Training*           
Lower Bound Assumption 11 $3,158,154 * $3,158,154 *
Upper Bound Assumption 54 $15,790,772 * $15,790,772 *
Electronic Stability Aids 341 $93,351,246 $42,348,947 $51,002,299 2.204
Tanker Design (Upper Bound)           
Lower CG 434 $117,784,588 $31,550,282 $86,234,306 3.733
Wider Track 307 $83,349,722 $1,971,943 $81,377,779 42.268
Aggressive Improvement 1,102 $299,452,343 $189,301,691 $110,150,651 1.582
Tanker Design (Lower Bound)           
Lower CG 193 $52,557,266 $31,550,282 $21,006,985 1.666
Wider Track 137 $37,191,908 $1,971,943 $35,219,965 18.861
Aggressive Improvement 492 $133,620,169 $189,301,691 -$55,681,522 0.706
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  122 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
All of the approaches analyzed produce value for society, except for one.  The aggressive 
improvement in vehicle design under the lower bound benefits assumption performed the worst 
in the BCA.  However, under the upper bound assumption, its BCR is greater than one, though 
lower than any others.  It also has the highest total benefits numbers, even under the lower bound 
assumption, of any of the approaches, which makes it clear that its high $12,000 per vehicle cost 
drives the result.  However, taking net benefits as the criterion, the aggressive improvement 
vehicle design out performs everything else in under the upper bound assumption (though it still 
underperforms everything else in the lower bound).  This is because while costs are high for this 
approach, benefits are high as well—leading to a small proportional difference but large absolute 
difference.  It had the highest efficacy rate of all of the vehicle design methods.  While the 
electronic stability control had a higher efficacy rate, it was applied to a much smaller subset of 
crashes, producing overall fewer crashes avoided (and lower total benefits).   
 
The best performing vehicle design option, and the best performing over all according the 
benefit-cost ratio, was the wider track design.  It out performs any other method with respect to 
BCR even under the lower bound assumptions.  The success of the wider tack design is owed in 
large part to its low cost of $500 per vehicle, which is lower than for any other mitigation 
approach (excluding the training for which costs are assumed to be neutral). 
 
The training method, while its net benefits are relatively modest compared to the wider track 
vehicle design or the electronic stability control, should not be over looked.  If the costs truly are 
insignificantly different from existing training, the relevant benefit cost ratio for society would 
have a zero in the denominator and, thus, would be approaching infinity.  This should be 
carefully interpreted to not imply that industry necessarily benefits as greatly from the training, 
as all of the crash costs used to value the crashes are calculated for society as a whole. 
 
The common wisdom holds that the electronic stability controls pay for themselves.  Despite the 
fact that the relatively small number of crashes they apply to, that common wisdom is confirmed 
here with a positive net benefits number and a BCR greater than one.   
 
The Zaloshnja and Miller study that serves as the basis for valuation of the potential avoided 
crashes uses a 4 percent discount rate internally.  The rest of the benefit and cost numbers 
presented here use the 7 percent discount rate recommended by OMB for regulatory analysis.  
For comparison, Table 7-22 presents the final results of the analysis under a 4 percent discount 
rate.  It should be noted that this variation produces small changes the BCRs, but does not 
change any of the conclusions reached by using the 7 percent rate. 
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Costs Net Benefits  
Benefit Cost 
Ratio  Approach 
Training*           
Lower Bound Assumption 11 $4,192,617 * $4,192,617 *
Upper Bound Assumption 54 $20,963,087 * $20,963,087 *
Electronic Stability Aids 341 $127,589,982 $58,147,135 $69,442,847 2.194
Tanker Design (Upper Bound)           
Lower CG 434 $161,941,281 $43,866,734 $118,074,547 3.692
Wider Track 307 $114,596,959 $2,741,740 $111,855,218 41.797
Aggressive Improvement 1,102 $411,715,122 $263,200,405 $148,514,717 1.564
Tanker Design (Lower Bound)           
Lower CG 193 $72,260,651 $43,866,734 $28,393,917 1.647
Wider Track 137 $51,134,898 $2,741,740 $48,393,158 18.651
Aggressive Improvement 492 $183,713,521 $263,200,405 -$79,486,884 0.698
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8.0 Conclusions 
There are many reasons that lead cargo tank motor vehicles to roll over, and many factors must 
be addressed to reduce the number of rollovers.  There is no one solution to all heavy vehicle 
rollovers.  Four general approaches have been studied in this project, better driver training, 
electronic stability aids, improvements in the vehicle design, and improvements in highway 
design.  There was no clear “winner” among them.  All have their respective merits, and all 
warrant further attention in a broad program to improve highway safety.  Drivers need to realize 
the diverse situations that can lead to rollover so they can exercise proper care to prevent those 
situations from developing.  Drivers and carriers alike must understand both the benefits and the 
limits of electronic stability aids.  And carriers and manufacturers should appreciate the stability 
improvements to be gained from even a small reduction in the height of a cargo tank vehicle. 
8.1 Driver Training 
With driver error of one kind or another figuring in 3/4 of all cargo tank rollovers, a 
comprehensive rollover prevention program must address the driver.  The driver must be awake 
and alert at all times.  To this end, dispatchers must provide reasonable and legal delivery 
schedules, and drivers must avail themselves of opportunities for sleep.  The driver must be 
trained to perceive and handle dangers arising from the highway, the weather, and from other 
vehicles.   
 
Drivers need to be aware of the conditions that can lead to rollovers.  While one might at first 
think that most heavy truck rollovers are due to excessive speed on a freeway on ramp or off 
ramp, these situations actually account for fewer than 10 percent of all cargo tank rollovers.  A 
much more common cause of rollovers is running off the road which, in turn, is often caused by 
drowsiness, inattention, or speed.  Multiple-vehicle crashes with a rollover (which are 1/5 of 
cargo tank rollovers) are caused most frequently by “the other driver.”  Driver training should 
include not just a presentation of national crash statistics but an explanation of their implications 
for driver awareness.  Drivers should be told to be on the lookout for all pre-rollover situations.  
Older and larger companies would have a history of rollovers and can personalize the training 
with accounts of specific events, so the driver will appreciate what situations require care. 
 
Large carriers have experienced reductions in overall crash counts and reductions in training 
time through the use of modern driving simulators.  There are not yet long term studies to 
demonstrate the benefits of simulator training specifically on rollover prevention.  There is good 
reason to continue development of rollover prevention curricula, as simulators provide the 
possibility for drivers to experience near-rollover conditions that would be too dangerous to 
drive even on a test track.  When drivers are on ramps, they should stay well enough below the 
rollover limit that they never feel “the edge,” but safe maneuvers for avoiding other vehicles and 
recovering from pavement departures can be practiced in a simulator.  Simulators can be 
adjusted so that drivers can feel loads with different roll properties.  Simulators can be equipped 
to model electronic stability aids, so drivers can learn their effects. 
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8.2 Electronic Stability Aids 
These devices, which slow the truck when a driver inadvertently enters a curve at too high a 
speed, can be remarkably effective in slowing the truck before a rollover occurs.  By building on 
the existing electronics for ABS, they are robust and inexpensive.  However, crash statistics and 
anecdotal counts from carriers consistently show that the majority of heavy vehicle rollovers are 
caused by reasons other than excessive speed in a curve.  According to two of the databases 
consulted for this study, excessive speed is a factor in about half of cargo tank rollovers.  
Rollovers result from a single vehicle running off the road, or they follow crashes with other 
motor vehicles.  Electronic stability aids are certainly a part of the overall solution, but decision-
makers in the industry must remember that they address only a portion of the rollover population.   
 
Modern sensors and communication technology allow drivers’ safety practices to be monitored 
by the dispatcher or supervisor, almost in real time.  Supervisors know whether drivers are 
adhering to speed limits and company-designated safe routes.  A concern has been expressed that 
drivers might use electronic stability aids as a “crutch” or an excuse to take curves too fast.  The 
stability aids record when they are activated, so supervisors can use these records as a positive 
learning tool for drivers.  If handled properly, the information can reduce risk-taking, and so the 
aids will have benefits beyond simply slowing the truck in an emergency. 
8.3 Vehicle Design 
Improving the basic stability of the vehicle itself is the only approach that will help to reduce 
rollovers resulting from any cause.  No new technological breakthroughs are required to achieve 
rollover benefits through vehicle design.  Models with a slightly lower center of gravity than is 
common and models with wider tracks are available today.  The 10-15 percent reduction in 
rollover experience offered by these trailers will be significant in the long run.  These models do 
have a cost premium.  A carrier with a tight operating budget may have to choose whether to 
spend a little more to buy a more stable trailer or to buy an electronic stability aid.  Smaller 
carriers, in particular, do not see the national crash trends, and carriers do not experience all of 
the societal costs that were included in the economic analysis. 
 
The greatest improvement that has a regulatory impediment is widening the track width of 
semitrailers from 96 inches to 102 inches.  One carrier remarked during an interview that 
virtually all new trailers would have 102-inch axles overnight if they became generally legal.  
Some carriers, however, noted that maneuvering even a 96-inch wide trailer in a tight urban 
environment is difficult, so there will always be a portion of the DOT 406 trailers that do not 
convert.   
 
The quantitative benefits analysis for improved vehicle design concentrated on DOT 406 trailers, 
those that carry petroleum products.  The entire cargo tank market is much smaller than the dry 
van semitrailer market, and aside from petroleum, there is tremendous segmentation of specialty 
vehicles for specialty products.  Modest gains in stability are certainly feasible from an 
engineering viewpoint, but each trailer would essentially be its own design case.   
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8.4 Highway Design 
The one common lesson from the review of highway design locations is that drivers should be 
made aware of unusual curves, grades, or traffic patterns.  Existing land use or terrain (e.g., 
mountains) often dictate geometric design decisions.  Within these constraints, highway design 
engineers work to make the best possible choices, and they advise drivers of the conditions. 
 
While carriers can do little to affect the design of highways, they can recognize difficult 
locations in their delivery area.  Experienced drivers become familiar with sites that require 
special care and pass this information, formally or informally, to new drivers in the company.  In 
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This appendix contains nearly all of the data that was examined during the study of rollover 
statistics.  There were many more tables than could be comfortably discussed in the main text.   
 
Nearly all the tables in Section 2 of the main text contain data only for rollover crashes.  In this 
appendix, most tables for the three truck-specific databases (MCMIS, LTCCS, and TIFA) have 
data for all crashes, so the distribution of factors for rollovers can be compared to those for all 
crashes.  Most of these tables have a column entitled, “percent rollover crashes.”  This is a 
calculation across a row answering the question, “Given that there was a crash, what fraction of 
the vehicles that crashed rolled over?”  NHTSA used an analysis of this type to ascribe a 
vehicle’s inherent propensity to rollover when it was developing its procedures for light vehicle 
NCAP (New Car Assessment Program) rollover ratings [USDOT NHTSA, 2002]. 
 
Many tables identify whether the rollover was the first event or a subsequent event.  These terms 
are defined differently in TIFA than in GES and MCMIS.  If a truck runs off a road but no 
damage or injury is caused until it rolls over, the first event in MCMIS is running off the road 
and rolling over in GES and TIFA.  Therefore, the number of cases where the rollover is the 
“first” event will be smaller in MCMIS than in the other databases. 
 
Please refer to the main text, Section 2.1, for an explanation of the databases and how the records 
were selected.   
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 A-1 Crosscutting Factors 
 
Crosscutting factors are those that include more than one category of vehicle, environment and 
driver.  These tables, perhaps more than any other, provide a perspective on where emphasis 
should be placed if the number of rollover accidents is to be reduced.  They show the relationship 
between driver, vehicle, and environmental factors. 
 
A-1.1 Primary Reason or Critical Event 
 
Table A -  1 Primary Reasons Assigned to Single Vehicle Accidents (MCMIS) 
 
The driver errors are divided into four types.   
 
• Driver decision error:  the driver can decide to perform the wrong evasive maneuver,  
• Driver non-performance error:  the driver can fail to perform the required maneuver 
correctly,  
• Driver performance error: the driver can be incapacitated in some way and be unable to 
perform the task,  
• Driver recognition error: the driver can fail to recognize the need to make a maneuver 





















Error 23 17 75 92 115 79.7% 41.6%
Driver Non-








17 2 56 58 75 77.4% 26.3%
Total Driver 
Errors 54 18 171 189 244 77.7% 85.8%
Vehicle Related 0 0 9 9 9 100.0% 3.9%
Highway Related 22 0 8 8 30 26.8% 3.7%
Weather Related 2 0 0 0 2 0.0% 0.0%
Other Vehicle 
Induced 1 0 12 12 13 91.8% 5.3%
Unknown 0 0 3 3 3 100.0% 1.3%
Total   79 18 202 220 300 73.5% 
Driver Error 
Percentages 68.5% 100.0% 84.5% 85.8% 81.2%  
Other Vehicle 
Percentages 1.3%  5.8% 5.3% 4.3%  
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The most common error, contributing to about 40 percent of the driver errors, is driver decision 
error.  This correlation indicates that with better training, the driver might have done something 
differently and avoided the rollover accident.  Driver recognition error was next most common 
reason. 
 
For multiple vehicle accidents, the primary reason was assigned to the other vehicle in over  
70 percent of the cases.  In the 12 rollover accidents where the primary reasons were not 
assigned to the other vehicle, driver error was the primary cause in 11 of the 12 rollover 
accidents.  There were very few accidents assigned to vehicle, highway, or weather related 
causes and in the case of rollovers, there were no vehicle or highway related causes assigned.   
 

















Error 114 0 7 7 121 5.8% 16.3%
Driver Non-
Performance 2 0 0 0 2 0.0% 0.0%
Driver 
Performance Error 5 0 0 0 5 0.0% 0.0%
Driver Recognition 
Error 41 0 4 4 45 8.9% 9.3%
Total Driver Errors 162 0 11 11 173 14.7% 25.6%
Vehicle Related 7  0    0.0% 0.0%
Highway Related 8 0 0 0 8 0.0% 0.0%
Weather Related 1  1 1 2 50.0% 2.3%
Other Vehicle 
Induced 321  30 31 352 8.8% 72.1%
Unknown 6   0 6 0.0% 0.0%
Total   505 0 42 43 541 
Driver Error 
Percentages 32.1%  26.2% 25.6% 32.0% 
Other Vehicle 
Percentages 63.6%  71.4% 72.1% 65.1% 
 
One change was made to the primary reason categories.  While the LTCCS lists the first category 
as “No Driver Error,” it clearly is “No Driver, Vehicle or Environmental Factor.”  About half the 
accidents fall into this category, probably because the driver of the other vehicle is the primary 
reason for the accident.  Table A-3 shows that for the remaining 50 percent of the accidents, 
driver related factors are the primary reason. They account for 43 percent of the accidents while 
in the remaining 7 percent, the highway and the vehicle were the primary reasons in one and five 
percent of the accidents respectively.  Table A-3 also shows that 180 of the 252 rollovers, about 
71 percent, are related to driver performance (physical factors, driver performance, decision and 
recognition categories).  Physical factors are related to driver health.  Only 38 out of the 252 
rollovers, about 15 percent, are linked to no driver, vehicle, or environmental factors.   
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Table A-4, the companion table to Table A-3, is limited to cargo tank truck accidents.  The 
observed trends in Table A-3 are present in Table A-4 as well.  About half the accidents are not 
attributed to driver, vehicle and environmental factors and for about the same percent of the 
accidents, 44 versus 43 for all vehicles, driver factors are cited as the primary reason.  Although 
the vehicle related factors are lower, 2 versus 5 percent for all vehicles and no highway related 
factors are cited, the quantity of cargo tank accident data is limited and as a result these 
differences should not be considered to be significant.  Even with the limited data, the cargo tank 
results are very consistent with the results for all vehicles, 20 out of 28 rollovers, about  
71 percent are attributed to driver errors, the same percentage found when all vehicle types are 
considered.  Similarly, 5 out of the 28 or about 18 percent of all the cargo tanks rollovers were 
not related to driver, vehicle or environmental factors.   
 
Tables A-3 and A-4 clearly show the importance assigned to driver, vehicle and environmental 
factors.  In terms of ratios, the vehicle related factors are about 5 times more important than the 
environmental factors, 5 percent of all accidents versus 1 percent of all accidents.  Similarly, 
driver related factors are about 9 times more important than vehicle related factors, 43 percent 
versus 5 percent.  When driver factors are examined as a percentage of all rollovers, they clearly 
dominate the categories being present in about 71 percent of rollovers for both the all truck and 
cargo tank only cases.  Because of the higher percentage of rollovers when driver followed by 
vehicle factors are cited, ordering the emphasis on these factors should have the greatest effect in 
reducing both the number of accidents and rollovers for all vehicle categories including cargo 
tanks.   
 
The corresponding field in the GES database is the “critical event.”  The critical event is defined 
in GES as the event that occurred that made the crash possible or imminent.  The GES data show 
that about 78 percent of the rollovers are related to the driver, confirming the relationships 
observed in the analysis of the primary reason in the two databases described above.  
 
LTCCS records a “pre-crash event.”  The table shows that about 82 percent of the rollover 
crashes [(105 + 101)/253] were preceded by either the truck going straight or negotiating a curve.  
In about 41 percent of the rollovers [101/252], the truck was negotiating a curve.  For those 
crashes, about 54 percent of all crashes resulted in a rollover.  About 93 percent of rollovers for 
cargo tank trucks [(10+19)/28] were preceded by the truck either going straight or negotiating a 
curve.  Negotiating a curve accounted for about 57 percent of all rollovers for the tank trucks 
[19/28].  Of the trucks in this category, about 76 percent of the rollovers occurred after the truck 
was negotiating a curve.  There was but a single case in which a stopped truck involved in a 
crash rolled over. 
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No Driver, Vehicle or 
Environmental Factor 583 38 621 6.1% 15.1% 50.0%
Driver Physical Factor 34 29 63 46.0% 11.5% 5.1%
Driver Decision Factor 129 92 221 41.6% 36.5% 17.8%
Driver Performance 
Factor 38 29 67 43.3% 11.5% 5.4%
Driver Recognition Factor 158 30 188 16.0% 11.9% 15.1%
  Total Driver Factors 359 180 539 33.4% 71.4% 43.4%
Environment – Highway 10 2 12 16.7% 0.8% 1.0%
Environment – Weather 4 0 4 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Unknown Reason 4 2 6 33.3% 0.8% 0.5%
Vehicle Related Factor 29 30 59 50.8% 11.9% 4.8%
Overall 989 252 1241 20.3% 100.0% 
 
 
















No Driver, Vehicle or 
Environmental Factor 41 5 46 10.9% 17.9% 51.7%
Driver Physical Factor 3 3 6 50.0% 10.7% 6.7%
Driver Decision Factor 4 14 18 77.8% 50.0% 20.2%
Driver Performance Factor 2 2 4 50.0% 7.1% 4.5%
Driver Recognition Factor 10 1 11 9.1% 3.6% 12.4%
  Total Driver Factors 19 20 39 51.3% 71.4% 43.8%
Environment – Highway 0.0% 0.0%
Environment – Weather 1 0 1 0.0% 0.0% 1.1%
Unknown Reason 0 1 1 100.0% 3.6% 1.1%
Vehicle Related Factor 0 2 2 100.0% 7.1% 2.2%
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 
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Table A -  5 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Critical Event (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Blow Out or Flat Tire 1.05% (0.3, 3.8) 
Disabling Vehicle Failure 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Non-disabling Vehicle Failure 0.05% (0.0, 0.4) 
Other Vehicle Stopped 4.54% (1.9, 10.6) 
Encroaching Vehicle Left 13.36% (6.4, 25.8) 
Total Vehicle 19.07% (9.9, 33.7) 
Poor Road Conditions 0.94% (0.4, 2.5) 
Total Road 0.94% (0.4, 2.5) 
Traveling too Fast for Conditions 28.4% (16.1, 45.1) 
Other Cause of Control Loss 4.44% (2.3, 8.4) 
Unknown Cause of Control Loss 0.53% (0.1, 2.0) 
Over Lane Line Left 3.79% (1.4, 9.9) 
Over Lane Line Right 0.67% (0.1, 3.2) 
Off Edge Road Left 12.04% (6.1, 22.3) 
Off Edge Road Right 23.75% (16.6, 32.8) 
Turing Left @ Intersection 0.61% (0.1, 2.6) 
Turning Right at Intersection 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Crossing Intersection 3.73% (1.6, 8.4) 
Total Driver 78.03% (62.9, 88.2) 
Animal in Roadway 1.02% (0.2, 5.1) 
Other Critical Event/No Collision 0.93% (0.3, 2.8) 
Total Other 1.95% (0.7, 5.3) 
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Figure A -  1 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Critical Event (GES) 
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Accelerating in Traffic Lane 17 2 19 10.5% 0.8%
Backing Up (other than for parking position) 6  6 0.0% 0.0%
Changing Lanes 34 5 39 12.8% 2.0%
Decelerating in Traffic Lane 59 6 65 9.2% 2.4%
Disabled or Parked in Travel Lane 2  2 0.0% 0.0%
Going Straight 559 105 664 15.8% 41.7%
Making a U-turn 1  1 0.0% 0.0%
Merging 5 2 7 28.6% 0.8%
Negotiating a Curve 87 101 188 53.7% 40.1%
No Driver Present 16 1 17 5.9% 0.4%
Other (specify) 12 1 13 7.7% 0.4%
Passing or Overtaking Another Vehicle 8 4 12 33.3% 1.6%
Starting in Traffic Lane 7 1 8 12.5% 0.4%
Stopped in Traffic Lane 122  122 0.0% 0.0%
Successful Avoidance Maneuver to a Previous 
Critical Event 27 13 40 32.5% 5.2%
Turning Left 17 4 21 19.0% 1.6%
Turning Right 8 7 15 46.7% 2.8%
Unknown 2  2 0.0% 0.0%
Overall 989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0%
 
 











Changing Lanes 4  4 0.0% 0.0%
Decelerating in Traffic Lane 7  7 0.0% 0.0%
Going Straight 36 10 46 21.7% 35.7%
Negotiating a Curve 5 16 21 76.2% 57.1%
Starting in Traffic Lane 1  1 0.0% 0.0%
Stopped in Traffic Lane 4  4 0.0% 0.0%
Successful Avoidance Maneuver to a Previous 
Critical Event  2 2 100.0% 7.1%
Turning Left 1  1 0.0% 0.0%
Turning Right 2  2 0.0% 0.0%
Unknown 1  1 0.0% 0.0%
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0%
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A-1.2 Accident Type 
 
Tables A-8 and A-9 show the distribution of accident types for straight truck tanks and tractor-
semitrailer tanks in TIFA.  The “Collision with other vehicle” category was created from a 
combination of more detailed categories shown in Appendix B. 
 
• Note that most first event rollovers (71.7 percent for straights) start by running off the 
road, though overall, only 17.7 percent of all crashes start by running off the road.  
 
• Subsequent event rolls more often are initiated by a collision with another vehicle. This 
occurs in 63.1 percent of these cases for straight truck tanks and 50.5 percent of the cases 
for tractor-semitrailer tanks. 
 
Table A-10 and A-11 show the pre-crash maneuver in TIFA.  This is what the truck was doing 
before the crash was initiated.  The “Other” category was created from a combination of more 
detailed categories shown in Appendix B.   
 
• Note the big difference in negotiating a curve between first event and later event. There is 
also a difference in negotiating a curve between no rollover and overall.  Also, most are 
going straight before a fatal crash, whether it rolled over or not. 
 
• Tractor-semitrailers have a higher rate of negotiating a curve in first event rollover than 
do straights.  
 
Table A -  8 Accident Type for Straight Truck Tanks (TIFA) 
Straight Truck Tanks 































Road 13 33 17 63 79.4% 5.3% 71.7% 26.2% 45.0% 17.7%
Hit Object in 




179 5 41 225 20.4% 73.1% 10.9% 63.1% 41.4% 63.2%
Untripped 
Roll 0 8 2 10 100.0% 0% 17.4% 3.1% 9.0% 2.8%
Unknown 28 0 4 32 12.5% 11.4% 0% 6.2% 3.6% 9%
Total 245 46 65 356 31.2% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 100%
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Table A -  9 Accident Type for Tractor-semitrailer Tanks (TIFA) 
Tractor-semitrailer Tanks 































Road 26 99 81 206 87.4% 2.3% 65.6% 36.8% 48.5% 13.9%
Hit Object in 
Road 67 1 9 77 13.0% 6% 0.7% 4.1% 2.7% 5.2%
Collision with 
Other Vehicle 866 3 111 980 11.6% 78% 2% 50.5% 30.7% 66.2%
Untripped 
Roll 1 37 5 43 97.7% 0.1% 24.5% 2.3% 11.3% 2.9%
Unknown 150 11 14 175 14.3% 13.5% 7.3% 6.4% 6.7% 11.8%
Total 1,110 151 220 1,481 25.1% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 100%
 
 
Table A -  10 Pre-crash Maneuver for Straight Truck Tanks (TIFA) 
Straight Truck Tanks 































Straight 176 24 42 242 27.3% 71.8% 52.2% 64.6% 59.5% 68%
Negotiate 
Curve 24 18 13 55 56.4% 9.8% 39.1% 20% 27.9% 15.4%
Other 45 4 10 59 23.7% 18.4% 8.7% 15.4% 12.6% 16.6%
Total 245 46 65 356 31.2% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 100%
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Table A -  11 Pre-crash Maneuver for Tractor-semitrailer Tanks (TIFA) 
Tractor-semitrailer Tanks 































Straight 835 46 153 1,034 19.2% 75.2% 30.5% 69.5% 53.6% 69.8%
Negotiate 
Curve 63 84 50 197 68.0% 5.7% 55.6% 22.7% 36.1% 13.3%
Other 212 21 17 250 15.2% 19.1% 13.9% 7.7% 10.2% 16.9%
Total 1,110 151 220 1,481 25.1% 100% 100% 100% 100.0% 100%
 
Of the 1,261 hazmat cargo tank accidents selected from MCMIS, only 321 were single vehicle 
accidents.  However, these single vehicle accidents, representing only 25 percent of all accidents, 
constituted more than 78 percent of the hazmat cargo tank rollovers. 
 




















Single 92 22 207 229 321 71.3% 78.7%
Multiple 878 2 61 62 940 6.6% 21.3%
Total 970 24 267 291 1,261 23.1% 100.0%
 
The rollover is usually not the first harmful event in the crash sequence.  When the rollover is a 
subsequent event, it is instructive to note what was the first event.  In the case of an accident 
involving another vehicle, the first event is normally collision with that other vehicle.  For single 
vehicle accidents, the most common first event is ran off road. 
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Table A -  13 First Event when The Rollover was a Subsequent Event (MCMIS) 
Single Vehicle  Multiple Vehicle  
First Event Count Percent Count Percent  
Collision Involving Motor 
Vehicle in Transport -- -- 35 61.4% 
Ran Off Road 119 66.0% 7 12.3% 
Loss of Control 17 9.4%  
Loss of Cargo or Shift 12 6.6%  
Avoiding 10 5.5% 12 21.1% 
Collision Involving Fixed 
Object 5 2.8% 1 12.8% 
Separation of Units 4 2.2%  
Cross Median Centerline 4 2.2%  
Skidding/Sliding 3 1.7%  
Equipment Failure (Brake 
failure, blown tires etc) 2 1.1%  
Over Corrected 1 0.6%  
Other 1 0.6%  
Jacknife 1 0.6% 2 3.5% 
Ditch 1 0.6%  
 
GES records the “manner of collision.”  The rollover crashes did not involve a collision with 
another motor vehicle in transit in 87 percent of the cases.  Although the 78.7 percent number for 
single-vehicle crashes in the MCMIS table is barely outside the confidence interval for the GES 
figure, the two databases agree that most rollovers occur in single vehicle crashes.  For this 
reason, a number of other tables in the appendix are limited to single-vehicle crashes. 
 
Table A -  14 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes byManner of Collision (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Not Collide with Motor Vehicle in Transit 87.32% (79.8, 92.3) 
Rear-End 0.93% (0.2, 5.0) 
Head-On 1.99% (0.6, 6.8) 
Angle 8.71% (4.9, 15.0) 
Sideswipe/Same Direction 0.8% (0.3, 2.1) 
Sideswipe/Opposite Direction 0.25% (0.0, 1.9) 
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A-2 Vehicle Factors 
 
Vehicle-related factors include the design of the vehicle and any defects it had prior to the crash. 
 
A-2.1 Vehicle Configuration 
 
























Tractor/Semitrailer 638 16 158 174 812 21.4% 59.8%
Tractor, Two 
Trailers 18 1 6 7 25 29.0% 2.4%
Straight Truck, No 
Trailer 275 5 85 90 365 24.7% 30.9%
Straight Truck, 
One Trailer 34 2 13 15 49 30.9% 5.2%
Other / Unknown 5 0 5 5 10 46.3% 1.7%
Overall 970 24 267 291 1,261 23.1% 100.0%
 
 
Table A -  16 Percentage of Rollovers Occurring on Highways  
for each Vehicle Configuration (MCMIS) 
Interstate Primary Secondary Unknown 
All 
Road 
Types Vehicle Configuration 
Tractor/Semitrailer 23.4% 55.2% 20.0% 1.4% 100.0%
Tractor, Two Trailers 21.1% 54.1% 24.8%  100.0%
Straight Truck, Utility Vehicle 9.2% 33.1% 57.7%  100.0%
Straight Truck, One Trailer 20.9% 62.6% 16.6%  100.0%
Other / Unknown 37.0% 63.0%   100.0%
Overall 18.8% 48.6% 31.8% 0.8% 100.0%
 
LTCCS records the “general vehicle type,” and the cargo tank vehicles can be further subdivided 
according to the cargo.  The two tables show that cargo tanks roll over in a higher fraction of the 
crashes studied for the LTCCS.  The rollover rate for all vehicles is about 20 percent compared 
to about 32 percent for cargo tanks.  Liquids in bulk have the highest rollover rate of about  
47 percent while gases in bulk, (only one case) combined with solids in bulk, have a rollover rate 
of 40 percent.  
 
The rollover data for all trucks shows little difference between the rollover rate of straight trucks, 
and tractor semitrailers with one or more trailers.  As is the case with the MCMIS data, the great 
majority of all rollovers occur with tractor trailer configurations.  For all vehicles, a truck-tractor 
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pulling one trailer accounts for about 62 percent of all rollovers while a straight truck only 
accounts for about 31 percent of all rollovers. 
 










Rollovers General Vehicle Types 
Medium/Heavy Duty Pickup Truck 7 0 7 0.0% 0.0%
Step Van 2 1 3 33.3% 0.4%
Single Unit Straight Truck 272 79 351 22.5% 31.3%
Truck-tractor Pulling One Trailer 638 156 794 19.6% 61.9%
Truck-tractor Pulling Two or More 
Trailers 46 11 57 19.3% 4.4%
Truck-tractor with No Cargo Trailer 24 5 29 17.2% 2.0%
Overall 989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0%
 
 
Table A -  18 Vehicle Type Rollover Rate: Cargo Tanks Only (LTCCS) 
Tank-
compressed 






Vehicle Type Number of Rollovers / Number of No Rollovers 
Empty   0 / 6 0 / 22 28   
Gases in Bulk 1 / 0   1 / 0 2 100.0%
Liquids in Bulk     21 / 24 45 46.7%
Solids in Bulk   5 / 9   14 35.7%
Overall 1 20 68 89 31.5%
 
In the TIFA data, tank trucks are shown to roll over at a much higher rate, for both straight trucks 
and tractor-semitrailers, than vans.  About 10 percent of the trucks with the van configuration 
rolled compared with about 26 percent of the cargo tank vehicles.  Table A-19 also shows that 
straight cargo tank trucks roll over at a slightly higher rate than cargo tank semitrailers.  The 
cargo tank straight trucks have a rollover rate in fatal crashes of about 31 percent compared to 
cargo tank semitrailers, which have a rollover rate of about 25 percent.  Nevertheless, van tractor 
semitrailers account for almost 80 percent of all rollovers.  Tank trucks follow a similar pattern 
with about 31 percent of the straight trucks rolling over in a fatal crash and about 25 percent of 
tractor semitrailers rolling over in a crash.  Tractor semitrailers account for 77 percent of all of 
the rollovers for the tank trucks. 
 
The table shows that, in fatal accidents, cargo tank trucks roll over at a much higher rate than 
vans.  This is true both when the rollover is the first event and when it is a subsequent event. 
When rollovers during a first and subsequent event are combined, approximately 10 percent of 
vans in fatal accidents roll over, compared to about 26 percent of cargo tank trucks.  
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Straight Truck 1,656 37 178 215 1,871 11.5% 20.1%
Tractor-Semi 7,669 222 634 856 8,525 10.0% 79.9%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Straight Truck 245 46 65 111 356 31.2% 23.0%
Tractor-Semi 1,110 151 220 371 1,481 25.1% 77.0%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
 


















Van 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 69.0%
Tank 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 31.0%
Total 10,680 456 1,097 1,553 12,233 12.7% 100.0%
 
 



















Hazmat 121 8 14 22 143 15.4% 2.1%
No 
Hazmat 9,204 251 798 1,049 10,253 10.2% 97.9%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Hazmat 359 105 139 244 603 40.5% 50.6%
No 
Hazmat 996 92 146 238 1,234 19.3% 49.4%
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Table A -  22 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Trailing Units and Body Type (GES) 
Number of 
Trailing Units 





None  99.63% (97.1, 100) 
Single-Unit 
Straight Truck 1 0.37% (0.0, 2.9) 
2 0% -- 
None  0% -- 
Truck Tractor 1 93.48% (77.3, 98.4) 
2 6.52% (1.6, 22.7) 
None  25.36% (1.9, 85.4) 
Medium Heavy 
Truck 1 74.64% (14.6, 98.1) 
2 0% -- 
 
A-2.2 Vehicle Loading 
 
As expected, the loading of a truck and especially a cargo tank is closely linked with the 
propensity to roll over.  
 
The definitions of empty, partial, and full were the same for LTCCS as for MCMIS. 
 
• Empty:  from completely empty to 20 percent of capacity,   
• Partial:  from 20 to 75 percent of capacity 
• Full:  greater than 75 percent of capacity.  (Tanks were never completely full because an 
allowance must be made for thermal expansion and a fully loaded cargo tank of diesel 
will be at its maximum gross hauling weight when the tank is only about 75 percent of its 
rated capacity.) 
 
TIFA does not have a variable that could directly indicate partial loads, and even characterize 
them in terms of percent full by volume and by weight, was unavailable.  Instead, TIFA data 
include the gross combination weight (GCW), empty combination weight (tare), and cargo 
weight.  Cargo weight by itself could not be examined because it excludes a consideration of a 
truck’s size.  For example, a 10,000 pound load might fill a class 6 tanker, but leave a semitrailer 
only 25 percent full.  In order to control for truck size, the percentage of the GCW accounted for 
by cargo weight was calculated.  From histograms of the data, three categories were determined: 
0 to 10 percent (where the weight of the truck would be expected to dominate handling), 10 to  
50 percent (which are most likely partial loads), and over 50 percent (which are most likely full 
loads). 
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Empty 93   1 1 94 1.1% 2.0%
Partial 38 0 10 10 48 21.4% 19.6%
Full 67 5 33 38 105 36.4% 74.5%
Unknown 9   2 2 11 16.7% 3.9%
Overall 206 5 46 51 257 19.8% 100.0%
 
 











Empty 377 27 404 6.7% 10.5% 
Partial 178 40 218 18.3% 15.6% 
Full 324 149 473 31.5% 58.0% 
Partial & Full 502 189 691 27.4% 73.5% 
Overall 1009 257 1,2661 20.3% 100.0% 
 
 











Empty 32 0 32 0.0% 0.0% 
Partial 4 7 11 63.6% 20.0% 
Full 33 20 53 37.7% 57.1% 
Partial & Full 37 27 64 42.2% 77.1% 
Overall 73 35 1081 32.4% 100.0% 
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Number of Fatal Crashes 
Empty 2,146 22 72 2,240 531 7 21 559
Loaded 6,765 233 722 7,720 808 189 262 1,259
Unknown 414 4 18 436 16 1 2 19
Total 9,325 259 812 10,396 1,355 197 285 1,837
Percentage of Fatal Crashes with/without Rollovers 
Empty 95.8 1.0 3.2 100.0 95.0 1.3 3.8 100.0
Loaded 87.6 3.0 9.4 100.0 64.2 15.0 20.8 100.0
Unknown 95.0 0.9 4.1 100.0 84.2 5.3 10.5 100.0

























0 to 10% 2,636 27 104 131 2,765 4.7% 15.4%
11 to 50% 2,466 72 212 284 2,750 10.3% 33.4%
> 50% 2,325 110 325 435 2,760 15.8% 51.2%
Total 7,427 209 641 850 8,277 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
0 to 10% 528 10 22 32 560 5.7% 8.1%
11 to 50% 141 40 41 81 222 36.5% 20.6%
> 50% 501 116 165 281 782 35.9% 71.3%
Total 1,170 166 228 394 1,564 25.2% 100.0%
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A-2.3 Cargo Tank Specification 
 
Of the databases used for this study, only the MCMIS database contained adequate data to 
examine the relationship between cargo tank specification and rollover.   
 
















MC306 222 7 54 61 283 21.5%
DOT406 107 0 23 23 130 17.3%
MC307 23 4 20 24 47 51.0%
DOT407 23 0 7 7 30 23.5%
 
A-2.4 Mechanical Problems 
 
The LTCCS database is unique among the crash databases in that it includes intensive data 
related to post crash inspections of brakes.  The include data for four types of truck brake 
problems related to a particular crash.  These four types are:  brakes out of adjustment, brakes 
inoperative, brake failure and brakes deficient.  Each is described below. 
 
Out-of-adjustment:  if any of the brakes were measured as out-of-adjustment, then the variable 
would be recorded as present.  
 
Brakes inoperative:  means the brakes are not working for any reason.  If the brakes are 
inoperative because they are severely out of adjustment, they might be recorded in the out-of-
adjustment category. 
 
Brake system deficiency:  Braking system deficiency records any problem other than brake out-
of-adjustment.  It includes the following: worn pads, unmatched brakes, hose connection, air 
pressure, break fade, etc.   
 
Brake system malfunction (failure):  This variable establishes whether or not the vehicle 
experiences a braking system malfunction (total failure such as pedal to the floor) during the pre-
crash phase (may not include a malfunction due to out-of-adjustment). Note: this variable was 
present in this analysis. 
 
The LTCCS is the only database used for this analysis that provides sufficient data to use to 
investigate the relationship between tire condition and rollover.  Tables A-30 and A-31 show the 
relationship of tire failure or defects to rollover for all trucks and only the cargo tank trucks in 
the LTCCS.  
 
About 84 percent of the rollovers in the GES data set are not associated with a mechanical 
problem. This data is different than that derived from the LTCCS and shown in Table A-30.  
Brake defects would have been coded in GES only when the defect’s responsibility for the crash 
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was clear or the defect was obvious.  Part of the protocol for LTCCS was a detailed field 
inspection of all trucks, so brake defects in that study were more likely to be noticed.  
 






















Crashes Brake Condition  
No Brake Defect Absent Absent Absent Absent 762 142 904 15.7% 56.3% 72.8%
Brake System 
Deficiency Absent Absent Absent Present 64 33 97 34.0% 13.1% 7.8%
Brakes Inoperative Absent Absent Present Absent 7 4 11 36.4% 1.6% 0.9%
Brakes Inoperative 
and Brake System 
Deficiency 
Absent Absent Present Present 2   2 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
Brakes Out Of 
Adjustment Absent Present Absent Absent 122 54 176 30.7% 21.4% 14.2%
Brakes Out Of 
Adjustment and Brake 
System Deficiency 
Absent Present Absent Present 18 10 28 35.7% 4.0% 2.3%
Brakes Out Of 
Adjustment and 
Brakes Inoperative 
Absent Present Present Absent 8 3 11 27.3% 1.2% 0.9%




Absent Present Present Present 1 1 2 50.0% 0.4% 0.2%
Brakes Defective Present Absent Absent Absent 5 3 8 37.5% 1.2% 0.6%
Brakes Defective and 
System Deficiency Present Absent Absent Present   1 1 100.0% 0.4% 0.1%
Brakes Defective and 
Out Of Adjustment Present Present Absent Absent   1 1 100.0% 0.4% 0.1%
Some Type of Brake 
Defect Present         227 110 337 32.6% 43.7% 27.2%
Overall         989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0% 100.0%
Percent of Accidents 
with Defective Brakes           27.2%     
  
Percent of Rollovers 
with Defective Brakes         43.7%    
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Table A -  30 Brake System Deficiency and Rollover: Cargo Tanks (LTCCS) 
























No Brake Defect Absent Absent Absent Absent 48 13 61 21.3% 46.4% 68.5%
Brake System 
Deficiency Absent Absent Absent Present 5 2 7 28.6% 7.1% 7.9%
Brakes Inoperative Absent Absent Present Absent  1 1 100.0% 3.6% 1.1%
Brakes Out Of 
Adjustment Absent Present Absent Absent 5 8 13 61.5% 28.6% 14.6%




Absent Present Absent Present 2 4 6 66.7% 14.3% 6.7%
Brakes Out Of 
Adjustment and 
Brakes Inoperative 
Absent Present Present Absent 1   1 0.0% 0.0% 1.1%
Brake Defect         13 15 28 53.6% 53.6% 31.5%
Overall         61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 100.0%
 














Rollovers Tire Condition 
No Tire Defects Absent Absent 946 225 1171 19.2% 89.29%
Tire Deficiency 
Present Absent Present 36 20 56 35.7% 7.94%
Tire Failure Present Present Absent 5 6 11 54.5% 2.38%
Tire Failure and 
Tire Deficiency 
Present 
Present Present 2 1 3 33.3% 0.40%
Any Tire Defect   43 27 70 38.6% 10.71%
Overall   989 252 1,241   100.00%
 
 














Rollovers Tire Condition 
No Tire Defects Absent Absent 60 27 87 31.0% 96.43%
Tire Deficiency 
Present Absent Present 1 1 2 50.0% 3.57%
Tire Failure Present        0.00%
Tire Failure and 
Tire Deficiency 
Present 
       0.00%
Any Tire Defect   1 1 2 50.0% 3.57%
Overall   61 28 89  100.00%
 
 
Table A -  33 Tire Failure or Defect Related to Rollover:  
Cargo Tanks Only (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
None 84.33% (77.4, 89.4) 
Tire 2.51% (0.9, 7.0) 
Brakes 1.21% (0.3, 4.4) 
Other 3.85% (1.3, 10.5) 
Unknown 8.1% (5.4, 11.9) 
 
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  160 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
A-3 Environment and Roadway 
 
This section discusses crashes grouped by environmental factors.  These factors include road 
type, access, location, rural or urban surroundings, light condition, roadway surface condition, 
roadway curvature, and roadway profile.   
 
A-3.1 Location of Accident with Respect to Junctions 
 
Table A-34 shows that the overall probability of a rollover on a divided highway is about  
20 percent and the overall probability of a rollover on undivided highway is about 30 percent.  
However, undivided highways account for almost 69 percent of all rollovers while divided 
highways account for only about 31 percent of rollovers.  The table also shows that for divided 
highways, very few rollovers occur close to the interchange but this low percentage is 
counterbalanced by the higher percentage of accidents that occur on exit and entrance ramps.   
On undivided highways, there does not seem to be much difference as to whether or not the 
accident occurs close to an intersection.  A significant number of all rollovers occur at or near the 
interchange on divided highways, but they are by no means the bulk of the rollover problem. 
 






















s Location of Accident 
Close to Interchange 130 2 10 11 141 8.0% 4.6%
Not at Interchange 197 0 45 45 242 18.7% 19.0%
On or Off Ramp 29 0 17 17 46 37.4% 7.2%
Total Divided Highway 355 2 72 74 429 17.2% 31.2%
Close to Intersection 189 7 75 82 271 30.3% 34.6%
Not at Intersection 183 4 77 81 264 30.7% 34.2%
Not on Roadway 8 0 0 0 8 0.0% 0.0%
Railroad Grade 
Crossing 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 
0.0%
Total Undivided 
Highway 381 11 153 163 545 30.0% 
68.8%
 Total 737 12 225 237 974 24.4% 100.0%
 
The data in Table A-35 from GES also indicate that most rollovers do not occur near an 
interchange, but GES records an even smaller fraction being at or near an interchange than 
MCMIS. 
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Table A -  35 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Relation to Junction (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Non-interchange 92.45% (83.9, 96.6) 
Interchange 1.27% (0.3, 4.5) 
Entrance/Exit 6.28% (3.0, 12.8) 
 
A-3.2 Population Area 
 
An Urban area is defined by MCMIS as a city with more than 100,000 residents, a City more 
than 5,000 residents, and a Town less than 5,000 residents.  The accident was assumed to occur 
in a Rural area if the County were the accident occurred was listed but the City or Place field was 
left blank.  TIFA has two designations, rural and urban. 
 




















Urban 157 5 13 18 174 10.2% 6.9%
City 271 8 40 47 319 14.9% 18.0%
Town 128 5 51 56 184 30.2% 21.5%
Rural 325 7 134 140 465 30.2% 53.6%
Overall 881 24 237 261 1,142 22.9% 100.0%
 
 




















Urban 7 3 8 11 18 61.1% 5.5%
City 12 8 26 34 45 75.6% 16.5%
Town 13 5 42 47 60 78.3% 23.2%
Rural 46 7 106 112 159 70.4% 54.9%
Overall 78 22 182 205 282 72.7% 100.0%
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Urban 3,197 56 183 239 3,436 7.0% 22.3%
Rural 5,948 193 621 814 6,762 12.0% 76.0%
Unknown 180 10 8 18 198 9.1% 1.7%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Urban 377 24 48 72 449 16.0% 14.9%
Rural 952 172 228 400 1352 29.6% 83.0%
Unknown 26 1 9 10 36 27.8% 2.1%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
A-3.3 Road Designation or Access Control  
 
In Table A-39 it is not possible to distinguish between primary roads that are built to interstate 
specifications and two-lane primary roads.  Thus, some of the primary road data might better fit 
with the intestate data and some with the secondary data. 
 
Refer to Table A-16 for the distribution of rollovers across road designations and vehicle types. 
 

















Interstate 282 2 43 45 327 13.7% 15.5%
Primary 459 14 130 144 603 23.8% 49.5%
Secondary 225 8 91 100 325 30.7% 34.4%
Unknown 4   3 3 6 44.3% 1.0%
Overall 970 24 267 291 1,261 23.1% 100.0%
 
Although there are more crashes on urban roads than on rural roads, Tables A-38 and A-40 show 
that a higher percentage of crashes in rural areas result in a rollover than in urban areas.  For all 
trucks, about 18 percent of urban crashes result in a rollover compared to 25 percent of rural 
crashes.  For cargo tank trucks, despite the fact that there are an identical number of rural and 
urban crashes, 14, about 26 percent of urban crashes result in a rollover compared to 40 percent 
of rural crashes.  Note that the percentage of all rollovers for cargo tanks is evenly split between 
urban and rural roads. 
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Rural Interstate 109 28 137 20.4% 11.1%
Rural Primary 71 38 109 34.9% 15.1%
Rural Other 141 41 182 22.5% 16.3%
Urban Freeway or Interstate 463 105 568 18.5% 41.7%
Urban Primary 81 17 98 17.3% 6.7%
Urban Other 115 19 134 14.2% 7.5%
Unknown 9 4 13 30.8% 1.6%
Rural Total 321 107 428 25.0% 42.5%
Urban Total 659 141 800 17.6% 56.0%
Unknown 9 4 13 30.8% 1.6%
Overall 989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0%
 
 











Rural Interstate 5 3 8 37.5% 10.7%
Rural Other 11 6 17 35.3% 21.4%
Rural Primary 5 5 10 50.0% 17.9%
Urban Freeway or Interstate 32 10 42 23.8% 35.7%
Urban Primary 2 3 5 60.0% 10.7%
Urban Other 6 1 7 14.3% 3.6%
Rural Total 21 14 35 40.0% 50.0%
Urban Total 40 14 54 25.9% 50.0%
Unknown 0 0 0   0.0%
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0%
 
 










RolloversRoad Category “Signage” 
Interstate 505 120 625 19.2% 47.6%
U.S. Highway 90 29 119 24.4% 11.5%
State Highway 176 53 229 23.1% 21.0%
Other 218 50 268 18.7% 19.8%
Overall 989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0%
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Interstate 36 13 49 26.5% 46.4% 
U.S. Highway 3 7 10 70.0% 25.0% 
State Highway 13 4 17 23.5% 14.3% 
Other 9 4 13 30.8% 14.3% 
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 
 
 
Limited access is not directly identified in TIFA.  Route signing is somewhat of a surrogate. 
Interstate roads are all limited access; but some U.S. Highways are limited access, as are a few 
State highways.  County roads are not limited access, however, and typically are in rural areas, 
and likely more problematic with respect to safety.  Township, municipal, and frontage roads are 
urban and probably lower speed.  
 



















3,493 133 384 517 4,010 12.9% 48.3%Interstate 
2,396 45 181 226 2,622 8.6% 21.1%US Highway  
2,168 56 190 246 2,414 10.2% 23.0%State Highway 
370 13 29 42 412 10.2% 3.9%County Road 
88 1 2 3 91 3.3% 0.3%Township 
532 1 16 17 549 3.1% 1.6%Municipality 
32 3 2 5 37 13.5% 0.5%Frontage Rd 
142 4 4 8 150 5.3% 0.7%Other 
104 3 4 7 111 6.3% 0.7%Unknown 
9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%Total 
Tank 
285 29 53 82 367 22.3% 17.0%Interstate 
351 49 71 120 471 25.5% 24.9%US Highway  
435 68 105 173 608 28.5% 35.9%State Highway 
138 25 37 62 200 31.0% 12.9%County Road 
26 4 1 5 31 16.1% 1.0%Township 
60 3 5 8 68 11.8% 1.7%Municipality 
9 1 2 3 12 25.0% 0.6%Frontage Rd 
37 15 8 23 60 38.3% 4.8%Other 
14 3 3 6 20 30.0% 1.2%Unknown 
1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%Total 
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Table A -  45 Type of Trafficway Flow (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Not Divided 66.24% (52.4, 77.7) 
Divided 21.87% (15.3, 30.3) 
One Way 6.57% (2.6, 15.4) 




Figure A -  2 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Type of Trafficway Flow (GES) 
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Table A -  46 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Number of Travel Lanes  
and Trafficway Flow (GES) 
Number of 
Travel Lanes 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Trafficway Flow 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
1 1.82% (0.2, 14.4) 
2 80.19% (64.8, 89.9) 
Not Divided 
3 8.57% (3.1, 21.8) 
Unknown 9.42% (4.0, 20.7) 
1 0.52% (0.1, 2.4) 
2 78.86% (58.1, 90.9) 
Divided 
3 17.26% (6.6, 38.2) 
Unknown 3.36% (0.6, 17.7) 
1 89.46% (65.7, 97.4) 
2 4.05% (1.0, 15.6) 
One Way 
3 1.11% (0.1, 9.1) 
Unknown 5.39% (0.8, 28.5) 
1 0% -- 
2 0% -- 
Unknown 
3 0% -- 
Unknown 100% -- 
 
 










Rollovers Access Control 
Full Control 645 150 795 18.9% 57.3% 
No Control 415 112 527 21.3% 42.7% 
Other (Specify) 1  1 0.0% 0.0% 
Overall 1061 262 1323 19.8% 100.0% 
 
 










Rollovers Access Control 
Full Control 40 15 55 27.3% 53.6% 
No Control 21 13 34 38.2% 46.4% 
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 
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A-3.4 Traffic Control Devices: GES 
 
Table A -  49 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Traffic Control Device (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No Control Device 75.53% (62.3, 85.2) 
Control Device 23.72% (14.1, 37.1) 
Unknown 0.75% (0.2, 3.0) 
 
A-3.5 Lighting Conditions 
 
Three databases show that 2/3 to 3/4 of rollovers occur in daylight. 
 











Daylight 733 185 918 20.2% 73.4% 
Dark 101 33 134 24.6% 13.1% 
Dark, but Lighted 120 26 146 17.8% 10.3% 
Dawn and Dusk 35 8 43 18.6% 3.2% 















Daylight 42 19 61 31.1% 67.9% 
Dark 7 3 10 30.0% 10.7% 
Dark, but Lighted 9 3 12 25.0% 10.7% 
Dawn and Dusk 3 3 6 50.0% 10.7% 
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 
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Daylight 5,457 133 454 587 6,044 9.7% 54.8%
Dark 2,576 91 258 349 2,925 11.9% 32.6%
Dark but 
Lighted 961 21 55 76 1,037 7.3% 7.1%
Dawn 227 11 33 44 271 16.2% 4.1%
Dusk 97 3 11 14 111 12.6% 1.3%
Unknown 7 0 1 1 8 12.5% 0.1%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Daylight 862 139 185 324 1,186 27.3% 67.2%
Dark 316 45 66 111 427 26.0% 23.0%
Dark but 
Lighted 122 7 20 27 149 18.1% 5.6%
Dawn 31 4 11 15 46 32.6% 3.1%
Dusk 23 2 3 5 28 17.9% 1.0%
Unknown 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 0.0%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
 
Table A -  53 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Light Condition (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Daylight 71.42% (60.8, 80.1) 
Dark 21.91% (12.6, 35.3) 
Dark But Lighted 1.83% (0.6, 5.5) 
Dawn 3.1% (1.2, 8.0) 
Dusk 1.74% (0.3, 9.4) 
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A-3.6 Road Surface Conditions 
 
In the larger samples, TIFA, and GES, the portion of rollovers on dry roads is in the 80 percent 
range.  The ratio in LTCCS was higher. 
 










Rollovers Road Condition 
Dry 807 223 1030 21.7% 88.5% 
Wet 145 26 171 15.2% 10.3% 
Snow or Slush 11 1 12 8.3% 0.4% 
Ice 19 1 20 5.0% 0.4% 
Other (Specify) 7 1 8 12.5% 0.4% 
Overall 989 252 1,241 20.3% 100.0% 
 
 










Rollovers Road Condition 
Dry 50 26 76 34.2% 92.9% 
Wet 8 2 10 20.0% 7.1% 
Ice 3 0 3 0.0% 
Overall 61 28 89 31.5% 100.0% 
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Dry 7,331 222 663 885 8,216 10.8% 82.6%
Wet 1,493 30 116 146 1,639 8.9% 13.6%
Snow or Slush  254 1 13 14 268 5.2% 1.3%
Ice 224 6 17 23 247 9.3% 2.1%
Sand Dirt Oil  8 0 1 1 9 11.1% 0.1%
Other 5 0 0 0 5 0.0% 0.0%
Unknown 10 0 2 2 12 16.7% 0.2%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Dry 1,136 180 238 418 1,554 26.9% 86.7%
Wet 161 16 36 52 213 24.4% 10.8%
Snow or Slush  30 0 6 6 36 16.7% 1.2%
Ice 25 0 3 3 28 10.7% 0.6%
Sand Dirt Oil  1 0 1 1 2 50.0% 0.2%
Other 1 0 0 0 1 0.0% 0.0%
Unknown 1 1 1 2 3 66.7% 0.4%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
 
Table A -  57 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes  
by Weather (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 




82.67% (71.7, 90.0) 
Rain 8.38% (3.0, 21.1) 
Snow 7.31% (2.1, 22.2) 
Fog 1.65% (0.2, 12.3) 
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Table A -  58 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes by Roadway Surface Condition (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Dry 76.88% (67.3, 84.3) 
Wet 13.61% (7.0, 24.9) 
Snow or Slush 6.45% (1.7, 21.6) 
Ice 2.54% (0.7, 8.4) 
Sand, Dirt, or Oil 0.06% (0.0, 0.5) 
Other (Specify) 0.47% (0.1, 3.6) 
 
A-3.7 Roadway Curvature (Horizontal and Vertical) 
 
The TIFA data show that the about half of tank truck fatal involvements on a curve included a 
rollover and these accounted for about 44 percent of all rollovers.  Note that the fraction of first-
event rollovers is much higher for tanks on a curve than for tanks on a straight or for vans on 
either alignment.   
 


















Straight 7,996 117 607 724 8,720 8.3% 67.6%
Curve 1,308 142 202 344 1,652 20.8% 32.1%
Unknown 21 0 3 3 24 12.5% 0.3%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Straight 1,143 71 199 270 1,413 19.1% 56.0%
Curve 210 126 85 211 421 50.1% 43.8%
Unknown 2 0 1 1 3 33.3% 0.2%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
GES data in Table A-59 show rollover crashes for tank trucks for straight and curved road 
alignment.  The data show that 59 percent of the rollovers took place on a straight stretch of road 
while 41 percent occurred on a curve. 
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Table A -  60 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes  
by Road Alignment (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Straight 59.07% (43.4, 73.1) 
Curve 40.93% (26.9, 56.6) 
 
The majority of rollover crashes recorded in GES occurred either when the driver was moving 
straight or negotiating a curve prior to the critical event of the crash.   
 
Table A -  61 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Movement  
Prior to Critical Event (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Going Straight 41.46% (28.0, 56.3) 
Decelerating in Traffic 
Lane 1.86% (0.5, 7.3) 
Passing or Overtaking 
Another Vehicle 1.48% (0.3, 6.1) 
Turning Right 11.69% (4.7, 26.3) 
Turning Left 10.46% (4.5, 22.6) 
Negotiating a Curve 31.77% (18.6, 48.6) 
Changing Lane 0.9% (0.2, 5.2) 
Merging 0.07% (0.0, 0.6) 
Other 0.31% (0.0, 2.2) 
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Figure A -  3 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Movement Prior to Critical Event (GES) 
 
The data in Table A-62 show that tank trucks involved in a fatal crash on a grade (slope up or 
down) are much more likely to roll over, compared with level, hillcrest, or sag.  About  
40 percent of the fatal tank truck crashes on a grade are involved a rollover and these represent 
about 39 percent of all the tank truck rollovers.  The effect is the same, but much smaller for 
vans with only about 15 percent of these vehicles rolling over on a grade although these 
represent 37 percent of all tank rollovers. 
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Level 6,711 127 508 635 7,346 8.6% 59.3%
Grade 2,217 122 275 397 2,614 15.2% 37.1%
Hillcrest 183 4 11 15 198 7.6% 1.4%
Sag 23 1 2 3 26 11.5% 0.3%
Unknown 191 5 16 21 212 9.9% 2.0%
Total 9,325 259 812 1,071 10,396 10.3% 100.0%
Tank 
Level 1,010 101 177 278 1,288 21.6% 57.7%
Grade 280 87 99 186 466 39.9% 38.6%
Hillcrest 33 7 3 10 43 23.3% 2.1%
Sag 6 0 1 1 7 14.3% 0.2%
Unknown 26 2 5 7 33 21.2% 1.5%
Total 1,355 197 285 482 1,837 26.2% 100.0%
 
GES data show a slightly higher number of tank truck rollovers are on a grade than on level 
roadway, but the TIFA proportions are within the GES confidence intervals.  
 
Table A -  63 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes  
by Roadway Profile (TIFA) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
Level 47.79% (28.2, 68.0) 
Grade 50.36% (30.3, 70.3) 
Hillcrest 1.66% (0.5, 5.3) 
Sag 0.19% (0.0, 1.6) 
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A-4 Driver Factors 
 
Driver factors include demographics such as age and experience.  They include driver actions 
and inactions such as speeding or judgment of the appropriate speed.  The driver’s physical 
condition, such as alcohol impairment or illness, are also included. 
 
A-4.1 Driver Experience 
 
The MCMIS data show that drivers with less than five years’ experience account for two-thirds 
of all rollovers, but the TIFA data is more evenly distributed between the experience categories.  
No conclusions can be drawn about the rollover rate of drivers with a particular amount of 
experience, because the distribution of experience among the professional tank truck driving 
population is not known. 
 




















<5 57 2 23 24 81 29.9% 66.7%
>5 65 0 12 12 77 15.5% 33.3%
Overall 122 2 34 36 158 22.9% 100.0%
 
 




















<5 28 1 11 12 40 31.3% 70.6%
>5 28 0 5 5 33 13.9% 29.4%
Overall 56 1 16 17 73 23.5% 100.0%
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< 2 106 34 140 24.3% 15.2% 
2 - 5 139 30 169 17.8% 13.5% 
5 - 10 164 38 202 18.8% 17.0% 
10 - 20 217 47 264 17.8% 21.1% 
20 - 30 141 30 171 17.5% 13.5% 
30 - 40 62 8 70 11.4% 3.6% 
40 - 50 19 3 22 13.6% 1.3% 
Unknown 62 33 95 34.7% 14.8% 
Overall 910 223 1,133 19.7% 100.0% 
 
 











< 2 4 4 8 50.0% 15.4% 
2 - 5 5 1 6 16.7% 3.8% 
5 - 10 10 8 18 44.4% 30.8% 
10 - 20 24 7 31 22.6% 26.9% 
20 - 30 3 2 5 40.0% 7.7% 
30 - 40 2 1 3 33.3% 3.8% 
40 - 50 4 0 4 0.0% 0.0% 
Unknown 8 3 11 27.3% 11.5% 
Overall 60 26 86 30.2% 100.0% 
 
 
A-4.2 Driver Age 
 
The three databases with driver age all show that middle aged drivers account for most of the 
rollovers, with the youngest and oldest drivers contributing a smaller number.  As with driver 
experience, without knowledge of the demographics of the entire population, no conclusions 
about the respective rollover rates of various age groups can be drawn.  
 
If the rollover is listed as the first event, which occurs about 10 percent of the time, it is 
necessary to look at the pre-crash condition to determine the precursors to the rollover event.  In 
the majority of these cases, the pre-crash event is a decision error on the part of the truck driver 
error in a single vehicle accident.  Since in more than 90 percent of the accidents, rollover is not 
the first event, then there was some other dangerous event that occurred before rollover.  In the 
case of an accident involving another vehicle, the first event is normally collision with a motor 
vehicle in transit.  For single vehicle accidents, the most common first event is ran off road.   
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<25 15 4 11 14 29 49.3% 4.8%
25 – 35 182 8 59 67 249 27.0% 23.0%
35 – 45 299 7 90 96 395 24.4% 33.0%
45 – 55 258 4 56 60 319 18.9% 20.6%
55 – 65 152 2 43 45 197 22.8% 15.5%
>65 65 0 8 8 73 11.6% 2.7%
Total 970 24 267 291 1,261 23.1% 100.0%
 
 



















<25 0 4 7 11 11 100.0% 4.8%
25 – 35 17 8 46 54 71 76.0% 23.6%
35 – 45 29 5 65 70 98 70.8% 30.6%
45 – 55 21 4 47 51 71 71.2% 22.3%
55 – 65 18 2 35 37 55 67.7% 16.2%
>65 8 0 7 7 15 45.3% 3.1%
Total 92 22 207 229 321 71.3% 100.0%
 
 




















≤ 25 553 15 63 78 631 12.4% 7.3%
26 – 55 7,347 210 625 835 8,182 10.2% 78.1%
≥ 56 1,306 34 122 156 1,462 10.7% 14.6%
Total 9,206 259 810 1,069 10,275 10.4% 100.0%
Tank 
≤ 25 59 9 14 23 82 28.0% 4.8%
26 – 55 1,067 148 217 365 1,432 25.5% 75.9%
≥ 56 221 39 54 93 314 29.6% 19.3%
Total 1,347 196 285 481 1,828 26.3% 100.0%
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Table A -  71 Percent of Rollover Crashes by 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
<25 7.74% (2.4, 22.4) 
25-34 23.97% (16.6, 33.3) 
35-44 32.29% (14.4, 57.5) 
45-54 24.83% (15.4, 37.6) 
55-65 9.18% (5.6, 14.8) 




Figure A -  4 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Driver Age 
 
 
A-4.3 Effect of Speed on Rollovers 
 
In the table with LTCCS data for all trucks (Table A-72), in about three quarters of all crashes, 
845 out of 1,114 accidents, speed was not a factor.  For those crashes that resulted in a rollover, 
speed was not a factor 100 out of 216 (46 percent).  In the table listing only the cargo tank 
crashes (Table A-73), more than half (52 percent) were judged to have no speed-related factors.  
The GES data also indicate that speed was a factor in less than half of the rollovers. 
 
Interestingly, the next GES table (Table A-74) shows that, when the speed was known, the 
number of rollover crashes is fairly evenly distributed across the range of speeds.  Some 
rollovers even occur at very low speeds.  The next table separates the rollovers according to the 
posted speed limit.  A number of rollovers were at speeds above the posted limit, but some were 
below the limit as well.  Again, other factors beside speed can contribute to a rollover.   
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Certainly, one cannot conclude that speed is not a factor in rollovers—it is a major factor—but 
there are a substantial number of crashes where speeding was not a factor. 
 











Did Not Realize Caution Required 50 41 91 45.1% 19.0%
Keeping Up with Traffic 11 3 14 21.4% 1.4%
No Driver Present 10  10 0.0% 0.0%
No Traveling too Fast Factors 745 100 845 11.8% 46.3%
Other Reason (Specify) 54 63 117 53.8% 29.2%
Unknown 28 9 37 24.3% 4.2%
Overall 898 216 1,114 19.4% 100.0%
 
 











Did Not Realize Caution Required 2 4 6 66.7% 16.0%
Keeping Up with Traffic 1  1 0.0% 0.0%
No Driver Present 0 0 0 0.0 % 0.0 %
No Traveling too Fast Factors 52 13 65 20.0% 52.0%
Other Reason (Specify) 2 6 8 75.0% 24.0%
Unknown 2 2 4 50.0% 8.0%
Overall 59 25 84 29.8% 100.0%
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Table A -  74 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes  
by Speed Related (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No 59.67% (42.6, 74.7) 
Yes 38.34% (23.3, 56.0) 




Table A -  75 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes by 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
<=15 4.33% (1.1, 15.9) 
20 0.97% (0.3, 3.5) 
25 6.18% (1.6, 21.1) 
30 5.48% (2.1, 13.5) 
35 4.1% (1.1, 14.5) 
40 5.26% (1.6, 16.0) 
45 4.42% (1.9, 9.8) 
50 4.67% (1.2, 16.2) 
55 6.17% (3.6, 10.4) 
60 1.07% (0.2, 4.8) 
65 3.85% (1.7, 8.7) 
70 3.09% (0.9, 9.9) 
75+ 2.27% (0.6, 8.9) 
Unknown 48.14% (25.7, 71.4) 
 

















<=15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75+ Unk
 
Figure A -  5 Percent and Number of Rollover Crashes by Travel Speed (GES) 
 
 
Table A -  76 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Number of Speed Limit  
and Travel Speed (GES) 
Travel Speed 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Speed Limit 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
0-20 0% -- 
21-40 0% -- 
0-20 41-60 0% -- 
>60 0% -- 
Unknown 100% -- 
0-20 16.01% (5.4, 38.9) 
21-40 33.64% (18.0, 54.0) 
21-40 41-60 6.64% (1.5, 24.7) 
>60 0% -- 
Unknown 43.71% (31.3, 57.0) 
0-20 2.68% (0.7, 10.3) 
21-40 20.46% (6.7, 48.0) 
41-60 41-60 19.91% (10.8, 33.7) 
>60 7.58% (2.9, 18.3) 
Unknown 49.37% (21.2, 78.0) 
0-20 0% -- 
21-40 6.19% (1.0, 29.6) 
>60 41-60 17.87% (3.8, 54.8) 
>60 28.87% (8.8, 63.0) 
Unknown 47.07% (14.4, 82.4) 
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A-4.4 Training and Rollover 
 
The LTCCS is the only database that records the type of commercial motor vehicle training that 
a driver had previous to the crash.  Four categories of training are included in Tables A-76 and 
A-77 as well as other training and no training (none). 
 











Community College, etc. 6 5 11 45.5% 2.2%
Driving School 306 77 383 20.1% 34.5%
Company 146 25 171 14.6% 11.2%
Military 27 8 35 22.9% 3.6%
None 271 49 320 15.3% 22.0%
Unknown or Other 154 59 213 27.7% 26.5%
Overall 910 223 1,133 19.7% 100.0%
 
A-4.5 Other Driver Factors 
 
Tables A-78 and A-79 show driver-related factors in the TIFA database.  Driver-related factors 
are those driver conditions or driver errors that were judged to contribute to the crash or that 
existed at the time of the crash.  Up to four such factors can be coded, so a driver can have more 
than one.  The tables show the number coded for selected factors and aggregated categories, such 
as “other physical.”  Appendix B contains tables with all of the available coded factors.  The 
total is the number of trucks involved, so the percentages are the percent of trucks with a given 
factor coded.  The following observations about these data can be made:  
 
• The distribution among the different factors for first event rollover is quite different from 
when the rollover is a later event.  
o Note the difference in the number for which “none” is coded.  For first-event 
rollovers, some error or driver condition is coded in nearly every case.  But in 
subsequent event rollovers (that is, after a previous harmful event), in 37 percent 
no error is coded.  
o Most of the first event rollovers are related to speed and running off the road. 
Overcorrecting is also well marked.  These are cases of going off the road and 
overcorrecting back on. 
• The two most frequent factors are exactly the same between straight trucks and tractor-
semitrailers. 
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Community College, etc.      0.0%
Driving School 19 16 35 45.7% 61.5%
Company 12 3 15 20.0% 11.5%
Military 1 1 2 50.0% 3.8%
None 14 1 15 6.7% 3.8%
Unknown or Other 14 5 19 26.3% 19.2%




Figure A -  6 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Straight Tank Trucks (TIFA) 
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Table A -  79 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Straight Tank Trucks (TIFA) 
Straight Truck Tanks 
 
Driver Factor 























164 2 24 190 13.7% 66.9% 4.3% 36.9% 23.4% 53.4%None 
Physical/mental Condition 
5 3 0 8 37.5% 2% 6.5% 0% 2.7% 2.2%Drowsy, Asleep 
9 6 7 22 59.1% 3.7% 13% 10.8% 11.7% 6.2%Inattentive 
1 1 0 2 50.0% 0.4% 2.2% 0% 0.9% 0.6%Other Physical 
Miscellaneous Driver Errors 
23 34 26 83 72.3% 9.4% 73.9% 40% 54.1% 23.3%Run Off Road 
1 2 6 9 88.9% 0.4% 4.3% 9.2% 7.2% 2.5%Erratic/Reckless 
23 0 9 32 28.1% 9.4% 0% 13.8% 8.1% 9%Failure to Yield or Obey 
11 17 8 36 69.4% 4.5% 37% 12.3% 22.5% 10.1%Driving Too Fast 
2 10 7 19 89.5% 0.8% 21.7% 10.8% 15.3% 5.3%Over Correcting 
13 0 7 20 35.0% 5.3% 0% 10.8% 6.3% 5.6%Other Driver Error 
Other 
4 1 1 6 33.3% 1.6% 2.2% 1.5% 1.8% 1.7%Misc. Non-Driver Causes 
3 0 2 5 40.0% 1.2% 0% 3.1% 1.8% 1.4%Vision Obscured 
8 7 4 19 57.9% 3.3% 15.2% 6.2% 9.9% 5.3%Avoiding, Swerving or Sliding 
14 1 3 18 22.2% 5.7% 2.2% 4.6% 3.6% 5.1%Miscellaneous Violations 
Possible Distractions 
(Inside the Vehicle) 
6 0 2 8 25.0% 2.4% 0% 3.1% 1.8% 2.2%
Total 
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Table A -  80 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Tractor-semitrailers (TIFA) 
 
 




















None 809 6 81 896 9.7% 72.9% 4.0% 36.8% 23.5% 60.5%
Physical/mental Condition 
Drowsy, Asleep 7 13 18 38 81.6% 0.6% 8.6% 8.2% 8.4% 2.6%
Inattentive 33 23 16 72 54.2% 3.0% 15.2% 7.3% 10.5% 4.9%
Other Physical 3 4 4 11 72.7% 0.3% 2.6% 1.8% 2.2% 0.7%
Miscellaneous Driver Errors 
Run Off Road 47 107 96 250 81.2% 4.2% 70.9% 43.6% 54.7% 16.9%
Erratic/Reckless 29 14 15 58 50.0% 2.6% 9.3% 6.8% 7.8% 3.9%
Failure to Yield or Obey 65 6 8 79 17.7% 5.9% 4.0% 3.6% 3.8% 5.3%
Driving Too Fast 48 66 36 150 68.0% 4.3% 43.7% 16.4% 27.5% 10.1%
Over Correcting 2 17 9 28 92.9% 0.2% 11.3% 4.1% 7.0% 1.9%
Other Driver Error 57 5 9 71 19.7% 5.1% 3.3% 4.1% 3.8% 4.8%
Other 
Misc. Non-Driver Causes 16 6 3 25 36.0% 1.4% 4.0% 1.4% 2.4% 1.7%
Vision obscured by weather 30 0 2 32 6.3% 2.7% 0.0% 0.9% 0.5% 2.2%
Vision obscured by other 5 0 3 8 37.5% 0.5% 0.0% 1.4% 0.8% 0.5%
Avoiding, swerving or sliding 29 6 9 44 34.1% 2.6% 4.0% 4.1% 4.0% 3.0%
Miscellaneous violations 46 1 6 53 13.2% 4.1% 0.7% 2.7% 1.9% 3.6%
Possible distractions (inside 
vehicle) 
28 3 4 35 20.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.8% 1.9% 2.4%
Total 
Total 1,110 151 220 1,481 25.1% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
Figure A -  7 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Tractor-semitrailer Tanks (TIFA) 
 
Table A-81 associates driver physical impairment with rollovers.  Transportation safety research 
has demonstrated that truck crashes are associated with various physical impairments such as 
diabetes and sleep apnea.  Most of the drivers (83 percent) involved in a rollover did not suffer 
from a physical impairment.  Of those with an impairment, most simply fell into the general 
category of tired. 
 
Table A -  81 Percentage of Drivers with a Physical Impairment (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
None 83.53% (78.0, 87.9) 
Ill, Blackout 2.5% (0.7, 8.2) 
Drowsy, Sleepy, Fell 
Asleep, Fatigued 6.63% (4.0, 10.9) 
Other Physical Impairment 0.31% (0.0, 2.2) 
Unknown If Physically 
Impaired 7.02% (2.7, 17.1) 
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Table A -  82 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Driver Vision Obscured (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No 74.59% (60.6, 84.9) 
Yes 6.35% (1.5, 23.5) 
Unknown 19.06% (9.8, 33.7) 
 
As with a number of types of crashes, driver distraction and inattention are significant factors.  
 
Table A -  83 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Driver Distraction (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
None 43.94% (24.9, 64.9) 
Adjusting Music/Other 
Devices 1.72% (0.3, 9.4) 
Sleepy 6.68% (4.0, 11.0) 
Other Person/Object 1.66% (0.3, 9.7) 
Inattentive 13.9% (5.6, 30.4) 
Other 0.19% (0.0, 0.8) 




Figure A -  8 Percent of Rollover Crashes by Driver Distraction (GES) 
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Alcohol and drugs are rarely a factor in commercial vehicle rollovers. 
 
Table A -  84 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Driver Drinking in Vehicle (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No 87.77% (74.5, 94.6) 
Yes 0.44% (0.1, 2.7) 
NA 11.79% (5.0, 25.2) 
 
 
Table A -  85 Percent of Rollover Crashes  
by Police-reported Drug Involvement (GES) 
Percent of All Rollovers 
Category 
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
No 87.9% (74.7, 94.7) 
Yes 0.31% (0.0, 2.2) 
Not Reported 0.8% (0.2, 2.7) 
Unknown 11% (4.4, 25.0) 
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Appendix B  
Additional TIFA Data Analyses
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Table B -  1 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Straight Tank Trucks 
Straight Cargo Tank Trucks 
Frequency Column Percentage 
Driver Factor NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
None 164 2 24 190 66.9 4.3 36.9 53.4 
Physical/mental condition 
Drowsy, Asleep 5 3 0 8 2.0 6.5 0.0 2.2 
Emotional 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Inattentive 9 6 7 22 3.7 13.0 10.8 6.2 
Other Physical 0 1 0 1 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.3 
Miscellaneous causes 
Run Off Road 8 25 14 47 3.3 54.3 21.5 13.2 
Improper Loading 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
W/O Req Equip 2 1 0 3 0.8 2.2 0.0 0.8 
Improper Tailing 2 0 2 4 0.8 0.0 3.1 1.1 
Run Off Rd/Lane 15 9 12 36 6.1 19.6 18.5 10.1 
Imp Entry/Exit 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Impr Start/Back 2 0 0 2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Prohibited Pass 1 0 1 2 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.6 
Erratic/Reckless 1 2 6 9 0.4 4.3 9.2 2.5 
Failure to Yield 11 0 3 14 4.5 0.0 4.6 3.9 
Failure to Obey 12 0 6 18 4.9 0.0 9.2 5.1 
Driving Too Fast 11 17 8 36 4.5 37.0 12.3 10.1 
Othr Improp Turn 1 0 4 5 0.4 0.0 6.2 1.4 
Wrong Side of Rd 5 0 0 5 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 
Stopping in Rd 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Locked Wheel 1 0 1 2 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.6 
Over Correcting 2 10 7 19 0.8 21.7 10.8 5.3 
Vision obscured by 
Weather 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.3 
Glare 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Curve,Hill,etc 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Tree,Plants 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.3 
Other Obstruct 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Avoiding, swerving or sliding due to: 
Slippery Surface 0 2 0 2 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.6 
Flat Tire 3 1 0 4 1.2 2.2 0.0 1.1 
Debris in Road 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.3 
Vehicle in Road 3 2 3 8 1.2 4.3 4.6 2.2 
Phantom Vehicle 0 1 0 1 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.3 
Water,Snow,Oil 2 0 0 2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Fishtailing, swaying 0 1 0 1 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.3 
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Straight Cargo Tank Trucks 
Driver Factor 
Frequency Column Percentage 
NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
Other miscellaneous factors 
Haul Hazmat Impr 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Hit and Run 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Homicide 3 0 1 4 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.1 
Other Violation 9 1 2 12 3.7 2.2 3.1 3.4 
Possible distractions (inside the vehicle) 
Cellular Phone 3 0 2 5 1.2 0.0 3.1 1.4 
Unknown 3 0 0 3 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 




Table B -  2 Miscellaneous Driver Factors for Tractor-semitrailer Tank Trucks 
Tractor-semitrailer Cargo Tank Trucks  
Frequency Column Percentage 
Frequency NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
None 809 6 81 896 72.9 4.0 36.8 60.5
Physical/mental condition 
Drowsy, Asleep 7 13 18 38 0.6 8.6 8.2 2.6
Ill, Blackout 3 1 1 5 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3
Emotional 0 0 2 2 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1
Drugs-Medication 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1
Other Drugs 0 2 0 2 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.1
Inattentive 33 23 16 72 3.0 15.2 7.3 4.9
Other Physical 0 1 0 1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1
Miscellaneous causes 
Run Off Road 21 73 51 145 1.9 48.3 23.2 9.8
Veh Unattended 3 0 0 3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Improper Loading 1 2 2 5 0.1 1.3 0.9 0.3
Improper Towing 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
W/O Req Equip 7 4 1 12 0.6 2.6 0.5 0.8
Improper Tailing 22 0 2 24 2.0 0.0 0.9 1.6
Impr Lane Change 7 1 0 8 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.5
Run Off Rd/Lane 26 34 45 105 2.3 22.5 20.5 7.1
Imp Entry/Exit 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Impr Start/Back 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Prohibited Pass 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Pass Insuff Dist 1 1 1 3 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.2
Erratic/Reckless 29 14 15 58 2.6 9.3 6.8 3.9
Failure to Yield 42 1 5 48 3.8 0.7 2.3 3.2
Failure to Obey 23 5 3 31 2.1 3.3 1.4 2.1
Fail to Obs Warn 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Driving Too Fast 48 66 36 150 4.3 43.7 16.4 10.1
Othr Improp Turn 10 0 3 13 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.9
Wrong Side of Rd 5 1 3 9 0.5 0.7 1.4 0.6
Op Inexperience 0 1 0 1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1
Unfamiliar w/Rd 1 1 0 2 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1
Stopping in Rd 5 0 0 5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3
Locked Wheel 3 0 0 3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Over Correcting 2 17 9 28 0.2 11.3 4.1 1.9
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Tractor-semitrailer Cargo Tank Trucks  
Frequency 
Frequency Column Percentage 
NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
Vision obscured by 
Weather 30 0 2 32 2.7 0.0 0.9 2.2
Glare 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Curve,Hill,etc 2 0 1 3 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.2
Bldg,Billboard 1 0 1 2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1
Tree,Plants 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1
Obstruct Angles 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Avoiding, swerving or sliding due to: 
Flat Tire 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Debris in Road 0 0 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1
Live Animal 1 0 1 2 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1
Vehicle in Road 13 3 4 20 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.4
Phantom Vehicle 4 1 0 5 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.3
Pedestrian 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Water,Snow,Oil 8 1 3 12 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.8
Fishtailing, swaying 0 1 0 1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1
Other miscellaneous factors 
Haul Hazmat Impr 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Hit and Run 5 0 0 5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3
Homicide 22 0 1 23 2.0 0.0 0.5 1.6
Other Violation 17 1 5 23 1.5 0.7 2.3 1.6
Possible distractions (inside vehicle) 
Cellular Phone 18 0 3 21 1.6 0.0 1.4 1.4
Computer 0 1 0 1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1
Unknown 10 2 1 13 0.9 1.3 0.5 0.9





Table B -  3 Accident Type for Straight Tank Trucks 
Straight Cargo Tank Trucks 
Frequency Column Percentage 
Accident Type 
NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
ran off road 13 33 17 63 5.3 71.7 26.2 17.7
hit object in road 25 0 1 26 10.2 0.0 1.5 7.3
rearend strike 5 0 2 7 2.0 0.0 3.1 2.0
rearend struck 23 0 0 23 9.4 0.0 0.0 6.5
rearend other 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3
ss sm encro 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ss sm o encro 3 0 1 4 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.1
ss sm oth 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3
head encro 5 0 4 9 2.0 0.0 6.2 2.5
head o encro 43 1 5 49 17.6 2.2 7.7 13.8
ss op encro 7 2 1 10 2.9 4.3 1.5 2.8
ss op o encro 23 1 2 26 9.4 2.2 3.1 7.3
ss op other 4 1 3 8 1.6 2.2 4.6 2.2
turn across 6 0 3 9 2.4 0.0 4.6 2.5
oth turn across 19 0 4 23 7.8 0.0 6.2 6.5
str, into oth 3 0 5 8 1.2 0.0 7.7 2.2
str, oth into 27 0 9 36 11.0 0.0 13.8 10.1
str, other 6 0 2 8 2.4 0.0 3.1 2.2
back into oth 3 0 0 3 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8
untrip roll 0 8 2 10 0.0 17.4 3.1 2.8
unknown 28 0 4 32 11.4 0.0 6.2 9.0
Total 245 46 65 356 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: ss=sideswipe, sm=same direction, op=opposite direction, encro=encroaching, o=other, 
oth=other, str=going straight, strike=truck is striking vehicle, struck=truck is struck 
vehicle. 
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Table B -  4 Accident Type for Tractor-semitrailer Tanks 
Tractor-semitrailer Cargo Tank Trucks 
Frequency Column Percentage 
Accident Type NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
ran off road 26 99 81 206 2.3 65.6 36.8 13.9 
hit object in road 67 1 9 77 6.0 0.7 4.1 5.2 
rearend strike 75 0 13 88 6.8 0.0 5.9 5.9 
rearend struck 101 0 1 102 9.1 0.0 0.5 6.9 
rearend other 6 0 1 7 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 
ss sm encro 6 0 1 7 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 
ss sm o encro 51 0 7 58 4.6 0.0 3.2 3.9 
ss sm oth 15 0 1 16 1.4 0.0 0.5 1.1 
head encro 11 0 2 13 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 
head o encro 146 1 14 161 13.2 0.7 6.4 10.9 
head other 4 0 0 4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
ss op encro 6 2 5 13 0.5 1.3 2.3 0.9 
ss op o encro 111 0 17 128 10.0 0.0 7.7 8.6 
ss op other 38 0 8 46 3.4 0.0 3.6 3.1 
turn across 48 0 1 49 4.3 0.0 0.5 3.3 
oth turn across 63 0 12 75 5.7 0.0 5.5 5.1 
oth turning 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
str, into oth 52 0 7 59 4.7 0.0 3.2 4.0 
str, oth into 118 0 20 138 10.6 0.0 9.1 9.3 
str, other 7 0 1 8 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5 
back into oth 7 0 0 7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 
oth back into 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
untrip roll 1 37 5 43 0.1 24.5 2.3 2.9 
unknown 150 11 14 175 13.5 7.3 6.4 11.8 
Total 1,110 151 220 1,481 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: ss=sideswipe, sm=same direction, op=opposite direction, encro=encroaching, o=other, 
oth=other, str=going straight, strike=truck is striking vehicle, struck=truck is struck 
vehicle. 
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Table B -  5 Pre-crash Maneuver for Straight Tank Trucks 
Straight Truck Tanks 
Frequency Column percentage Pre-crash 
Maneuver NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
Going Straight 176 24 42 242 71.8 52.2 64.6 68.0 
Slowing/Stopping 6 0 1 7 2.4 0.0 1.5 2.0 
Starting in Lane 4 0 0 4 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Stopped in Lane 11 0 0 11 4.5 0.0 0.0 3.1 
Passing 1 0 2 3 0.4 0.0 3.1 0.8 
Leave Parking 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Parked 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Enter Parking 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Avoid Animal,etc 3 2 4 9 1.2 4.3 6.2 2.5 
RTOR:Permitted 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
RTOR:not Legal 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
RTOR:not Known 1 1 0 2 0.4 2.2 0.0 0.6 
Left Turn 10 1 2 13 4.1 2.2 3.1 3.7 
U-turn 1 0 0 1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Backing up 3 0 0 3 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Changing Lanes 4 0 0 4 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 
Negotiate Curve 24 18 13 55 9.8 39.1 20.0 15.4 
Other 1 0 1 2 0.4 0.0 1.5 0.6 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 245 46 65 356 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note:  RTOR means right turn on red. 
 
 
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  199 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
Cargo Tank Roll Stability Study  200 Final Report:  April 30, 2007 
 
Table B -  6 Pre-crash Maneuver for Tractor-semitrailer Tanks 
Tractor-semitrailer Tank Trucks 
Pre-crash 
Maneuver 
Frequency Column percentage 
NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total NoRoll 1stEvt Subsqnt Total 
Going Straight 835 46 153 1,034 75.2 30.5 69.5 69.8 
Slowing/Stopping 37 1 1 39 3.3 0.7 0.5 2.6 
Starting in Lane 6 0 0 6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 
Stopped in Lane 50 0 0 50 4.5 0.0 0.0 3.4 
Passing 7 1 4 12 0.6 0.7 1.8 0.8 
Leave Parking 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Parked 1 0 0 1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Enter Parking 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Avoid Animal, etc 23 4 7 34 2.1 2.6 3.2 2.3 
RTOR:Permitted 2 0 0 2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
RTOR:not Legal 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
RTOR:not Known 8 3 0 11 0.7 2.0 0.0 0.7 
Left Turn 46 3 1 50 4.1 2.0 0.5 3.4 
U-turn 5 0 1 6 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.4 
Backing up 8 0 0 8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 
Changing Lanes 17 4 2 23 1.5 2.6 0.9 1.6 
Negotiate Curve 63 84 50 197 5.7 55.6 22.7 13.3 
Other 1 4 0 5 0.1 2.6 0.0 0.3 
Unknown 0 1 1 2 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.1 





Appendix C  
Model Of The TIFA Data
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While the tables in the Appendix A provide some insights into the causes of rollover fatal 
crashes, they are not able to show the effect of combined factors.  Therefore, a model of the 
TIFA was developed to help sort out the separate effect of the factors identified above.  The 
tables can be read to show the effect of the factors, one at a time, but in practice, the probability 
of rollover is the net effect of many factors working together.  A model estimates the individual 
effect of each factor, holding the other factors equal. 
 
The model is a binary logistic regression model, which assumes that the response variable is 
either 1 (rollover) or 0 (no rollover).  Essentially, logistic regression models the log odds of the 
response variable by the predictor variables.  The odds is defined as p/(1-p) where p is the 




where α is an intercept parameter and β’ is the vector of parameters. 
 
Table C-1 shows the variables and levels used in the model.  All the variables were considered in 
the TIFA tables in Appendix A.  For example, the configuration variable has two levels, tractor-
semitrailer and straight (straight truck with no trailer).  In the model tractor-semitrailer is 
assigned level 0 and straight truck is assigned 1.  Table A-19 showing rollover by configuration 
showed that configuration was associated with the probability of rollover in a fatal crash.  For the 
purpose of the model, each variable that was found to be associated was re-coded into two levels, 
with the exception of the percent of load category variable, which has three levels.  The purpose 
of the re-code was to define a baseline case with the lowest probability of rollover.  
 
The baseline case is a tractor-semitrailer, with a van cargo body, either empty or with cargo no 
more that 10 percent of GCW, not carrying hazmat, not on an Interstate, in an urban area, on a 
straight, level, not dry road.  Note that the design variable is set to zero for each factor for the 
baseline case.  The parameters in the model thus show the effect of each variable and interaction 
relative to the baseline case. 
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0 to 10 0      0 
Percent of Load 
Carried 11 to 50 1      0 
> 50 0      1 
No Hazmat 0 
Hazmat 
Hazmat 1 




Population Area  
Rural 1 
Not a Curve 0 
Road Alignment 
Curve 1 
Not a Grade 0 
Road Profile 
Grade 1 





Table C-2 show major parameters in the model.  These parameters are the statistics of interest. 
Most of the main effects are statistically significant.  There are some that are not but they are 
included in the model because there are significant interaction terms that are included.  For 
example, the parameter for body (tank) is not statistically significant, but the interaction between 
body type and percent of load carried is highly significant, so body stays in the model. 
 
For the purposes of model interpretation, note that the baseline case was set up to include all the 
factors with the lowest probability of roll.  The parameters show the effect of the characteristic 
relative to the baseline case.  All the main effects are positive, meaning they increase the odds of 
rollover.  In the case of hazmat, the parameter estimate is 0.3369.  This indicates that the main 
effect of hazmat is to increase the odds of roll.  To gauge the size of the effect, exponentiate the 
estimate (e0.3369=1.4) to determine that the straight condition increases the odds of rollover by 
about 40 percent.  Note that there is an interaction between configuration and percent of load 
carried. This means that the effect of straight varies depending on loading.  Loads in a straight 
have a different effect from loads in a tractor-semitrailer. 
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Square Pr > ChiSqParameter 
Intercept 1 -4.3618 0.1641 706.5825 <.0001 
configuration         straight 1 0.912 0.1746 27.2812 <.0001 
body type          tank 1 0.1815 0.2184 0.6912 0.4057 
Percent of load carried  
        11 to 50 1 0.7328 0.1489 24.209 <.0001 
  Percent of load carried      > 50 1 1.1712 0.138 72.066 <.0001 
hazmat            hazmat 1 0.3369 0.1254 7.2194 0.0072 
road  type        interstate 1 0.3606 0.0726 24.6739 <.0001 
Population area           rural 1 0.6536 0.0828 62.3513 <.0001 
Road alignment          curve 1 0.2068 0.2068 0.9999 0.3173 
Road profile        grade 1 0.4024 0.0727 30.6658 <.0001 
 
Surface Condition       dry 1 0.4375 0.0909 23.1512 <.0001 
body* Percent of load  tank       
11 to 50 1 0.915 0.2843 10.3583 0.0013 
body*  Percent of load tank        
> 50 1 0.8285 0.2454 11.3989 0.0007 
Percent of load *align   
    11 to 50   curve 1 0.7276 0.2445 8.8556 0.0029 
Percent of load *align   
       > 50       curve 1 1.1394 0.2285 24.8564 <.0001 
configuration*Percent of load  
straight       11 to 50 1 -0.3025 0.2201 1.8882 0.1694 
configuration* Percent of load  
straight       > 50 1 -0.8176 0.3266 6.2661 0.0123 
 
 
Table C-3 illustrates how the model can be used to estimate how the odds of a fatal accident 
including a rollover are increased as certain factors are changed from the baseline case.  The 
probability of a rollover is listed for all of the cases where a single factor is changed from the 
baseline case and for some of the cases where multiple factors are changed from the baseline.  It 
is impossible to include all combinations of factors because there are millions of possibilities.  
Therefore, samples of cases that show an increasing likelihood of rollover were selected.  One of 
these cases shows all of the possible road factors combined, while another case shows all of the 
possible vehicle factors combined.  Note that a small number of factors that tend to interact with 
each other can increase the likelihood of a rollover more than a larger number of other factors.  
For example, a case that only uses two factors (tank is  
>50 percent full and there is a curve) has a 30.3 percent chance of rolling over, while the case 
that uses all five road factors only has a 9.1 percent chance of rolling over.  The model shows 
that the worst case scenario, when all 10 factors are present, is about 335 times more likely to 
rollover than the baseline case.   
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Table C -  3 Example Cases from Model 
Case 
Odds Ratio for Rollover 




Baseline (TS, Van, 0-10% full, No Hazmat, 





Baseline except Straight 2.5 3.1% 
Baseline except Tank 1.2 1.5% 
Baseline except 10-50% full 2.1 2.6% 
Baseline except >50% full 3.2 4.0% 
Baseline except Hazmat 1.4 1.8% 
Road Factors 
Baseline except Interstate 1.4 1.8% 
Baseline except Rural 1.9 2.4% 
Baseline except Curve 1.2 1.5% 
Baseline except Grade 1.5 1.9% 
Baseline except Dry 1.5 1.9% 
Example Combination Cases 
Vehicle Factors 
Baseline except Tank and >50% full 8.9 10.2% 
Baseline except Straight, Tank, >50% full, and 
Hazmat. 13.6 14.8% 
Road Factors 
Baseline except Interstate, Rural, Curve, 
Grade, Dry 7.9 9.1% 
Vehicle and Road Factors Combined 
Baseline except Tank, >50% full, Curve 34.0 30.3% 
Baseline except Tank, >50% full, Curve, 
Grade, and Dry 78.8 50.1% 
Baseline except Baseline except Tank, >50% 
full, Interstate, Rural, Curve, Grade, and Dry 217.3 73.5% 
Worst Case (all factors opposite of baseline, 
uses >50% full) 334.6 81.0% 
 
 
Appendix D  
Vehicle Inventory And Use Survey
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The Bureau of Census conducts, as one of its quinquennial (every five years) economic surveys, 
a survey of truck owners. The survey used to be called the Truck Inventory and Use Survey, but 
in the most recent survey (2002), pickups, SUVs, and other light trucks were added, so it is now 
the Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey. 
 
The data are collected by means of a mailed survey that is filled out by registered truck owners. 
Respondents are required by law to complete and return the survey.  In 2002, about 98,000 
surveys were completed.  The VIUS is one of the few sources of detailed exposure data. 
 
In the top half of the table are estimated counts of the number of dry bulk or liquid/gas tankers, 
divided into tractor-combination vehicles and straight trucks, including straight trucks with 
trailers.  The estimated 26,057 straights with dry bulk tank cargo bodies seems unlikely.  It is 
possible that respondents are including grain bodies and other such cargo bodies.  About 19,000 
(3/4ths) are coded as being used in agriculture, forestry, fishing, or hunting, so these may not be 
true dry bulk tankers. 
 
Table D -  1 Estimates of Vehicles and Miles For Tank Trucks,  
2002 Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey 
TS & Double Straights Total 
Tank Type 
N % N % N % 
Dry Bulk 28,296 26.0 26,057 13.5 54,353 18.0 
Liquid/Gas 80,599 74.0 166,654 86.5 247,252 82.0 
Total 108,895 100.0 192,710 100.0 301,605 100.0 
Miles (millions) 
TS & Double Straights Total 
Tank Type 
N % N % N % 
Dry Bulk 1,855.64 25.0 191.92 8.2 2,047.56 21.0 
Liquid/Gas 5,565.14 75.0 2,152.14 91.8 7,717.28 79.0 
Total 7,420.78 100.0 2,344.07 100.0 9,764.84 100.0 
 
The VIUS data includes some information on cargoes carried, but not in a way that allows tanks 
for gases to be differentiated from tanks for liquids.  For example, the “basic chemicals” 
category is defined to include hydrogen, oxygen, hydrochloric acid, and chlorine.  So the above 
estimate is the most detailed available from VIUS. 
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Appendix E  
Survey Of Tank Truck Carrier Training Practices
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Commercial Vehicle Operator 
Training Survey 
 
Dear Transportation Industry/Training Company Professional:  
 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is currently working on an effort to 
gain a better understanding of commercial tank truck operator training programs.  As a 
representative of your company's safety and/or training efforts, we are eager to receive your 
insights on the following issues.  All information will remain confidential.  If you are available 
for potential follow-up questions and/or would like a copy of the final research report, please 
include your contact information.  Please note that all responses will be combined for the final 
report and your individual surveys will remain confidential. 
 
When you have completed the questionnaire, please fax to John Brock at (202-544-4783).  




Do you train drivers before they have a CDL? ____ 
 




Contact Information (optional) 
 
Company Name: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Name: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Phone Number and/or Email: _____________________________________________ 
 
Your Title and Department: ______________________________________________ 
 




Do you include air brake training?   YES__    NO__ 
 
How many students did you train in:  2002 _____2003________2004_______ 2005_______ So 
far, in 2006______ 
Of all of these students, how many went on to drive cargo tank motor vehicles?  _____________ 
 
 
Do you have specific training segments on preventing roll overs?  ____ 
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Now, tell us some specifics about your training program: 
 
What is your primary method for training?  Lectures__Films/videos__CBT__Web-based 
training__Textbooks__ 
 
Restricted In-vehicle driving   # of hours___________ 
Simulation     # of hours___________ 
Demonstrations    # of hours___________ 
On the Road driving    # of hours___________ 
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Do you obtain training materials from one or more vendors?   YES__ NO__ 
If YES, please list: 
 
VENDOR    MATERIALS/PRODUCTS 
 
_____________   ___________________________________ 
 
_____________   ___________________________________ 
 
______________   ____________________________________ 
 
______________   ____________________________________ 
 
Please rate the effectiveness of each training method you use.  Use the following scale: 
1=not effective, 2=marginally effective, 3=effective, 4=very effectively, 5=most effective 
 
Lectures    _______________ 
Films/videos    _______________ 
CBT     _______________  
Web-based training   _______________  
Textbooks    _______________ 
Restricted In-vehicle driving  _______________ 
Simulation    _______________ 
Demonstrations   _______________ 
On the Road driving   _______________ 
 
 
We believe that training leads to safer drivers.  However, there isn’t a lot of hard evidence 
that this is true.  We would like to know if you have any records or data that show that 
your graduates have better safety records than drivers who have not had your training.  
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Appendix F  
Assumptions For The Benefit-Cost Analysis
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Element Data       Source 
      General Assumptions 
Discount Rate 0.07       
United States Whitehouse Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB), Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-
4, 2003. 
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-
4.pdf last accessed November 17, 2006]   
Year to discount to 2007       Current year   
Annual Wage Growth  (ECI) 0.0367       
Average annual change % change in the 
Employment Cost Index from Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (www.bls.gov) (2001-2005) 
[http://www.bls.gov/news.release/eci.toc.htm last 
accessed January 19, 2007]   
Annual average Inflation 0.0262       
Average annual change in the Producer Price Index 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov) (2001-
2005)   
         
      Rollovers Addressed 
  Number Annually         
All Rollovers -- HAZMAT Tankers 680       Table 2-8   
Tractors pulling HAZMAT tank 
trailers-GES 405       
Table 2-8 
  
Tractors pulling HAZMAT tank 
trailers-MCMIS 181       
Table 2-8 
  
  Tanker Design (Upper) 251       Petroleum Tank Trailers, Section 7.2.1, including 
Table 7-1   Tanker Design (Lower) 112       
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Element Data       Source 
  Electronic Stability Aid         
Section 7.2.1 
  Untripped 41 40.8     
  SVRD with Untripped 0       
  SVRD with Tripped 0       
  SVRD without rollover 0       
  Total 41       
              
Training         
Calculated using the driver age distributions [Global 
Insight, 2005, "U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: Analysis 
and Forecasts," prepared for ATA.], driver crash 
distributions from Table 7-22, and the total rollover 
number from Table 2-8. 
  
  MCMIS version 6       
  GES version 30       
         
      Efficacy Rates 
  Tanker Design         
Table 3-10   Lower CG 0.118       
  Wider Track 0.167       
  Aggressive Improvement 0.3       
Electronic Stability Aid 0.53       Section 5.4.4   
Training 0.1       
Estimate based on industry interviews.   
  
         











All Rollovers 0.2939 0.3692 0.2282 0.1087 GES   
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Element Data       Source 
2000 dollars     Cost of Crash Severity 
  Property damage $11,953       Zaloshnja, Eduard, and Ted Miller (2002).  Revised 
Costs of Large Truck- and Bus Involved Crashes, 
Final Report for Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration.  Pacific Institute for Research and 
Evaluation. 
[http://ai.volpe.dot.gov/carrierresearchresults/PDFs/
Truck_Crash_Costs_2002_Final.pdf last accessed 
January 15, 2007] 
  Non-Incapacitating $70,680       
  Incapacitating $225,507       
  Fatal $3,645,273       
2007 dollars     Cost of Spills per Crash 
Clean up, Environmental 
Damage, and Evacuation cost of 
HAZMAT spills per crash $23,177       
Updated from--From Greenberg FMCSA Report, 
3/2001, Tables 30, 33, and 38 of: “Comparative 
Risks of Hazardous Materials and Non-Hazardous 
Materials Truck Shipment Accidents/Incidents" 
  
  Specific to Flammable Liquids $27,957       
         
2007      Fleet Characteristics 
Number of Gasoline Tank 
Trailers 20,000       Appendix G   
Growth of Gasoline Tanker Fleet 0.015       
Appendix G.  5 and 20 year annual average 
increase in gasoline deliveries in the US.  From EIA 
[http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mgfupus1m.ht
m]     
Number of tractors for HAZMAT 
Tank Trailers 53,450       
2002 Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey 
[http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/vius/products.htm
l], count of trucks with "Yes" for Hazmat and Trailer 
type "12" for Liquid or gaseous tanks.   
Growth Rate for Tractors for 
HAZMAT Tank Trailers 0.015       
Default set to the same rate as the gasoline tanker 
fleet   
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Element Data       Source 
Age  Fitted %     Age Distribution of  Trailers 
    0 10.06%     
Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey 
[http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/vius/products.html], 
model years of heavy trucks, % of fleet regressed on 
Age, then rescaled to add up to 100% of vehicles 
being 15 years or younger, and calculated implied 
retirement rates.  See Appendix H for details.   
    1 9.55%     
    2 9.04%     
    3 8.54%     
    4 8.03%     
    5 7.52%     
    6 7.01%     
    7 6.50%     
    8 6.00%     
    9 5.49%     
    10 4.98%     
    11 4.47%     
    12 3.96%     
    13 3.46%     
    14 2.95%     
    15 2.44%     
      Fitted Age Distribution of Tractors 
    Age Fitted %     
Calculated based on distribution of tractors that pull 
hazmat tankers from2 002 Vehicle Inventory and Use 
Survey 
[http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/vius/products.html], 
count of trucks with "Yes" for Hazmat and Trailer type 
"12" for Liquid or gaseous tanks.--regressed % on 
Age them rescaled to get 100% of vehicles 10 years 
or younger, and calculated implied retirement rates. 
See Appendix H for details. 
    0 0.1357     
    1 0.1268     
    2 0.1178     
    3 0.1088     
    4 0.0999     
    5 0.0909     
    6 0.0819     
    7 0.0730     
    8 0.0640     
    9 0.0551     
    10 0.0461     
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Element Data       Source 
      Market Penetration 
Tanker Design             
Lower CG 1       Assumption: 100% of new HAZMAT tank trailers   
Wider Track 0.5       
Assumption: only half of the destinations will be able 
to accommodate the wider track.   
Aggressive Improvement 1       Assumption: 100% of new HAZMAT tank trailers   
Electronic Stability Aid 1       Assumption: 100% of new HAZMAT tank trailers   
Training 1       Assumption: 100% of new HAZMAT tank trailers   
         
      Driver Age Distribution & Crashes 
Age Distribution of Drivers 
Year: 
2000           
  <25 0.034       
[Global Insight, 2005, "U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: 
Analysis and Forecasts," prepared for ATA.] 
  25-35 0.21       
  35-45 0.328       
  45-55 0.263       
  55-65 0.139       
  >65 0.028       
  Total 1.00       
Age Distribution in Crashes – 
MCMIS             
  <25 0.048       
Table 2-40 
  25-35 0.23       
  35-45 0.33       
  45-55 0.206       
  55-65 0.155       
  >65 0.027       
  Total 1.00       
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Element Data       Source 
Age Distribution in Crashes - GES             
  <25 0.0774       
Table 2-40 
  25-35 0.2397       
  35-45 0.3229       
  45-55 0.2483       
  55-65 0.0918       
  >65 0.0198       
  Total 1.00       
         
      Driver population characteristics 
Driver per tractor 1.14       
Weighted mean from MCMIS data. See Appendix J 
for details.      
Replacement rate (growth plus 
turnover/retirement) 0.042       [Global Insight, 2005, "U.S. Truck Driver Shortage: Analysis and Forecasts," prepared for ATA.]   
  Growth in # of drivers 0.022       
Annual Phase In of Training 0.2       
Assumption to acknowledge deployment of training 
will not be instantaneous.   
              
          Purchase costs 
  2007 dollars         
Alternative Tanker Design             
Lower CG 2000       The costs for the lower CG and the wider track are 
the mid range of quotes from manufacturers who 
offer such products.  The cost for the aggressive 
improvement is the estimate from a manufacturer 
who considered designing such a product. 
  
  Wider Track 500       
  Aggressive Improvement 12,000       
              
Electronic Stability Control 619       Quote for the option from a tractor dealer.   
Training Equipment             
Simulator Cost 300,000       Quote from a vendor   
simulator runs per year 512       
2 sessions per machine per day * 5 days per week * 
52 weeks minus 8 holidays   
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Element Data       Source 
      Recurrent Costs 
  Electronic Stability Control         Failure rate from Battelle, 2003. 
  Annual Parts Failure Rate 0.0019       
Training             
Annual Cost of PC plus software 2000       estimate   
PC runs per year 252       
1 session per machine per day * 5 days per week*52 
weeks minus 8 holidays   
             
Annual Maintenance Contract on 
Simulator 6000       Quote from a vendor    
  Warranty time in years 1       
Electronic Stability Control - Training             
hourly $19.32 2005 dollars   
From the US Dept of Labor's Occupational 
Employment and Wages Series, for job category 53-
3032, "Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer." 
Fringe benefit rate supplied by FMCSA in support of 
Battelle, 2003. 
  
  fringe benefits 31.0%       
Hours 1       From Battelle, 2003.   
Drivers per tractor 1.1       
Developed with MCMIS data. See Appendix J for 
details.   
Student Driver Wage $12.98 2005 dollars   
25th percentile of US Dept of Labor's Occupational 
Employment and Wages Series, for job category 53-
3032, "Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer."   
Experienced Driver Wage $20.55 2005 dollars   
75th percentile of US Dept of Labor's Occupational 
Employment and Wages Series, for job category 53-
3032, "Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer."   
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Element Data       Source 
Status Quo Training Hours per student         
  Hours of 15 to 1 training 40       estimate of current practice 
  Hours of 1 to 1 training 16       
        
Alternative Training Hours per student      
  Hours of 15 to 1 training 24       
estimate based on a carrier’s experience with 
simulators 
  Hours of 1 to 1 training 12       
  
Hours of technology assisted 
training 6       
  Hours of simulator training 3       
      
 Annualizing Costs         
 Relevant financing rate     
  
10 year interest rate bond yield (A 
through AA) 0.055       Yahoo Bond Center 
[http://finance.yahoo.com/bonds/composite_bon
d_rates] provided courtesy of Valubond.   
  15 year bond yield (A through AA) 0.057       
 20 year bond yield (A through AA) 0.059    
     
 Economic Life of Equipment  Years     
 Vehicle Designs 15    life of a HM cargo tank semitrailer 
 Electronic Stability Control 10    life of a tractor in the HM cargo tank industry 
 Training Simulators 30    estimate 
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In 2003, the National Tank Truck Carriers surveyed its membership and counted 10,648 
petroleum-hauling semitrailers2.  As their report noted, not all operators of such tankers are 
members of the organization, so this is a lower bound of the populations.  One of the highest 
estimates in the same docket, 60,0003 would provide a possible upper bound, though several 
contributors noted that a portion of the counted vehicles were not carrying petroleum but may 
have been subject to the rule then pending.  There is no precise number for the number of 
semitrailers currently in service delivering petroleum, but all of the numbers proposed were 
within the same order of magnitude and in fact within a reasonable range.  For the purpose of the 
present study, the number was taken to be 20,000.   
 
For the economic analysis, the growth in the population of these vehicles will be assumed to be 
equal to a projection of the recent growth rate in petroleum products supplied, as reported by the 
Energy Information Administration.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Thomas P. Lynch, Vice President and General Counsel, National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.  June 10, 2003.  
Document RSPA-1999-6223-16.  http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?documentid=245685&docketid=6223 
3 Cindy Gordon, Senior Associate, American Petroleum Institute.  June 10, 2003.  Document RSPA-1999-6223-22.  
http://dms.dot.gov/search/document.cfm?documentid=246150&docketid=6223 
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Year 
Motor Gasoline Product Supplied, 













Appendix H  
Historical Profiles For Tractor And Trailer Fleets
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Phasing in of new tractors and trailers for both benefits (how much of the fleet is cover by the 
new efficacy rate) and costs (how many vehicles should annualized purchase costs and other 
costs be applied for) requires understanding the age of the existing fleet which implies something 
about how vehicles are rotated out of the fleet.  The richest data source for this type of 
information is the Census Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS).  This data serves as the 
basis for an approach to profiling the fleet that was applied to the vehicle designs trailers and the 
electronic stability control tractors. 
 
While the tractors that pull HAZMAT tank trailers can be specifically identified in the VIUS, the 
trailers themselves are not categorically represented.  However, some basis was required to 
profile the fleet, so the assumption was made that the age distribution for all heavy trucks would 
not be significantly different from the age distribution of trailers.  Using the model year (not to 
be confused with the purchase year) variable in the VIUS, a distribution of the age of all heavy 
trucks was constructed for 2002, which is presented in Figure H-1. 
 
 
Figure H -  1 Percent of Trucks by Age 
 
The distribution shows a clear decline across age, with bumps attributable to random variation 
and ups and downs in the industry (carriers by more trucks when times are good).  These bumps 
are irrelevant to this analysis as we are not forecasting business cycles for the industry to 
incorporate into the analysis.  Under this distribution, about 87 percent of vehicles are 15 years 
old or less.  Because we expect that the gasoline hauling tank trailers will be among the newer 
vehicles on the road, the assumption was made to disregard the tail of the distribution that is in 
excess of 15 years of age. 
 
In order to smooth out the bumps in the distribution, the percent of vehicles of each year of age 
up to and including 15 years was regressed on the age.  The R-squared for this regression was 
0.82.  The results are represented in Figure H-2. 
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Figure H -  2 Percent of Trucks by Age, Fitted and Actual 
 
The fitted distribution was proportionally rescaled to reflect 100 percent (since the underlying 
data only summed to 87 percent) and applied to the base number of gasoline hailing tank trailers 
(described in Appendix G) to form the fleet profile.  The year by year retirement rates implied by 
the fitted distribution were then applied to move the fleet across time for the analysis, with new 
vehicles of age zero being introduced to make up for both those lost to retirement and growth in 
the fleet.  At the fifteenth year of age the remaining vehicles, which are a relatively small 
fraction of what they originally15 years previous in year zero, are all retired for the next period. 
 
The fleet profile was developed and applied in the same way for the tractors that pull HAZMAT 
tank trailers.  However, the HAZMAT status variable and the type of cargo pulled variable in the 
VIUS allowed for identification of the specific type of vehicle (unlike the generalization required 
for the gasoline tank trailers).  Figure H-3 presents the actual distribution of the ages of these 
truck tractors. 
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Figure H -  3 Percent of Tractors Pulling Tankers HAZMAT by Age 
 
Here, 90 percent of the trucks are ten years or younger, which is the assumed economic life of 
these trucks for this analysis.  Even though the distribution is cut off for 10 years of age, the 
aggregate number of trucks in this category is maintained at the observed level (with the 
remaining vehicles being implicitly reallocated proportionately across the other years when the 
total number of vehicles is applied to the new distribution).  The same types of bumps are present 
as for the general trucks data, requiring the same regression procedure to smooth the distribution 
to build the fleet profile.  Following are the results of the regression in Figure H-4. 
 
 
Figure H -  4 Percent of Tractors Pulling Tankers HAZMAT by Age, Fitted and Actual 
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This data could be considered to be significantly “bumpier,” producing an R-squared statistic of 
0.66.  This fitted distribution was rescaled and applied to the tractors for the electronic stability 
control in the same way that the general truck distribution was used for the vehicle designs. 
 
This VIUS data were also the source for the total number of trucks for the electronic stability 
control approach (53,450).  The VIUS data were collected for 2002.  This requires that the 2002 
number of trucks be adjusted to 2007 (the common year for all base data) according to the same 
fleet growth factor (based on the growth in gasoline deliveries, 0.015 percent) used for growth in 
the fleet across time for both the vehicle design and the electronic stability control.  This 
produces a base of 57,581 relevant trucks for 2007. 
 
Appendix J  
Number of Drivers for Hazmat-Carrying Cargo Tanks
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Calculating costs of the training approach requires knowing approximately how many drivers 
there are of tractors that pull HAZMAT cargo tank trailers. Because the VIUS (see Appendix H) 
identifies the relevant number of truck tractors, one approach for determining the number of 
drivers is to determine the number of drivers per truck. 
 
The MCMIS Census data were queried for HAZMAT carriers.  Specifically, the query selected 
carriers with the HM designation and business in either LIQGAS, OILFIELD, or CHEM. 
 
The query was further limited to those that had at least one owned leased regular or HM trailer.  
The ratio of drivers to power units was figured for each carrier, and the distribution was plotted 
as Figure J-1.  “Large” carriers are those with more than 10 power units. 
 
 
Figure J -  1 Drivers per Power Unit 
 
The data clearly shows that the most common policy is for carriers to have one driver per power 
unit.  Rather than relying just on the apparent mode, the mean was calculated—it came to 1.1 
drivers per power unit, which is the number that was used in the analysis.  This mean is not 
weighted by the number of drivers at each carrier—but because the distribution across the larger 
and smaller carriers is so similar, carrier size is not thought to affect the analysis.  Applying the 
1.1 drivers per tractor to the relevant 57,581 tractors produces 63,339 drivers for 2007. 
 
The industry representatives interviewed for this project consistently reported the ratio of drivers 
to power units as higher than 1.1, with 2.5 being a common response.  Using a number as high as 
2.5 drivers per tractor does not change the relative results of the benefit cost ratios, though it 
does increase cost slightly for the electronic stability control because it has a small, limited 
training element.  It also increases both cost savings from labor and the cost of required 
simulators for the training approach.
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Wyoming Highway Plan
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